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"The happy man will have
the attribute of permanence.
-Aristotle, Ethics. Bk I
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ABSTRACT
This enquiry first establishes both the importance and
the

general

meaning

Rousseau's corpus.

of

the

notions

of

happiness

in

Both private and public happiness are

seen as the overarching intent of his life as a thinker.
The possibility of a tertiary notion of happiness— between
private and public— is presented with the introduction of
the subject work Julie: or The New Heloise.
Themes considered at some length are passion/virtue,
happiness/duty, love/friendship, as well as the notions of
Platonic and courtly love— not to mention the dichotomy
motion/rest.
At the end of Part One of the novel, the lovers are
forcibly separated, and the tasks of reconciling the above
dichotomies must be accomplished in other than physical
terms.

Parts Two and Three are portrayed as a classic

example of the passion myth playing itself out until the
symbolic deaths of the lovers— he goes to sea and she
marries at her father's demand.
The remainder of the story chronicles the reign of
morality and extreme sublimation.

Passion and virtue are

eventually reconciled in the death of the heroine Julie, but
not

before

she

offers

a vision

reconciliation and fulfillment.

v

of

a viable means

of

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Julie; or The New Heloise is a political novel in that
it deals with mores that govern human passions.

One might

even presume that the work formulates an ethic of love.
Besides, one can assume that anything a philosopher creates
also partakes of philosophic discovery.
the Julie:

And so it is with

an interplay of the poet and the philosopher.

And, yes, there are conflicts.
Julie, philosophy

formulates

I would say that, in the
the question— that

of

the

possible reconciliation of passion and virtue— and poetry
dares a resolution.
Much of this study reads like a commentary, for it was
judged that such a form of analysis was best suited to a
philosophical
argument.

novel,

where

there

was

both

story

and

Also, a novel of letters, as this one is, does

not include an all-seeing or synthesizing first or third
person; the commentator fills that role as best he can.
This study divides the novel into three parts:
love affair itself

(Part I); 2)

1)

the

the period of forced

separation of the lovers (Parts II and III); and 3)

the

lovers' reunion and attempt to salvage love on other than
physical terms (Parts IV, V, and VI).
It is my contention that love and virtue are reconciled
only

incidentally

Rousseau,

within

through his

the

novel

paradigmatic

1

itself,

personage

but

that

of Julie,

offers

a

effected.

vision

of

how

that

reconciliation

night

be

In offering his answer to this age-old question

of the private and the public, Rousseau borrows, at least in
part,

from past ages,

as the title of his work would

indicate.
This study does not pretend to be a comprehensive
treatment of the Julie: rather, its essential concern is how
happiness is viewed and pursued by Rousseau's characters
and, by interpolation, by Rousseau himself.

And, of course,

within the confines of a love story, as this one is, the
question of happiness becomes the question of love.

In

fact, whereas the Julie is not meant to be a comprehensive
statement on happiness, it might rather be a comprehensive
statement on love and happiness; for it shows how happiness
might be attained within the context of love.
doorway turns out to be rather narrow.

And that

It is so narrow— so

tenuous— that its attainment is offered only as a vision.

CHAPTER 2
BETWEEN PRIVATE AND PUBLIC HAPPINESS
It will prove both useful and necessary to situate the
question of happiness within the confines of Rousseauean
works other than The New Heloise.

Such an investigation

serves not only to accentuate the importance of the subject
for Rousseau, but also to determine if it is given different
meaning and weight in different works.

To be examined

within this chapter are On the Social Contract. Emile. The
Confessions, and The Reveries of the Solitary Walker.
In the study of any political philosopher— in the study
of any philosopher or, for that matter, of any person of
letters— one should be able to question the overarching
intent of the work and receive from the text at least a
thoughtful

attempt at

an answer.

When

one

asks

this

ultimate question of Rousseau'sjcorpus, the most ubiquitous
and

logically necessary intention seems to

be that

of

defining and promoting both private and public happiness.
In a more than superficial sense, Rousseau returns us
to Aristotle and the ancient eudaemonistic understanding of
human behavior.

To his question "What is the fascination

with Rousseau?" Arthur M. Melzer ultimately has a concise
answer:

"In a word, he boldly insists on pushing beyond the

tame, manageable issue of comfortable self-preservation to

3

confront the whole, messy, complex question of happiness.1,1
This kinship between Aristotle and Rousseau holds true
surely if we define eudaemonism as that ethical theory which
upholds the highest ethical good to be happiness.

If we add

to this bare bones definition of eudaemonism the requirement
that reason be the essential element in the pursuit of
happiness, then the kinship becomes almost purely heuristic:
for

Aristotle,

humankind

is

essentially

rational;

for

Rousseau, humankind is essentially free.
One might foresee conflicts,

or at least tensions,

between the private and the public notions of happiness in
whoever thinks seriously about the good of man.

These

tensions exist in a fundamental way in both Aristotle and
Rousseau, and, perhaps, that is the source and substance of
their kinship.

For example, one might ask:

Does the same

thing render a private individual and a (public) citizen
happy?

Is it possible for a citizen to be both rational and

free, or either one of the two?

Aristotle resorts to a sort

of dualism— the differentiation of moral and intellectual
virtue or perfection.

And Rousseau will unearth what he

sees as the ultimate conflict between truth and life itself;
he may be seen as a sort of naturalist who, at the end of

‘Arthur M. Melzer, The Natural Goodness of Man: On the
System of Rousseau/s Thought (Chicago: The University Press
of Chicago, 1990), p. ix.

day, has only happiness and its phenomenological elements as
his guide.
The position that happiness is, in fact, Rousseau's
ultimate

occupation

needs

some

textual

justification,

although a general meditation on just about any of his
writings would yield just such a conclusion.
first,

demonstrate

that Rousseau's

expressed

I shall,
intent

in

writing was, in fact, individual and collective happiness.
I shall then briefly explicate the notion of happiness as it
appears in the above mentioned works.

Such a procedure will

provide for the reader of the Julie a context in which to
situate Rousseau's treatment of happiness in that novel.
Happiness as the Intent
At the heading of his first publication, The First
Discourse. Rousseau,

simultaneously,

humbles reason and

enthrones happiness as the goal of his deliberations.
Here is one of the greatest and noblest questions
ever debated [Has the restoration of the sciences
and arts tended to purify or corrupt morals?].
This discourse is not concerned with those
metaphysical subtleties that have prevailed in
all parts of learning and from which the
announcements of Academic competitions are not
always exempt; rather, it is a matter of one of
those truths that concern the happiness of
mankind.2
The logic of the above statement would make the question of
happiness itself an even greater and nobler question than

2 Jean-Jacques
Rousseau,
The
First
Discoursef
Translated by Roger D. Masters and Judith R. Masters (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1964), p. 33.

the one posed for the competition, which in itself, is "one
of the greatest and noblest questions ever debated."
The intention of Rousseau— his philosophic and poetic
focus— remained
writings.

constant

throughout

the

course

of

his

Twelve years later, in the Preface of Emile, he

identifies himself and his philosophizing with the very
notion of happiness.

Rousseau is saying that he believes

that he has an obligation to propose his ideas to the
public,
for the maxims concerning which I am of an
opinion different from that of others are not
matters of indifference.
They are among those
whose truth or falsehood is important to know and
which make the happiness or the unhappiness of
mankind.3
In that same year,

1762, Rousseau published On the

Social Contract, wherein,

it may be argued, he strongly

intimated that the end or objective of his masterpiece of
political philosophy was none other than happiness.

This

contention that the explicit intention of On the Social
Contract is the furtherance of public happiness should be
viewed within Rousseau's
philosophy:

Rousseau

general
believes

critique
that

of

Hobbesian

individuals

societies have some capacity for happiness

and

(after all,

humans are by nature good); whereas Hobbes sees only a

3 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile: or. On Educationr
Translated and Prefaced by Allan Bloom. (New York: Basic
Books, 1979), p. 34.

diminution of pain and a delaying of death as the ultimate
political
capable

successes.

of

greater

bellicose natural man.

Rousseau's primitive
heights

than

Hobbes's

innocent
cunning

is
and

But how does Rousseau inform us that

the intent of On the Social Contract is the happiness of the
citizens living under such a regime?
In the Introduction to Book I, Rousseau tells us that
his goal is "legitimate and reliable rule"— taking men and
their interests as they are and laws and right as they can
be.

A harmony of "justice and utility" seems to be his

ultimate goal.

Immediately, however, after defining what

seem to be his ultimate goals, he advances the issue one
step further toward a more encompassing perspective.
he writes:

First,

"I start in without proving the importance of my

subject."4 If the balancing of "justice and utility" be not
proof of the importance of his book, then what is?

The

proof must be in demonstrating the importance of the effects
of the balancing of "justice and utility."

I contend that

the intended effect of the harmony of justice and utility is
happiness of the citizen.

No wonder he does not prove the

importance of his subject— his subject is a foundational
principle (as Aristotle would say, it is the end and never
a means).

4 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contractr
Translated by Judith R. Masters (New York:
St. Martin's
Press, 1978), p. 46.

Almost immediately after stating that he has not proven
the importance of reconciling justice and utility, Rousseau
begins to muse about being "born a citizen of a free State"
and how the right to vote there imposes public duties.
concludes this meditation by saying:

He

"And I am happy,

everytime I meditate about government, always to find in my
research new reasons to love that of my country!"5 In other
words, Rousseau has been made happy, as a citizen, by a
state that resembles, at least in the essential of giving a
political voice and vote to its people, that state which he
is recommending in On the Social Contract.

Rousseau, it

seems, wishes to play the role of none other than the
legislator who would bring happiness to humankind by means
of a new ethos, as well as new institutions.
In the last months of his life— some fifteen years
after On the Social Contract— Rousseau boldly states in the
Sixth Walk of The Reveries of the Solitary Walker that, if
he had been given the proverbial ring of Gyges, "Only the
sight of public felicity could have affected my heart with
a permanent feeling, and the ardent desire to contribute to
it would have been my most constant passion."6

Here is a

5 On the Social Contract, p.46.
6 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Reveries of the Solitary
Walker.
Translated and Interpretation by Charles E.
Butterworth (New York: New York University Press, 1979), p.
82.

prince who can only be a prince if he has the capability of
living his passion:

contributing to public happiness.

Rousseau's Thoughts on Happiness
For Rousseau,
experiences

of

true

man is naturally good,

happiness

are

linked

to

and his
love

and

goodness.7 Although Rousseau agrees with Hobbes on the nonteleological

understanding

of

life

and

the

self,

he

disagrees with Hobbes that "felicity is a continual progress
of the desire, from one object to another."8
taking as model the

For Hobbes,

anxiety-ridden urban man,

life

is

opposition— a continuous flight from evil; for Rousseau,
taking as model peasants, savages, and even lower animals,
life is attraction to a "delicious idleness," but also
attraction to a "positive affection for oneself and for
simply being."9 Rousseau, critiquing Hobbes's myopic view
of human nature, saw that man was an unfortunate product of
history and that it might be possible to return— not to some
point of idyllic and unchanging human nature, for such a
nature, in the Aristotelian sense of nature, never existed,
but to an earlier period when man was more in tune with
himself and less at odds with his world.10

7 Melzer, p. 32.
8 Melzer, p. 37, quoting Thomas Hobbes, De Homine XI15:54.
9 Melzer, p. 38.
10 Melzer, p. 51 n. 3.
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Despite insistent "Kantian"

interpretations of

Rousseau, Melzer contends, as mentioned above, that Rousseau
held to the "traditional view that the good is prior to the
right" and that "justice must ultimately be judged before
the bar of happiness.1,11

This represents the essential

element of eudaemonism— the primacy of happiness as the
justification of moral acts.

Even Ernst Cassirer,

ultimately

a

conclude:

views

Rousseau

as

non-eudaemonist,

who
must

"From the outset, [Rousseau's] whole thought was

moved by the problem of happiness:

its aim was to find a

harmonious union of virtue and happiness."12 But it is less
the unjust or immoral man than it is the disunified man who
presents

the

more

tragically

fundamental

picture

of

unhappiness:
Always in contradiction with himself, always
floating between his inclination and his duties
[happiness and virtue], he will never be either
man or citizen.
He will be good neither for
himself nor for others. He will be one of these
men of our days: A Frenchman, an Englishman, a
bourgeois. He will be nothing.13
Strictly speaking, there are two opposing resolutions for
the above described vacillation:

a resolute public person

(a good citizen) or a resolute private person (a dreamer).
It is in On the Social Contract that Rousseau offers his

11 Melzer, p. 62.
12Ernst Cassirer, The Question of Jean-Jaccrues Rousseau
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954), p. 70.
13 Emile. I 40.

11

political solution, which, in great part, is an explicit and
implicit description of what a true citizen would be.
It is in The Reveries, however, that Rousseau offers
the (mutually exclusive?) private solution:
A simple and permanent state . . . where the soul
finds a base sufficiently solid on which to rest
entirely and to gather there all its being,
without the need to recall the past or encroach
on the future; where time is nothing for it,
where the present lasts forever without even
marking its duration and without any trace of
succession, without any other sentiment of
privation or of enjoyment, of pleasure or of
pain, of desire or fear, but alone of our
existence, which sentiment is able to fill the
soul entirely.14
Though hardly compatible with civil society, this private
solution would seem, according to Melzer, to. be of value as
a point de reoere for less radically private resolutions.
But one senses something unique and peculiarly new about
what Rousseau sees and how he proposes to correct it.

For

one, nature is good; it was (is) man who corrupts man, of
course, with the complicity of historical accidents.

One

would then think that the way to repair man would be to
return simply to his original nature.

The problem there is

that man has no changeless nature and no telos.
infinitely malleable, or theoretically so.

He is

What then is

Rousseau's advice for the restoration of man's authenticity?
Melzer explains:

14 Melzer, p. 66.

12

Any way of life of reasonable extent is good,
regardless of content, provided only that it is
internally consistent.
Rousseau is the first
thinker thus to complete man's liberation from
God and nature:
to abandon all substantive
standards, natural or divine, and to replace them
with the formal standard of psychic unity or non
contradiction .15
The two paths to wholeness actually proposed by Rousseau
were

complete

selflessness

(the

selfishness

(reveries)

community); extreme

extreme collectivism.

or

complete

individualism

or

These were his ways of eliminating

personal dependence and returning to unity— the ultimate
human problem and its resolution.16

15Melzer, p. 90.
16J. L. Talmon is quick to say that Rousseau never
decided if it was better or worse to be alone.
"The only
salvation for this agony [of "wavering between his
inclinations and duties"], if a return to the untroubled
state of nature was impossible, was either a complete selfabandonment to the elemental impulses or to "denature
(denaturer) man" altogether." The Origins of Totalitarian
Democracy (London:
Seeker and Warburg, 1955), pp. 38-39.
Talmon speaks of Rousseau's question as if it were his
conclusion, or even his prescription. In answer to one horn
of the dilemma, Ronald Grimsley writes IJean-Jacques
Rousseau— A Study in Self-Awareness (Cardiff: University of
Wales Press, 1969): "It may be said at once that [Rousseau]
does not attempt to solve the problem of frustrated passion
through development of some kind of anarchic individualism.
On the contrary, Saint-Preux/Rousseau tends to suggest the
spiritualization of his attitude through the elaboration of
a Platonic outlook which sets very definite limits to any
excessively individualistic attitude." (p. 130) And, on the
other hand, the Social Contract, though "denaturing" to
Talmonl, is viewed by Grimsley as fulfilled and protected
"participation in a social life based on the ultimate truth
and integrity of the 'law'." (p. 322)

The

work

of

antitheses:

Rousseau

is

charged,

solitude/community,

naturalism/self-conquest and so on.

in

fact,

with

idleness/activity,
These dichotomies are

not the result of confusion on Rousseau's part, but rather
"the

logical

consequence

of his

analysis

of

society's

contradictions and indeed a testament to the rigorous and
unflinching consistency of his thought."17
What is common to both poles of these antitheses is
"freedom."

Individualism

is

characterized by

"natural

freedom"; the political solution is characterized by "civil
and moral freedom." For Rousseau, freedom was the essential
condition of the good life.
wholeness
freedom.18

and

unity

Rousseau

of

Thus,

all restorations of

humankind

blends

liberal

must

account

for

(or

modern)

and

classical thought to arrive at a radical humanism:

"he will

bring true unity and happiness to men not by uplifting them
to some divine or transcendent standard, but by preventing
them from using and ruining each other."19
But, finally, Rousseau radicalized the argument beyond
the domain of modern and ancient premises by belittling the
rational and social principles which formed the bases of
Hobbesian thought and by doubting the highest of the high—

17 Melzer, p. 91.
18 Melzer, 91.
19 Melzer, p. 112.

i.e., religion or ultimate happiness— and by placing the
revival of unity and happiness in the care of man's animal
goodness

(the bodily,

the animal,

sentimental, the passionate).M

the

instinctive,

the

The attainment of unity and

happiness would appear a simple matter— just maintain an
original animality.

But the preservation of a natural

goodness proves "to require as much wisdom and to be as rare
and difficult as the perfection of the soul had formerly
been thought to be."

This is the irony of Rousseau's

project and, as Melzer bleakly concludes, it is "a study in
the

pessimistic

consequences

Heloise. I contend,

offers

of

humanism. "2I

a resolution,

The

New

though not

a

universal one and not a facile one.
On the Social Contract
Having touched on the importance of the concept of
happiness for Rousseau, this investigation will now focus on
a study of happiness in four of his major works:

On the

Social Contract. Emile. The Confessions, and The Reveries of
the

Solitary

Walker.

Two

of

these

works

are

autobiographical and two are more or less political in
nature; the latter two works were intended to be of use to
humankind in a public way.

Of the two non-autobiographical

works, On the Social Contract claims to demonstrate how to

20 Melzer, p. 286.
21 Melzer, p. 287.
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make men, as citizens, happy; and Emile attempts to educate
not necessarily a citizen or a philosopher but someone
capable of maintaining a sort of goodness and happiness even
while living within (a corrupt) society.
According

to

Charles

Butterworth,

Rousseau's

non-

autobiographical works were "intended for the common good of
his fellow men."
In these writings, Rousseau addressed himself to
the problems that beset man in general. . . .All
of these works had the same basic goal:
to
destroy the prejudices which gave rise to the
vices
and
misfortunes
besetting
men
or,
differently stated, to persuade men to stop
admiring the arts and sciences which enslave them
and to stop scorning the useful virtues which
could bring them happiness.22
On the Social Contract is an answer to the situation
and its historical genesis described in the two discourses.
History had dumbly conspired to bring humankind to a state
of general slavery,
Social

Contract

alienation,

would

describe

and unhappiness; On the
the

only way

over

the

impasse.
Rousseau looks to the past for his ideal of "man's
happy freedom" and to the future for the establishment of a
regime in accord with the nature of man, a nature replete
with contradictions:

primarily expressed in the dichotomy

“ Charles E. Butterworth, "Interpretive Essay" to The
Reveries of the Solitary Walker
(Indianapolis:
Hackett
Publishing, 1992), p. 152.
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of political society and the state of nature.23

Whereas

Hobbes considers only the condition of happiness— life,
Rousseau goes further in an attempt to discover what would
make men happy, or:

What is the good life?

In his pursuit of happiness, Rousseau challenges the
whole of the Enlightenment— not only do the sciences and
arts not improve morality, they corrupt it and contribute to
the unhappiness of man.

Sparta is presented as the refuge

of real men— a city founded on civic virtue.

But "Rousseau

is a republican; he is a republican because he believes men
are naturally free and equal" and, therefore, that only a
republic could make men happy.24
Because civic virtue is the core of the republican
regime,

moral

education— not

enlightenment

from

the

sciences— is "the prerequisite of sound civil society."
Rousseau praises ancient deeds and practice, specifically
the perceived necessity of civic virtue.

But he joins the

moderns in denying man's political nature and, for that
matter, he denies that man has any nature in the ancient or
teleological sense of the word.

The state is artifice-

originating

self-preservation.

in

the

desire

for

At

” Allan Bloom, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau" in History of
Political Philosophy, ed. Strauss/Cropsey (Chicago:
Rand
McNally, 1963), pp. 514-33.
^Bloom, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau," p. 516.
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present, societies merely protect existing privileges and
inequalities.
So what is man in this state of nature?
Hobbes describes.

He is not what

In fact, unlike Hobbes's natural man,

Rousseau's is apolitical and asocial.25
It is in the Second Discourse that Rousseau attempted
an explanation of just how humankind came to be as they
were.
the

To find natural man what is needed is a history of

species:

Rousseau

employs

(or rather

creates the

discipline called) anthropology, but he especially relies on
"introspection"

to

uncover

the

movements of the human soul:

1)

first

and

most

simple

Emerging from pre-civil

life into civil society, man took on simultaneously his
sociality, his speech, and his reason; 2)
had no

This early man

foresight or imagination, and thus could have no

fear of death; 3)

He was not naturally hostile, but would

defend his life; 4)

He was idle and saw no need to fight

(after all, he was living in a world of abundance); 5)
senses

"the

sweetness

consequently views

of

his

own

He

existence"— and

life as a good thing;

6)

His two

greatest passions were self-preservation and pity for his
species; 7)

He was not moral, for there was no need for

virtue, but he possessed a sort of primitive "goodness"; 8)

25 For us to "reach" Rousseau's pre-civil man, we must
do something like what Freud did in order to "discover" the
unconscious: We must imagine what must have been in order
to explain what is.

He saw no one as having a natural right to rule over anyone
else; 9)
the

His only virtues were equality and freedom.

human

emerges

into

his

nature,

or

rather

As

"second

nature," he is already equipped to distinguish himself from
the other animals:

especially, by freedom and equality.

Han was, and is, almost infinitely perfectible; he is pure
potentiality, and this is his curse and also the source of
his mastery.

It was a series of historical accidents,

Rousseau speculates, that allowed and encouraged pre-civil
man to develop.

For example, accidents threw pre-civil man

into close proximity; and this led to the notion of private
property.

The management of the crops of that private

property encouraged forethought, as well as inequalities,
which in turn led to wars between the haves and the havenots.

Man now

lives with and

for

others,

and he

is

constantly comparing himself to others; and this vanity
(amour-propre) is at the root of everything that causes man
unhappiness— wars included. Vanity (amour-propre) takes the
place of "amour de soi"(love of self).

Once man begins to

live his life on the outside, he cannot help but become a
slave to his own vanity.

Knowing at least the basics of how

Rousseau envisioned pre-civil man and his movements to
civilization will aid in the understanding of his ethics.
One thing seems clear:

The development of these terrible

passions requires, in order to counteract them, the most
severe moral education, if men are to live together happily.
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But there is no natural right in Rousseau's world:
must

be

created by

sentiment.

an

act

of will,

morality

intelligence,

and

Rousseau's answer was On the Social Contract:

an amalgam of self-interest and duty.

The goal of this

document was to restore wholeness to civil life— a life
based on convention.
But man's "capacity to make conventions is the sign of
[man's]

freedom;

his will

Thus, the trick is

is not

limited by nature."26

to avoid the arbitrary character of

conventions, and conventions become the fulfillment of man's
nature and worthy of his respect and obedience.

As Rousseau

writes in the Introduction to Book I of On the Social
Contract. he will attempt to reconcile right and interest,
justice and utility— and we might add, virtue and happiness,
and duty and interest.
How does the social contract lessen the agony of the
alienated citizen and,

at the same time,

make it more

difficult to succumb to the vainglory of the amour-propre?
The answer is as follows:

"The law is produced by the will

of each thinking in terms of all.

The primary function of

the social contract is to constitute a regime which can
express the general will."27
obeys only himself.

In obeying all an individual

He, thus, remains free and capable of

26 Bloom, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau," p. 523.
27 Bloom, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau," p. 523.

20

happiness, for "Willing is, as such, independent of what is
willed."

The

general will,

to

allow nan

freedom and

happiness, must remain an empty notion— it is "pure will."28

In an ironic sense, freedom is not the enemy of, but
the "sole source of morality."

Rousseau pulls down the last

vestiges of natural law, for "The will of the people is the
only law."

Each individual is both lawgiver and subject.

It must never be forgotten when thinking of Rousseau's
politics that the general will functions in an atmosphere of
self-imposed and severe moral conditions, even if "virtue is
not itself the end" and only a means to freedom.

Freedom,

we should add, is in turn the means to happiness, if it is
not happiness herself.
As Allan Bloom reminds us, "Rousseau began his critique
of

modern

thought

from

the

point

of

view

of

human

happiness."29

The question of course becomes whether the

solution

the

especially

of

social

whether

the

contract
best

men

works

for

can

find

all

men,

complete

satisfaction (or happiness) within any civil society.
a question is drawn from Rousseau's own writings.

Such

Baldly

stated, Is civil society in conformity with man's nature?

28 One might be reminded of the poet Robert Lowell who,
in "Jonathan Edwards in Western Massachusetts," comes to
realize that "hope lives in doubt. / Faith is trying to do
without / faith."
29 Bloom, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau," pp. 531ff.
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"Virtue is necessary for civil society, but it is unclear
whether it is good in itself."30 Where in civil society is
there room for a life of the "sentiments"?

What happens to

the good man, as opposed to the moral man?

It is enough to

remind ourselves that Rousseau ended his life— not totally
voluntarily— as a solitary dreamer beyond the walls of the
city, so to speak.

As we shall continue to observe, there

is a fundamental tension within Rousseau's understanding of
humankind.

Rousseau gave each of the generic vitae its due:

citizen and dreamer.
Emile
The Emile, according to Melzer, may be interpreted as
using natural law based on individual conscience in order to
liberate Emile from priests and philosophers; and On the
Social Contract may be interpreted as rejecting natural law
in favor of the general will in order, also, to liberate
citizens from priests and philosophers.

Melzer concludes

that Rousseau contends that "Men cannot be made virtuous or
secure by doctrines but only by living under the absolute
rule of law."31 We might add that the rule of law, which is
the expression of the general will, is also the only way to
render public men happy.

For the citizen, virtue amounts to

happiness.

30 Bloom, "Jean-Jacques Rousseau," p. 533.
31 Melzer, p. 148.
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On the Social Contract is an attempt to create an
environment

of

public

happiness;

Emile

attempts

the

formation of an individual capable of living happily, even
within a regime which falls short of the standards of On the
Social

Contract.

As

Allan

Bloom

summarizes

conclusion to the Introduction of Emile;

in

his

"Emile stands

somewhere between the citizen of the Social Contract and the
solitary of the Reveries. lacking something of each."32
In this analysis of happiness, it might be profitable
to consider,

as Bloom states,

that

"only in nature or

according to nature is man's happiness to be found," because
only there exists "a perfect equilibrium" between man's
desires and his capacity to satisfy them.33 If man were by
nature political, as Aristotle maintains, then the solution
would be a matter of moderating or perfecting desires.

But

there are even greater contrasts to be made on this issue of
the ultimate disagreement between Rousseau and Aristotle.
Bloom defines the contest;
An older moral philosophy, which goes back to
Aristotle, taught that desires are by nature
infinite and that man possesses the faculty of
will, guided by reason, which can control desires
for the sake of the good. The language of this
philosophy was that of virtue and vice. Virtue
was in this older view understood to be natural
and the control exercised by it to be productive

32 Allan Bloom, "Introduction" to Emile: or On Education
(New York; Basic Books, 1979), p. 28.
33 Allan Bloom, Love and Friendship (New York;
and Schuster, 1993), pp. 43-44.
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of at least one part of happiness.
Virtue is
happiness
according
to
Socrates'
formula.
Courage controls man's fear of pain; moderation
his love of pleasure. This control of pleasure,
a willed harmony
in tension,
was
itself
understood by this tradition to be a pleasure.
The
existence
of
such virtues
and their
pleasurable character— except perhaps for the
vain pleasure of superiority over others— is
flatly denied by Rousseau. In particular, it is
the virtue of moderation, which governs the
desires connected with food and sex, that
concerns him so much. To Rousseau, man is
naturally moderate.
Society inflames his
desires, and the control exercised over them is
not that of virtue but that of fear, of external
command, of what we now call repression. . . .
Healing, rather than appeals to morality, is what
is needed in order to attain the bit of happiness
possible for social man.34
Emile then is not exactly an attempt at reconciling
virtue and happiness; rather
Emile is an experiment in restoring harmony to
the
[incoherent]
world
by
reordering
the
emergence of man's acquisitions in such a way as
to avoid the imbalances created by them while
allowing
the
full
actualization
of
man's
potential.35
The intent of Rousseau is to restore to man his original
wholeness or *:lity— thus allowing for his rediscovery of a
degree of happiness.

The contemporary manifestation of the

diversion from possible happiness is represented by the
bourgeois, whose profundity of soul is defined solely by
fear of violent death.

34 Bloom, Love, p. 44.
35 Bloom, Intro. Emiler p. 3.
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The first part of Emile is devoted to rearing an autonomous
civilized savage, and the second part attempts to bring that
"atomic individual into human society and into a condition
of moral responsibility on the basis of his inclinations and
his generosity."36
One reading of Plato's Republic is that the best regime
is only possible "in word"— that there is no political
salvation,

so to speak,

citizen qua citizen.

and no true happiness for the

The message that Rousseau offers with

Emile is that "The right kind of education, once independent
of society, can put a child into direct contact with nature
without the intermixture of opinion."37 Of course, Rousseau
here denies the ultimate duality of desire and reason.

But,

even independent of society, the process of growth of the
child must be controlled.

For example,

the tutor must

impede the appearance of both the fear of death and amourpropre until such time as Emile is capable of dealing with
them— that is, until such time as he has developed strong
countervailing traits of character.
The net result of Emile's education is that "His will
to affirm never exceeds his capacity to prove."

He lives

only by the laws of necessity, and he "has not unlearned how

36 Bloom, Intro. Emile, p. 7.
37 Bloom, Intro. Emile, p. 9.
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to

die,

harms

no

one,

and knows

how

to

be

ignorant,

possesses a large share of the Socratic wisdom."38
Important to remember is that Emile has not been taught
to master his passions; rather, he has been reared such that
his passions do not come into conflict with each other, or
with the necessities of the external world.

Sublimated sex,

not repressed sex, becomes the link between the individual
and the disinterested respect for law.

Sublimation,

a

Rousseauean notion, is making the higher from the lower.
And the last two books of Emile "undertake in a detailed way
the problematic task of showing how the higher might be
derived from the lower without being reduced to it."

And,

as Bloom points out, everything in those last two books is
related to sex.39
One example of the divided nature of man— a result of
his historical development— is the disparity between natural
puberty (15 years of age) and civil puberty (mid-twenties):
a tension between natural desire and civil duty.

Rousseau

unifies these two puberties by "establishing successively
two passions in Emile, which are sublimations of sexual
desire"— and they are compassion and love. Without entering
the details of the psychological mechanism of this lesson,
suffice it to say that "Rousseau studies the passions and

38 Bloom, Intro. Emilef p. 15.
39 Bloom, Intro. Emile, p. 16.
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finds a way of balancing them one against the other rather
than trying to develop the virtues which govern them."40
Emile, thus, moves from nature to society without his being
denatured

and

selfishness.
between

without

succumbing

In fact,

inclination

inclination and ideal.

in his

and

duty

to

a

education,
has

been

morality
the

of

conflict

supplanted

by

And, if it may be said that Emile's

love for Sophie is ideal and thus illusory, it must also be
said that "the deeds which those illusions produce are
real. "41
If controlling pleasures is not in itself pleasant, as
we

mentioned

at

the

outset

when

outlining

Rousseau's

position, Emile— as a husband and future father— must be
moral (as opposed to merely "good"). But what understanding
of morality does Rousseau give him?

Bloom addresses this

question directly:
Virtue, he tells him, is not the perfection of
desire, but rather the overcoming of desire.
Virtue is strength, the strength, to put it
paradoxically, to want to do what one does not
want to do. Where do we get the strength to look
at persons and things we love most and at the
same time to be aware of and unmoved by their
vulnerability?
The incapacity to face the
mortality of those we love is partially explained
by the weakness of modern man, attributed by
Rousseau to the conflict between nature and
society.42

40 Bloom, Intro. Emile, p. 20.
41 Bloom, Intro. Emile, p. 21.
42 Bloom, Love, p. 137.
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It is the absence of conflict in his desires that gives
Emile such strength of soul— such power.

He would probably

regard the Aristotelian man of virtue as divided in soul,
and the Roman Stoic as suppressed.

Emile is "good," though

he does not know he is good and does not know what goodness
might be.

He has been reared to be— not to think!

He has

been reared to a common happiness.
The Confessions
Whereas

On

the

Social

Contract

happiness of a sort for the citizen,
reared

the

happy

"good"

man,

The

provided

for

the

and whereas Emile
Confessions.

an

autobiography, concerns itself primarily with the happiness
of the radical individual— but more:

the individual, as

Rousseau describes himself in the opening paragraph:
unlike any one I have ever met."

Thus,

"I am

we can expect

Rousseau of The Confessions to be more interested in private
than in public happiness.

In fact, The Confessions should

be read as the history of one man's search for happiness— a
man who, through the fortuitous authenticity of his unique
character,

was

able

to

present

posterity

autobiography of at least heuristic value.

with

an

Since no one

knows to ask the question "What is happiness?" until he has
experienced it, this search is in large measure, but not
totally,

retrospective.

Rousseau

will

engage

in

reminiscence in order to identify the happy times of his
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younger years, but his glance back is as steely cold as it
is nostalgic.
In Emile. Rousseau rears his pupil to be a natural man,
who,

because

of a quiet

imagination,

can maintain his

wholeness and independence indefinitely.

But Rousseau

himself— the subject and the object of The Confessions— is
a civilized human and "must find wholeness by participating
in a community.1,43 The question remains the same:
we

return

to

a

state

of

even

How can

quasi-wholeness

and

independence?
In Book VI of The Confessions. Rousseau attempts to
attest to,
life."

if not describe,

"the short happiness of my

Four or five years were spent at Les Charmettes with

his benefactrice Mme de Warens.

And it was there that

Rousseau suffered an illness which convinced him that he was
about to die.

Christopher Kelly begins his analysis of Book

VI by questioning the nature of Rousseau's brush with death
and his perceived access to happiness.

"The major, question

raised by Book VI is how the prospect of imminent death can
serve as the foundation of happiness.1,44
During

his

illness,

imminent death— all

Rousseau

of which

harbored

a

fear

of

caused him to reflect

on

43 Christopher Kelly, Rousseau's Exemplary Life;
The
Confessions as Political Philosophy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1987), p. 147.
44 Kelly, Exemplary, p. 149.
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religious natters.

He does not,

however,

agree

(with

Hobbes) .that fear of death is natural, for pre-civil man 1)
is not possessed of the faculty of foresight, and 2)
sees no way of preventing death.

he

In sum, fear of death and

fear of Hell are both unnatural, and they are two great
causes contributing to the unhappiness of man.
The happiness of the pure state of nature
consists largely in the avoidance of tormenting
hopes and fears.
The same is true of the
happiness of the young Emile.
Book VI of the
Confessions shows that Jean-Jacques's happiness
is founded in the resignation toward death caused
by his acceptance of illness. This resignation
temporarily cures him of the civilized desires
that torment him, although fears of death and
Hell occasionally trouble his calm. He is happy
in so far as he is free of these fears.45
Living with the conviction of imminent death kills the
imagination and offers the experience of necessity:

thus,

allowing for the experience of undisturbed happiness.

There

is no fear, there is no hope.

But, unlike the natural man,

Jean-Jacques's happiness is both an absence of pain and "a
still sweeter awareness of this absence."

Imagination and

power, desires and abilities, are in equilibrium; Rousseau
imagines no great projects.

"He lives entirely in the

present."46 And that is another way of defining happiness,
a way out of civilized corruption and the debilitating games
of amour-propre (self-love).

45 Kelly, Exemplaryf p. 154.
46 Kelly, Exemplary, pp. 156-57.
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Is this sort of return to nature a viable way for
civilized

humans to

find happiness?

Christopher Kelly

concludes

in the negative: This sort of return to nature

and happiness "must be inflicted from outside; it is an
accident."47 Even Jean-Jacques cannot hold a steady course
after his experience of imminent death.
then, stronger than the reason?

Is the imagination,

It seems so, for as the

acceptance of the inevitability of death and its nearness
fade, the imagination takes control again.
A second period of elusive happiness comes in Book XII,
the last Book of The Confessions. Rousseau is now living on
Saint Peter's Island, in Lake Bienne.

There, the external

"accident," precipitating feelings of the possibility of
natural wholeness and happiness, is the so-called conspiracy
against Rousseau and his works.

According to Rousseau, his

former friends had totally isolated and degraded him and
were conspiring to alter his works.
conspiracy were so effective
Rousseau)

that, in

conspiracy plays

The results of the

(or were believed to be by

the equation

of

happiness,

this

the same role in Rousseau's life as did

severe illness in Book VI.

That is to say, the conspiracy

robbed Rousseau of the hope of ever fulfilling imaginary
projects.

In other words, the conspiracy played the role of

"necessity."

During this period,

47 Kelly, Exemplary, p. 158.

Rousseau,

due to the
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deaths of a chain of friends, is even cured of the desire
for friendship.
There are both similarities and dissimilarities between
Rousseau's life at Les Charmettes and on Saint Peter's
Island.

At the former, Rousseau was engaged in industrious

study of various disciplines; on the island, he lives an
idle life of botany, long walks, and contemplation.

He even

allows his imagination to enliven his botanical pursuits and
to take him back in his memory to happy times (the danger
with the imagination is precisely when it takes you into the
future). At Les Charmettes, he began his day with a prayer;
on the island, his prayer has become purely contemplative—
asking nothing of God.
Rousseau seems to be self-sufficient and whole on Saint
Peter's, but the only flaw is his anxious fear that the
authorities will not allow him to live out his life on the
island.

His happiness is in jeopardy, for his life is not

founded in necessity
hopes and fears.
island,

and certainty.

Also,

Rousseau still has

after being expelled from the

Rousseau gave serious consideration to drafting

legislation for Corsica.

Kelly writes of this undying need

for glory; Rousseau
makes it clear
that while his experience has
succeeded in curing him of his sexual passions
and petty vanity and has even been able to impose
some limits on
his imagination, it has not
succeeded in ending his attachment to justice and
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glory.
The return to wholeness is revealed as
partial and temporary.48
The salient features of Rousseau's meditations on happiness
in the Confessions involve a stripping away of artifice to
an almost buddhistic nudity.

It is a hope out of doubt,

which never abandons the doubt.
The Reveries of the solitary Walker
There are approximately eight years separating the
Confessions

and the Reveries, the

latter

of which was

apparently incomplete at the time of Rousseau's death in
1778.

Our subject is still happiness, and we shall look to

Rousseau's last (written) words in order to discover how he
then regarded (the notion of) happiness.

The title of the

work describes and depicts the nature of Rousseau's search
for happiness:

One must dream alone— which seems a far cry

from the rigors of the regime in On the Social Contract.
There seems to be a regression from concern with public
happiness and a movement inward toward individual happiness.
"I am now alone on earth," begins the First Walk.

In

such a condition of solitude, "What am I?' asks Rousseau—
and thus defines the task of the Reveries.

Ironically, it

is the conspiracy against Rousseau that has forced him into
this

solitude

and has,

in turn,

given

him

the unique

opportunity of examining himself as if in a philosophical
state of nature.

He has died to the world:

48 Kelly, Exemplary, p. 235.
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And here I am, tranquil at the bottom of the
abyss,
a
poor
unfortunate
mortal,
but
unperturbed, like God himself.49
Rousseau claims to be writing the Reveries only for his own
benefit— for "the sweetness of conversing with my soul"— and
not

as

an

apologetic,

as

in

the

Confessions

and

the

Dialogues.
There seems to be a strong strand of Platonism in this
small work.

Rousseau writes of the growth of his soul's

moral life "with the death of every earthly and temporal
interest.

My body is no longer anything to me but an

encumbrance, an obstacle, and I disengage myself from it
beforehand as much as I can."50
Together with all this talk of death, or at least of
talk about death to the world, the preceding citation might
allow us to feel that we are engaged in another Phaedo. Is
Rousseau

not

offering

the

alternative to Socrates's?

picture

of

his

soul

as

an

But the new Socrates might well

be an individual of feelings as opposed to a person of
thoughts.

Whatever, his happiness, like Socrates's, might

turn out to be of a "purely personal value."51
Because of the universal and infallible nature of the
conspiracy against him, Rousseau was forced upon his own
49 Reveries. p. 5.
50 Reveries. p. 7.
51 Butterworth, "Interpretative Essay" to Reveries. p.
154.
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resources, to the extent that he thanks his persecutors for
his new found spiritual and emotional independence or selfsufficiency.
This resource [i.e., feeding his heart with its
own substance], which I thought of too late,
became so fruitful that it soon sufficed to
compensate for everything. The habit of turning
within eventually made me stop feeling and almost
stop remembering my ills. By my own experience,
I thus learned that the source of true happiness
is within us and that it is not within the power
of men to make anyone who can will to be happy
truly miserable.52
To his

enemies,

Rousseau,

as

if a Stoic once-removed,

professes to owe his experience of rapture and ecstacy.
Whether

these

experiences

can

be

described

as

"contemplation" or "reverie" is difficult to discern, and
might just depend on definitions; Rousseau uses both terms,
it seems at times,
reverie

interchangeably.

Whatever the case,

(as the path to happiness)

does not presuppose

philosophic understanding.

Rousseau, even when speaking of

the highest things, is profoundly egalitarian.

By the close

of the Third Walk, wherein Rousseau speaks of his God and
the

tenuous

Butterworth

nature of
maintains

all arguments
that

Rousseau

about the divine,
is

not

anxiously

awaiting some sort of future compensation, but rather shows

52 Reveriesf p. 13.
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a confidence "rooted in his enjoyment of reverie, not in
hope beyond his control."53
The Fifth Walk deals explicitly with the subject of
this investigation:

happiness.

Rousseau states that he was

most happy, in his lifetime, during his two-month refuge on
Saint Peter's Island, which is "pleasant and singularly
placed for the happiness of a man who likes to cut himself
off."54 There he committed himself to idleness, as if to a
religion:
While [the others] were still at the table, I
would slip away and go throw myself alone into a
boat that I rowed to the middle of the lake when
the water was calm; and there, stretching myself
out full-length in the boat, my eyes turned to
heaven, I let myself slowly drift back and forth
with the water, sometimes for several hours,
plunged in a thousand confused, but delightful,
reveries which, even without having any welldetermined or constant object, were in my opinion
a hundred times preferable to the sweetest things
I had found in what are called the pleasures of
life.55
And, when the weather was too rough, he would retire to the
lake shore to watch and listen to the waves— which had
similar effects to his boating on the lake.

The happiness

he feels is, he says, not at all of the momentary nature of
delirium or passion; "rather a simple and permanent state
which has nothing intense in itself but whose duration

53 Butterworth, "Interpretative Essay" to Reveriesr p.
180.
54 Reveriesf p. 62.
55 Reveries, p. 66.
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increases its charm to the point that I finally find supreme
felicity in it."56
In the next paragraph, Rousseau seems to negate the
validity of his comments about "permanent" happiness:

He

raises the notion of the continual flux and transitory
nature of all things— including happiness.

And, then, as if

playing the devil's advocate, he proposes an acid test to
determine if what is felt is in fact happiness:
like this instant to last forever."57

"I would

Rousseau expounds

that if anyone can find happiness, then it is because he is
able to

live totally

in the present— with

recalling either past or future.

no

need

of

Yet, Rousseau stops short

of recommending his life of reverie to those engaged in the
active life, and justifies his idleness in a thoroughly ad
hoc manner:
But an unfortunate person who has been cut off
from human society and who can no longer do
anything here-below useful and good for another
or for himself can find compensations for all the
human felicities in this state, compensations
which fortune and men could not take from him.58
Rousseau briefly describes the environmental prerequisites
for such experiences; and the person himself must be at
peace and must have "a cheerful imagination" which comes
naturally "to those whom Heaven has favored."
56 Reveries. p. 68.
57 Reveries, p. 68
58 Reveries, p. 69.
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fine Stoic fashion, he claims that "this kind of reverie,"
would have sustained him even to the dark dungeon of the
Bastille.
Rousseau concludes this Fifth Walk extolling his past
life

on

the

island— assuring

himself

that

imaginative

recollection is a good, if not better than the original
experiences, then concluding with a reminder of the failing
powers of the aged.
manner,

"Alas!" he concludes in a Platonic

"it is when we begin to leave our skin that it

hinders us the most."S9 "The whole tone of the Walk is that
Rousseau's

truest

happiness

is

a

perfectly

solitary

happiness.1,60 But such a happiness is apparently attainable
by all, for "such a feeling is the sentiment of one's own
existence."

This passive and purely sensual moment is by no

means, concludes Butterworth, "contemplative."
The episode of Saint Peter's Island is described first
by Rousseau in the Confessions, some seven or so years
before the Reveries.
changed

from

one

Butterworth61 summarizes what has

version

to

the

other:

1)

In

the

Confessions. Rousseau was still concerned about convention,
and spoke of some acts as those of worship; 2)

In the

59 Reveries. p. 71.
60 Butterworth, "Interpretative Essay" to Reveries. p.
193.
61 Butterworth, "Interpretative Essay" to Reveries. pp.
197-99.
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Reveries. his explanation of the meaning of happiness took
the place of that worship; and 3)

In the Reveries. his new

view of happiness as a sentiment is likened to "the sense of
self-sufficiency God, too, must feel."

Those are the major

differences between the two works, but there is one more of
a purely political nature:

The dreamer was not only no help

to the little community on the island, but was, in fact, a
threat, because his states of reverie represented withdrawal
from the political— to the point of an "imitation of death":
a dying to the political life per se. as well as a dying to
the world itself.
This tension between the city and philosophy is, once
again, raised and resolved in a sort of ad hoc way:

I have

never been suited for civil society; but I have never been
a pernicious citizen (rather, I have been a "good" man) .
But, of course, the more specific question for the present
investigation

is

"whether

Rousseau's

substitution

of

sentiment for reason and of solitary happiness as described
in the Fifth Walk for ultimate happiness as contemplation is
defensible. "62
Whatever ultimate happiness might be, Rousseau speaks
unequivocally of "truest happiness":

"I know and feel that

to do good is the truest happiness the human heart can

62 Butterworth, "Interpretative Essay" to Reveries. p,
207.

savor."63

He commits himself to the "public felicity" in

the event he ever comes into possession of the ring of
Gyges.

But Rousseau even here implies that he will keep the

common good in mind only as long as he is allowed to act
from pleasure, as opposed to duty and constraint.

Rousseau

himself and his model human are nothing if they are not
free.

This, of course, means that true happiness must have

as the essential element the quality of freedom (and, I
venture, equality). But with the ring of Gyges there would
be no problem, for he would be above constraint.
By

now

it

appears

that

(private)

happiness

is

tantamount to achieving the state of reverie, which is, at
the least, living in the eternal present..
relation

between reverie

contemplating?

and thinking,

But what of the
meditating,

and

At this point in my investigation, I can

only ask if there is a question to ask.

That is to say,

does Rousseau sufficiently and consciously differentiate
these three "mental" processes?

I am not sure that he does.

Whatever the case, Rousseau draws a sharp line between
thought (reason) and reverie:
rather deeply,

"I have sometimes thought

but rarely with pleasure.

. . . Reverie

relaxes and amuses me; reflection tires and saddens me. . .
. Sometimes my reveries end in meditation, but more often my

63 Reveries. p. 75
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meditations end in reverie."64 And regarding contemplation,
Rousseau

advises

contemplator has,

that

"The

more

sensitive

a

soul

a

the more he gives himself up to the

ecstacies this harmony arouses in him."

Then Rousseau

proceeds to offer a sort of pantheistic description of that
reverie that issues from contemplation:
A sweet and deep reverie takes possession of his
senses then, and through a delicious intoxication
he loses himself in the immensity of this
beautiful system with which he feels himself one.
Then, all particular objects elude him; he sees
and feels nothing except in the whole.
Some
particular circumstance must focus his ideas and
close off his imagination for him to be able to
observe the parts of the universe he was
straining to embrace.65
It seems then that contemplation is used as a sort of
psychic exercise to bring the dream to the all-embracing
experience of reverie.66 Rousseau sometimes seems to employ
reverie,
Again,

contemplation,

and

in the Seventh Walk,

meditation

interchangeably.

he gives a description of

reverie (and meditation?), all the while defending his sole
pursuit of private happiness.
No, nothing personal, nothing which concerns my
body can truly occupy my soul. I never meditate,
I never dream more deliciously than when I forget
myself.
I feel ecstacies and inexpressible

64 Reveries. p. 91.
65 Reveries. p. 92.
66 Cf. Butterworth, "Interpretative Essay" to Reveries.
p. 210. Butterworth sees Rousseau's expressed distaste for
reasoning as a denial of Aristotle's teaching that reason is
essential to man and his happiness.
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raptures in blending, so to speak, into the
system of beings and in making myself one with
the whole of nature.
As long as men were my
brothers, I made plans of earthly felicity for
myself. These plans always being relative to the
whole, I could be happy only through public
felicity; and the idea of private happiness never
touched my heart until I saw my brothers seeking
theirs only in my misery.
Then it became
necessary to flee them so as not to hate them.
Then, seeking refuge in mother nature, I sought
in her arms to escape the attacks of her
children.
I have become solitary or, as they
say, unsociable and misanthropic, because to me
the most desolate solitude seems preferable to
the society of wicked men which is nourished only
by betrayals and hatred.67
Rousseau seems to be saying that the pursuit of private
happiness must be justified in each case, for it is, as a
theory (or as a religion), possibly detrimental to public
well-being.

He also seems to be saying,

in the above

citation, that public felicity was the more natural concern,
because it involves man "relative to the whole."

One can

only say in this confusion that private happiness,

not

public happiness, has as object "the whole of nature."68
There is irony within the apologia:

Rousseau is putting the

noose around his own neck.
Not having found happiness in the world of materiality,
Rousseau

nonetheless

succeeded

in

finding

peace

and

happiness— the key to which was having "learned to bear the

67 Reveries. p. 95.
68 Reveries. p. 95.
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yoke of necessity without a murmur."69

(Where there is a

Rousseauean happiness, there seems also to be the force of
necessity.)

This attainment of tranquility and happiness is

often expressed within the context of a Platonic/Stoic view
of ethics:

Whether he is submitting to necessity (Stoic) or

thrusting off the "old wrapping" of the soul (Platonic), the
reader might be lulled by a familiarity with Rousseau's
language.

But Rousseau is not only not a disciple of any

school of thought, he is the cornerstone of a new one.70 He
borrows what he feels truthful from other "schools."
The corollary to the solitary happiness of the Fifth
Walk is uniquely Rousseauean:
By withdrawing into my soul . . . by renouncing
comparisons and preferences . . . I again found
peace of soul and almost felicity.
In whatever
situation we find ourselves, it is only because
of self-love that we are constantly unhappy.71
This recipe for happiness— eradicate "amour-propre" (selflove)— seems simple enough, but becomes highly complex when
the individual so reared must, like Emile, enter society, as
opposed to living the life of a recluse.

Of course, self-

love is the first acquisition of natural man moving into

69 Reveries. p. 113.
70 For an appraisal of the profundity of Rousseau's
romanticism,
see
Samuel
S.
B.
Taylor,
"Rousseau's
Romanticism" in Reappraisals of Rousseaur Simon Harvey et
al., eds. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1980),
pp. 2-23.
71 Reveries. p. 116.
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civil society.
for

Thus, Rousseau's recipe for happiness calls

a world-historical revolution, which,it seems, can only

be carried on in the households, schools, and churches of a
society.

Butterworth defines the issue well:

[T]o the extent that the argument here proves the
necessity of solitary life for achieving that
natural
state,
it
strengthens
Rousseau's
contention that ultimate happiness is solitary
and points to the fundamental problem of civil
society, that is, the tension between what is
required of the citizen so that the regime and
all other citizens may survive and what is
necessary so that the individual may enjoy
complete happiness without regard for the demands
of the regime.72
The life of the solitary is not the way to happiness
for most people.

"Solitude is a viable solution only for

those who, like Rousseau, are able to bring this passion
[i.e., self-love] back under control."73

But this self

purification does appear like the "way" of Aristotle— that
is, self-mastery over the passions and to virtue.
Butterworth

distinguishes:

"[Rousseau]

adheres

But, as
to

no

morality of self-control or of the mean. . . . Instead, he

72 Butterworth, "Interpretative Essay" to Reveries. p.
215.
73 Butterworth, "Interpretative Essay" to Reveries. p.
220.
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permits his senses to have their full play.

He can afford

this luxury, he contends, because his natural temperament is
good.1,74
The compelling question, then, is this:

How does one

control self-love in the vast majority who see no cause to
control themselves?

Their way to happiness must be as

distinctive as their way to virtue.

A more than casual

reading of Rousseau will yield the notion of the few and the
many, but, for Rousseau— egalitarian and primitivist— this
dichotomy does not necessarily define superior and inferior.
One might say, on Rousseau's behalf, that the members of the
human species exist on a horizontal continuum with those at
the extremes of ignorance and wisdom possessing the greatest
chances for happiness.

The most "ignorant" and isolated are

more likely not to have developed a strong self-love; the
most wise and also isolated have had the wherewithal to
purify their souls of self-love.
So, how is the middle group, the vast majority, to b£
reared and civilized?

The answer, for what value it might

have, seems to be in On the Social Contract. In short, this
middle group is to be raised by the laws, by the general
will of the body politic.
Having raised those political questions in the Eighth
Walk, Rousseau makes a broad sweep in the opening sentence

74 Butterworth, "Interpretative Essay" to Reveries, p.
220.

of the Ninth Walk:
which

does

not

"Happiness is a permanent condition

seem

to

be

made

for

man

Everything on earth is in constant flux,

here-below.

which permits

nothing to take on a constant form."75 If people cannot be
happy, they can, Rousseau maintains, be "content."

Whereas

"Happiness

can

has

recognized.
among men.

no

exterior

sign,"

contentment

be

This duality is just another of the divisions
Now that Rousseau has drawn a division that many

will find problematic, he introduces two new notions in this
Walk:

contentment

compensation.

(briefly

mentioned

above)

and

He seems to be speaking to his world of

readers, despite his claim to be writing for himself alone;
and he is speaking of the many, for whom the happiness of
reveries will probably never materialize.
It is ironic that Rousseau, after stating that "There
is compensation for everything," places himself forward as
the one who is compensated for his few pleasures by the
opportunity of appreciating more deeply the few that he has.
There

is

no

more

talk

of

true

happiness

or

pretensions of Jean-Jacques's achievement of it:

of

the

as if he

felt a political need to make a silent but substantial
statement of salutary import.
The apparently unfinished Tenth Walk seems, in part at
least, to be a grand acknowledgement of Mme de Warens, who

75 Reveries. p. 122.
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played such a central role in the formation of Rousseau's
soul.

There are definitely, however, in these two pages,

conflicting ideas about determinism and free will.

The very

moment he met Mme. de Warens "determined my whole life and
by an inevitable chain of events shaped the destiny of the
rest of my days."

At the same time, he claims that four or

five years with Mme de Warens allowed him to be himself,
"fully, without admixture and without obstacle, and when I
can truly say that I lived."
and

to

do

what

he

contradiction— only

He was free to be who he was

wanted.

another

Perhaps

instance

of

there
a

is

no

benevolent

conspiracy of fate.
It was then that his soul was formed— that his affinity
for solitude,

contemplation,

and feelings developed and

sustained him the rest of his life.

Perhaps, the only debt

he dies owning is to "the best of women."

She had given him

five years of "pure and full happiness" which, he might have
said, compensated for "everything dreadful in my present
lot."
A Counter-Conclusion
Rousseau's ethics (if, in fact, he has one) is based in
developmental psychology.

Proper upbringing, somewhat like

what is found in Aristotle's ethics, is essential to the
attainment of happiness.
in large part,

But Aristotle's ethics, at least

is more attached to civic and political

virtue than to the individual

(Of course, Book X of the
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Nicomachean Ethics is the glaring exception.)

Rousseau's

upbringing is meant to clear away all obstacles from his
pupil's path, so that the pupil can simply be himself in his
educational confrontations with nature.

Rousseau does not

have a blind faith in civil man; rather, he has an informed
faith in "natural man."
Whereas Kant seemed to say:

If something is difficult

to do, then it is probably the right thing to do; Rousseau
seems to say:

If it is truly difficult to do, then it is

probably opposed to you, and you should not do it.

In fact,

as we have seen, Rousseau claims to be most happy when he is
most idle, as on Saint Peter's Island.

Idleness best allows

for the experience of one's own existence and, thus, for
happiness.
Nonetheless, self-mastery is important for Rousseau,
because it is the only way
approaching

death,

external

(short of the experience of
constraint,

fate,

conversions to the Emile) to attain happiness.

or

mass

But not

because self-restraint is rational (as with Aristotle), but
because self-restraint controls the imagination, which, for
Rousseau, plays the role of Aristotle's irrational element
in the soul.

The imagination is destabilizing and will take

us into an illusory future,

if it is not restrained by

either the will or necessity or law.

It is only when

grounded in necessity that one can allow the imagination to
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soar at will without fear of losing one's settled state of
happiness.
Rousseau's ultimate happiness seems a radically private
state of the soul, rather than an Aristotelian activity of
the soul.

For Rousseau, ultimate happiness is the sweet

sentiment of one's own existence, but this state, unlike the
independent Stoic soul, is formed in part by accidents of
fate.

This leads one to realize that Rousseau views the

world as divided between the few and the many,
corresponding notions of happiness.
being enough fortuitous

and the

Can one imagine there

"accidents" occurring to enough

humans in order to form a civil society of these lucky
unlucky individuals?

Thus, fate helps shape the few such

that they will experience happiness of the reverie; while
the many (lucky in a sense) are formed by the good laws of
the city.

Thus, for political purposes, Rousseau has the

air of a eudaemonist who relies on reason as his guide to
civic welfare.

For private purposes, he is a contemplative

whose contemplations often become reveries— perhaps because
his total isolation renders his thoughts useless.
Rousseau's
composition

of

private
an

happiness

Epicureanism

mysticism of existence.

and

seems,
a

at

sort

times,
of

a

earthly

He purges himself of fear and hope

(of the gods, that is), just as Lucretius would have his
reader do, and then absorbs himself in reveries that imitate
the mystics.

More precisely, he sublimates the lower into
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the higher.

As Allan Bloom puts it, "Rousseau's intention

is to create longing in the soul of man.
not long."76

Natural man does

And the way of sublimation is to

desires before they are satisfied."

"enrich

One might say that

sublimation is distinctly human, for it is ultimately an
exercise of freedom (someone's freedom, any way).
Rousseau's

understanding

of

ethics

and

happiness

receive their distinction from his foundational notion of
man and nature.

He begins with his own kind of modern

premises, but— like the alchemist trying to turn stone into
gold— he,

through a series of sublimations,

returns to

humankind the legacy of freedom and nobility.
So, finally:

Why study Rousseau today?

Because his

thinking represents an alternative to both the ancient and
the

typically

happiness.

modern

approaches

to

the

good

life,

or

Better than any other modern, I think, Rousseau

spells out not only the horizon of the political, but also
its limits.

The primary limit of the political would be its

inability to answer the claims of both the solitary and the
passionate

natures— neither

of

whom

can

find

earthly happiness within the collective order.

complete

He did for

eighteenth-century Europe what Plato did for the Athens of

76 Bloom, Love, p. 62.
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his day77; except that, for Rousseau, nan is an accident of
fate,

and,

accident.

once

man,

so

is his

happiness

That constitutes the limits.

essentially

It is as if one's

access to happiness only comes with a sort of grace of
nature.
The major distinction between The New Heloise— within
the context of the problem of happiness— and the works of
Rousseau we have just reviewed is that the above works deal
either with the happiness of one or with the happiness of
many.

The New Heloise grapples with the problem of limited

associations— the couple, if you will— and the added element
of sexual and romantic love.

At the outset of a study of

happiness in The New Heloise. one must ask:

How does the

happiness of a couple in love relate to the happiness of the
citizen or of the solitary?

And does that work offer ground

for synthesis or further fragmentation?
Rousseau portrays extensively, in the Julie, friendship
and domestic economy— both elements of any political order.
Thus, one might conclude, the possibilities and limitations
of these relationships— and their possible contributions to
happiness— could tell us something about the political.
Irving Singer seems to find a simple mapping of the Julie
onto Rousseau's more expressly politica? thought.

^"Rousseau undertook to reintroduce eroticism in the
context of Enlightenment materialism.
Plato's Socrates
performs the role that Rousseau played in response to this
condition." Bloom, Love and Friendship, p. 433.
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The goal of Rousseau's political philosophy thus
becomes the reorganization of society in a way
that purifies passionate love between individuals
and curtails the search for sensuous pleasure—
each of these being products of the unnatural
circumstances that man has forced upon himself.
They must be subordinated to, and partly replaced
by, the nonlibidinal love of one's fellow human
beings within a civic-minded community.78
We must determine if Singer is correct and, if so, exactly
how so.

That is to say, we must determine if Rousseau was

a true romantic or if he was only a disillusioned but
ultimately unfulfilled man
Antiquity.

of the

Enlightenment— or

of

And we must not dismiss Rousseau too lightly

when he says that he is "like no one in the world."79

78Irving Singer, The Nature of Love. Vol. II (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 335.
79Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Confessions. J. M. Cohen,
tr. (London: Penguin Books, 1953), p. 17. Also, see Bloom,
Love, p. 63, for a discussion of Rousseau and the new Adam.

CHAPTER 3
CIRCUMSCRIPTION OF THE STORY
Julie;

or

The

New

Heloise

might

be

called

a

philosophical romance consisting of exchanges of letters
between its principal characters who are as follows:
Julie d'Etange, a beautiful young girl
Baron d'Etange, her father
Saint-Preux, her tutor
Claire, her cousin
Lord Edward Bomston, Saint-Preux's benefactor
Monsieur de Wolmar, Julie's husband
First published in 1760, the novel has for a setting early
eighteenth century Switzerland.

Beyond the love affair and

its immediate aftermath,
Rousseau finds the occasion to broach all the
subjects which interest him:
God and religion
without a doubt, but also opera, duelling,
suicide, Parisians, conversation, domestic and
political economy,
gastronomy,
the art of
gardening,
relations
between
servants
and
masters, education of children, the use of
leisure time. . . . In conclusion, novel, poem,
The New Heloise figures in Rousseau's history,
certainly not as an interlude— not even as a
"partage de midi," but the place where all the
powers of his thought and all the marvels of his
art are assembled and exalted.1
The novel is divided into six parts, with Part III
ending with Saint-Preux's voyage around the world; Part IV
begins several years later with Saint-Preux's return.

For

Raymond Queneau, Histoire des Litteratures III.
Enclvclopedie de la Pleiade (Paris: Gallimard, 1958), p.
761.
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Julie, the before-and-after centers on her marriage in Part
III to Monsieur de Wolmar.
physical

love

affair

of

Ironically enough, the actual
this

cornerstone

romanticism begins and ends with Part I.
of

comparable

length,

though

the

of

European

All the parts are

number

of

letters

comprising each part varies greatly.
Writing of the Julie. Allan Bloom puts the novel's
importance in perspective:

"Although it appears now to be

a bore and a pain, it was one of the most popular books ever
written and took the whole of Europe by storm."2 "No novel
was

so

popular,"

says

Lester

G.

Crocker;

seventy-two

editions before 1800 were counted by Daniel Mornet.

"The

lending libraries were besieged; some doubled their fees and
limited borrowers to an hour per volume.

Readers snatched

it from friends fortunate enough to possess a copy."3 Even
sixty years later, Lamartine would cry, "I do not understand
how its pages do not catch fire!"
that

In fact, it is the Julie

allows Rousseau to be recognized as the progenitor of

the romantic movement,

if he was too much rooted in the

eighteenth century to be considered a romantic himself.
The Julie

is a bourgeois novel

in the sense that

"Rousseau believed that the religious and political passions

2Allan Bloom, Love and Friendship (New York:
Schuster, 1993), pp. 140-41.
York:

Simon and

3Lester G. Crocker, Jean-Jaccrues Rousseau. Vol. II (New
Macmillan, 1973), pp. 52-53.
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had cooled and that the appeal to love and the intimate
interiors

of

individuals

and

families

was

all

that

remained."4 But it is just because of this privatization of
life that Rousseau attempts, in the Julie, the socialization
of

the

individual— or,

more

specifically,

the

partial

socialization of love— the subject matter of the present
project.
That Rousseau was intending to prescribe social mores
was not lost on his enemies.
Foreseeing that a successful French Revolution5
would lead to more than just a readjustment of
governmental authority, [Edmund] Burke feared
that the baneful innovations of the Revolution
would have to extend themselves into the furthest
reaches of human experience,
into values,
attitudes, and manners.
He did not, therefore,
consider a political pamphlet an inappropriate
medium for discussion of Julie and St. Preux's
fictional passion.6
M. B. Ellis, in her 1949 work entitled Julie or La
Nouvelle Heloise. A Synthesis of Rousseau/s Thought (17491759)

argues

Rousseau's

that the Julie represents

previous

work.

Though

not

a synthesis
addressing

of

this

question in any formal manner, my inquiry demonstrates that
the Julie is in fact an extension of Rousseau's previous
ideas:

it is an attempt to rehabilitate humankind from one

4Bloom, Love and Friendshipr p. 141.
5Rousseau had been named philosopher of the Revolution
by the French Assembly.
fiEdward
Duffy,
Rousseau
in
England
University of California Press, 1979), p. 39.

(Berkeley:
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form of

alienation:

obstructed

love.

On the

Social

Contract and Emile, both of which immediately follow upon
the

publication

of

the

Julie,

are

even

differentiated attempts at rehabilitation.

further

and

Dr. Ellis also

finds ominous and ill intent in the character of SaintPreux, something I prefer to view as innocent desire (which,
at times, might admittedly look like evil).
To see Saint-Preux as the embodiment of perverted
nature and Julie as purely virtuous nature would gainsay
what Rousseau wrote in the Second Preface about Saint-Preux:
"a young upright and sensitive man, full of weakness and
beautiful talk." (OC II, p. 12)

And seeing Julie as a pure

paragon of virtue also says more than does Rousseau:

"a

young girl offending the virtue that she loves, and led back
to duty by the horror of a greater crime."
J.-R. Carre offers a more accurate description of the
gist of the Julie and Rousseau's general intentions as a
writer:
knew

"And we would know the secret of Rousseau, if we

what,

happiness

in his
to

most

consist

intimate

of."7

recesses,

Slowly,

Carre

he

thought

unveils

the

peaceful and silent nature of Rousseau's happiness— or, as
Rousseau said, the repose in the silence of the passions.
Furthermore, it is "sentiment"— not sensation exactly and

7J.-R. Carre, "Le secret de Jean-Jacques Rousseau,"
Revue d'Histoire litteraire de la Francer Avril-Juin 1949,
p. 131.
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not rational knowledge exactly— which holds the nature of
Rousseau's secret;

it is,

also,

that which makes moral

conscience possible.
He points out that Rousseau, at the age of forty-four,
left city life never to return.

He traces Rousseau's

peregrinations and sufferings that led him into a sort of
exile, where he discovers a secret more simple than the
conscience:

simply to exist! to be left alone!8

The problem with

Carre's

chronological

pursuit

of

Rousseau's secret of happiness is that it is necessarily
fatalistic.

One's last struggles with life will always

appear to be one's metaphysically ultimate answer.

In fact,

Rousseau never recommended the solitary life; he repeatedly
justified his living in solitude by saying that he had no
other useful choice,

and by saying that he would gladly

return to the society of men,

if he could.

Thus,

that

fortune brought Rousseau to a solitary end (which to his
credit he made the most of) does not annul his earlier work-for example, his formulae for happiness in On the Social
Contract and in the Julie.

Though Rousseau is perhaps

accused of solipsism, he never saw the world to be some sort
of identity of his own self.

If anything, he saw himself as

the ••outsider"— not as a model, but as an aberration.

8J.-R. Carre, "Le secret de Jean-Jacques Rousseau,"
Revue d'Histoire litteraire de la Francer Juillet-Septembre
1949, p. 234.
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In his most insightful treatment of the Julie. Jean
Starobinski

points

out

that

only death

can

synthesize

separation and union— the condition of our lovers.
Starobinski

seems

to

recognize

that,

even

in

But

death,

"sensuous existence" is recaptured; as it had first been
savored, then destroyed,

and finally transcended.9

With

these essentials I am in agreement.
But Starobinski seems to think that Rousseau must have
been embarrassed by the disagreement between the egalitarian
Social Contract and the paternalistic community of Clarens
in the Julie. Such would only be the case if Rousseau were
portraying Clarens as a political model in competition with
the Social Contract which he was writing at about the same
time as the latter books of the Julie.

I find it hard to

believe that Rousseau could have overlooked that possible
source of embarrassment.
differently,
Clarens

is

under
an

not

I would rather view Clarens
mutually

exclusive

alternative— perhaps

an

angles:

1)

impossible

alternative— to what is created in the Social Contract.
Specifically, Clarens represents a partial association— a
sort

of

self-sufficient

extended

family.

2)

The

paternalism of Clarens is the best political order possible-that is, prior to the introduction of Rousseau's Social

9Jean Starobinski, Jean-Jaccrues Rousseau— Transparency
and Obstruction (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
1988, first pub. 1971), p. 86.
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Contract.

3)

The community of Clarens is a life-like

metaphor of the communion of souls— "le menage a trois"—
that will be envisioned by Julie as the vehicle of the
reconciliation of passion and virtue.
Starobinski approaches the last interpretation when, he
describes Clarens as a "collective autarchy"--a sort of
self-sufficient man writ large.10

And he pierces to the

core of Rousseau's thought when he maintains that,

for

Rousseau, man is like God not in his knowledge, but in his
self-sufficiency.

But, in the Julie, there is presented— or

envisioned— a self-sufficiency that is more reminiscent of
a trinitarian God than of the Unmoved Mover of Aristotle.
It is the self-sufficiency not of two souls, not of the
isolated romantic couple, but of the triangle of friendship
and love that never finds sustained realization within the
boundaries of the story of The New Heloise.
Commenting on the

story's

end— on Julie's

death—

Starobinski writes that Rousseau "prefers the absolute of
personal

salvation to the absolute of

community."11

I

contend that Julie's death was the only way she could have
reconciled passion and virtue; she (and Rousseau) preferred
community— or a communion— which was denied her.

10Starobinski, p. 109.
“starobinski, p. 121.

And that
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night be the tragedy of Romanticism:

the necessity of

seeking one's happiness in another world.
Synopsis of the Julie
Part I :

This epistolary novel begins with an impassioned

letter from Saint-Preux to his student Julie, in which he
confesses his ardent love for her.

Julie, the lovely and

only child of the Baron and Baroness d'Etange, lives in the
Swiss town of Vevey on the shores of Lake Geneva and at the
foot of the Alpes.
the Baron,

Her tutor, hired during the absence of

is Saint-Preux who,

as the story begins,

is

twenty-three years of age.

Julie is eighteen.

It is the

early eighteenth century.

After two more letters from

Saint-Preux, one in which he threatens to leave forever,
Julie

answers

and eventually admits her

love

for him.

Claire, Julie's "inseparable" cousin and friend, is informed
of the budding romance.

There is a long correspondence

which satisfies Julie as to Saint-Preux's

feelings and

intentions; their first embrace is in the groves of Clarens,
owned by her parents.

Julie asks Saint-Preux to, so to

speak, exile himself to his country of Valais, since Julie's
father will be returning home.

In one of his several

letters written during this first separation from Julie, he
writes of the difference between their situation as lovers
and that of Heloise and Abelard; that is to say, those
bygone lovers had given in to baser instincts.
pleased

with

the

academic

progress

of

the

The Baron is
girls,

but

displeased with the fact that the tutor is a commoner, and
a proud one at that.

When her lover proposes that they

elope, Julie is extremely shaken by her emotions, so much so
that Claire feels the need to call him out of exile.

Saint-

Preux returns; Claire is absent from Clarens; the Baron
wishes to marry Julie off to one of his older friends:
couple consummates their love.

the

Julie immediately expresses

her remorse and, because of her mother's suspicions, advises
her friend to leave Clarens, but not without prospects for
clandestine meetings.

When left to stay with her cousin's

parents, Julie arranges a rendez-vous with Saint-Preux, but,
at the last moment,

she calls on him to help extricate

Claude Anet from military service so that he can marry
Fanchon,

a servant in the d'Etange household.

Julie's

parents return, and Lord Bomston, an English friend of the
Baron and also known to Saint-Preux, arrives on the scene.
Saint-Preux admires Bomston, but, at first, fears him as a
rival for Julie's hand.
daring even death,

Julie proposes that the couple,

meet in her bedchamber.

They give

themselves to each other for the second and last time.
Saint-Preux challenges Bomston to a duel for having said
something,

while under the influence of wine,

disrespectful of Julie.

that was

After Julie's intervention and his

learning of the plight of the couple, Bomston makes a public
apology and even tries to persuade the Baron to let the
couple marry.

Julie's

father

is

enraged

at the very
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thought, and Julie asks Claire, for the protection of her
lover, that she see to his exile— this tine to Paris.
Part II:

In exile, Saint-Preux is in a state of extreme

anxiety.

By letter, he protests to Julie.

Bomston offers

Julie an estate in England for their retirement, but, after
consulting with Claire, she refuses the offer, even though
she is aware that a marriage arranged by her father might be
the only alternative.

Bomston, then, resolves to return

eventually to Paris and to take Saint-Preux with him to
England.

Julie writes to her lover in Paris to advise that

she will never marry him without the Baron's consent, but,
also, that she will never marry another without his consent.
In his study of the French people, Saint-Preux is taken with
two subjects especially:

the difference between speech and

action

people;

in

the

French

and

the

more

general

epistemological problems involved in the study of the world.
Claire

marries

confidante

M.

to

d'Orbe,

whom

to

so

Julie

entrust

must

her

find

another

correspondence.

Consequently, Julie's cache of love letters is discovered by
her mother!
Part III;

Claire writes Saint-Preux of the seriousness of

Mme d'Etange's illness and encourages him to renounce Julie,
which he does

in a

afterwards dies.

letter to Julie's mother who

Feeling responsible for her mother's

death, Julie writes her farewell to her lover.
Baron wrings

soon

And the

from Saint-Preux a final renunciation and

release of Julie.

In despair, Julie falls seriously ill.

Clandestinely, Saint-Preux visits her bedside, after which
he is escorted back to Paris by Bomston.

In spite of her

feelings for her (former) lover, Julie is resolved not to
disobey her father.

She marries M. de Wolmar; she writes a

letter recapitulating their love affair and the events
leading to her marriage and her moral-religious conversion.
In a subsequent letter, she assures Saint-Preux that she is
happy

with

her

new

husband.

To

Bomston,

Saint-Preux

expresses suicidal despair.

Bomston attempts to refute his

justifications of suicide.

Putting himself in Bomston's

care, Saint-Preux agrees to sign on with a British vessel
that is scheduled to make a tour of the world.
Part IV;

Several years later, Julie is the mother of two

sons, and Claire, with one daughter, is a widow.

In the

midst of Claire's plans to move to Clarens with Julie, they
receive news from Saint-Preux announcing his return from
sea.

Wolmar, who is informed of Julie and Saint-Preux's

past together,
Clarens.

invites him to join the happy family at

Saint-Preux writes Bomston detailed letters of the

idyllic life at Clarens.

In the emotionally charged setting

of the groves of Clarens, Wolmar unites the couple with
himself in a show of utter confidence and announces that he
will take a week's journey— leaving them alone together.
Julie is rightly anxious over their being alone together.
The couple takes a boating trip that, due to a storm, lands
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them on the opposite shore at Meillerie— the very spot where
Saint-Preux had entertained romantic fantasies during his
first exile from Julie.

They, led by Julie's restraint,

resist temptation and return safely to Clarens.
Part V !

Bomston chides

lovesickness.

Saint-Preux for his

continued

But Saint-Preux reassures him of his good

health and writes of the private life of the Wolmars,
especially of the role of Julie— mistress of the estate and
educator of her children.

Julie is, however, distressed by

the religious incredulity of her otherwise perfect husband.
The final arrival of Claire to Clarens causes an ecstacy of
happiness.

The Baron and Saint-Preux are reconciled at the

grape harvest festival where the harmonious life of Clarens
is distinctively portrayed.

Bomston arrives at Clarens and

soon sets off with Saint-Preux for Rome where Saint-Preux
will attempt to assist Bomston with problems of his love
life.

But, during the voyage, Saint-Preux dreams repeatedly

of the death of Julie; Bomston takes him back to Clarens
where he assures himself of Julie's health and safety.
Saint-Preux serves his friend well in assisting him in
resolving his amorous difficulties.

Claire leaves for

Lausanne and Geneva, where she receives letters from Julie
that recognize her increased interest in Saint-Preux and
that propose a marriage between them.
Part VI; Writing from Lausanne, Claire rejects the idea of
marrying Saint-Preux.

Bomston writes from Rome and informs

Wolmar that his friend is passing the test devised by
Bomston:

that is, he is conducting himself as a man of

thought in his attempts to resolve Bomston's love affair.
Bomston is in love with a reformed prostitute Lauretta
Pisana,

but he knows that he cannot marry her. Bomston

pretends to seek Saint-Preux's advice.
for Saint-Preux,

Creating a dilemma

Bomston tells him that,

if he marries

Laura, they will settle at Clarens; but, if he does not
marry her, he will return to England to live.

Saint-Preux

<

is bound to 1)
Clarens, and 2)

educate the Wolmar children and live at
serve his benefactor Lord Bomston.

Preux passes muster:

Saint-

he convinces Laura to enter a convent.

At which instance, Bomston agrees to retire to Clarens.
Julie writes Saint-Preux, proposing marriage to Claire; like
Claire, he declines.

Then news arrives that Julie, while

rescuing her child from drowning, fell ill and, a few days
later, died.
days

Wolmar writes a detailed account of the six

preceding Julie's

death.

Her

death

compared to that of a saint or even a goddess.

can

only be

Before she

died, Julie wrote a final message to Saint-Preux, telling
him in essence that she always loved him and that she still
loved him and that she took joy in being able to tell him so
one last time.

In the final letter, Claire urges Saint-

Preux to return to Clarens as he had planned before Julie's
death.

They would live there, so to speak, in the shadow

and the light of her memory.

Finis

CHAPTER 4
PART ONE OF THE JULIE
The Red Thread of Happiness
An analysis of the notion of happiness in Julie, ou La
Nouvelle Heloise requires careful attention to how the
personages speak of happiness, as well as how they attempt
to live it.

Word and deed may well conflict.

Some of these

intricacies are examined in the following commentary on Part
I of the Julie, which commentary is meant to demonstrate
that the red thread of the Julie is, in fact, a treatment of
the notion of happiness, and a treatment of the notion of
love as it relates to the understanding of happiness.
happiness

always

represents

for

Rousseau

the

And

ultimate

political, as well as individual, concern.
The Julie begins, in the opening letter of Saint Preux,
with a demonstration of the unbearable nature of thwarted
desire.

Now in the midst of a passion for Julie, Saint

Preux pretends to ask advice from her.
away?

Should he simply run

He appeals to a promised friendship— so far from what

he truly feels for her— and places the onus on her by
asking:

"Advise me."

In this first paragraph, Saint Preux

is doing what he will do continually through the course of
the novel:
onus on her.

He will defer to Julie; he will place the moral
Also, this concise beginning portends the very

end of the story— with Claire, Julie's cousin, harkening to
Saint Preux to join the community of friendship at Clarens
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after the death of Julie and united in the spirit of Julie:
in a higher purpose, so to speak.

Will he fly from her?

And, later, will he join the others in friendship?
Saint Preux, in fact, ever make a decision?
ever know friendship?

These questions,

Does

And does he

though somewhat

premature, should be kept in mind through the course of the
analysis.
In the second paragraph of this brief first letter,
Saint Preux, after admitting the foolhardiness of his having
taken on the task of tutoring her, all but propositions
Julie, while ostensibly deferring to her high morality:
I suffer,

"If

I at least have the consolation of suffering

alone, and I would want no happiness that could cost you
yours." (I,l,31)x The word "happiness," in its first use,
is, one might say,

taken in vain.

Saint Preux is,

in

reality, asking Julie if her giving into his desire would
cost her her happiness.

In other words, does she feel for

him as he feels for her?

He is desperate; he must be,

however, cautious in his boldness.

1 All parenthetical references in the text are to JeanJacques Rousseau's Julie, ou La Nouvelle Heloise. Oeuvres
completes, vol. II. Bibliotheaues de la Pleiade. 1969. The
first Roman numeral will indicate the Part of the novel; the
second Roman numeral will indicate the number of the letter;
and Arabic numerals, whether alone or with Roman numerals,
will indicate page number; a lone Roman numeral indicates a
Letter in the Part of the novel under discussion at the
time. All translations from the Julie are by the author.

After some peregrinations, Saint Preux finally admits
that he cannot fly from Julie on his own.

She must be the

one to take action to deny him her presence.

The portrait

of a young philosopher without character or self-restraint
is slowly taking shape by paragraph five of the novel.

One

may predict that, barring a great change of character, Saint
Preux's pursuit of happiness will be faltering and uneven at
best.

Nonetheless, he insists that he is attracted to Julie

by her qualities of soul— by charms of the heart and not the
eye.

(1,1,32)

We are led to ask if attraction to the

"sentiments" of another should cause such nervousness and
lack of self-restraint.

Whatever the case, Saint Preux is

claiming to base his pursuit of happiness on other than
hedonistic

grounds,

satisfaction.

at

least

on

other

than

carnal

No lesser claim could be expected of a young

man pursuing a young woman.
its spirituality,

But his passion seems, for all

uncontrollable.

Are there other than

physical passions that might be uncontrollable?
Are we not already encountering what Allan Bloom calls
"a fine irony at the lack of self-knowledge of [Rousseau's]
characters"?2

We are on guard that we cannot rely on the

self-interpretations of Rousseau's personages.

How his

characters understand themselves is not necessarily the way
in which Rousseau does, nor the way in which Rousseau's

2 Allan Bloom, Love and Friendship (New York:
Schuster, 1993), 143.

Simon &
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reader is meant to understand them.

This suggests the

apparently thorny question, to be dealt with in an ad hoc
way within the analysis, of whether any one character speaks
for Rousseau.
Saint Preux goes so far as to tell Julie 1)

that he

"dares flatter himself sometimes that Heaven has staged a
secret conformity between our affections" (1,1,32) and 2)
that this conformity may be seen in their "natural" and
unprejudiced tendencies, unimpaired by the world.

Thus,

heaven seems to be blessing this union of two like and
natural minds.

But, as if afraid of tempting fate (or is it

showing dexterity in courtship?), Saint Preux concludes:
"the ardor of my desires lends to their object possibility
which is lacking to it." (1,1,33)

In effect, Saint Preux

has toyed with the possibility of Heaven's blessing his
(theirI) desires.

No doubt, such would be the making of a

perfect and happy union.

The happiness of one would not be

sacrificed to the happiness of the other.

Saint Preux seems

to be making appeal to the notion of Aristotle's blessed
man.
But immediately following this hypothetical blessing of
Heaven, comes Saint Preux's admission that his passion is an
illness, in spite of the professed purity of his sentiments.
He asks that Julie not only do him the grace of banishing
him from her presence, but, more specifically, of somehow
"drying up the source of the poison which is both nourishing
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him and killing him." (33)

It seems that we have not only

a new Heloise, but also a new Abelard.
cured or to die."

"I wish only to be

In this ongoing self-analysis, Saint

Preux admits that he has lost his reason and he defines, at
least implicitly, the recovery of reason as the return of
his heart to himself.
same?

Whatever,

Are reason and passion ultimately the

happiness

must

be

somehow

something

different from the loss of reason or the loss of one's
heart.

If not, Saint Preux would not now be experiencing

anxiety ("trouble") in the depths of his soul.
That love is somehow a matter of life and death is
seemingly innocently and melodramatically expressed by Saint
Preux when he states that to kiss Julie would cause him to
die— but to die the happiest of men.
something to do with death.

Somehow happiness has

Are we, in effect, dead when we

have nothing left to pursue?

I think that Rousseau poses

this question on the political as well as on the individual
level.

Or must we somehow die before earning the full

possibility of happiness?

A question akin to Stoic and

Christian alike.
Such questions take us, I think, beyond the bounds of
hedonism and into a sort of quasi-religious ethos— into a
severe

and

rigorous

happiness are great.

romanticism,

where

the

wages

of

Saint Preux asks that they cease those

dangerous parlor games,

and then,

only a moment later,

chides Julie for not being civil enough with him when they
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are left alone.

Does Saint Preux know what he wants at this

the outset of the story?

Is he a private xnan, a political

man/ or merely ill-defined?
for,

though

he

can

He seems to be in-the-making,

intellectualize

the

issues

of

his

romance, he continues, at the close of this first letter, to
indulge in his childlike though not simply ingenuous verbal
pursuit of Julie.
Much might be surmised of the character of Saint Preux
from this first brief letter, but, briefly stated, he seems
a young, sensitive "philosopher" of dubious fortitude, who,
in his attempt to win a woman (even if the woman), dares
recourse to Heaven!

But, beyond what it teaches us about

Saint Preux, this letter initiates the discussion of love
and

happiness:

What

is

the

basis

of

love

(and,

consequently, happiness)— desire or Heaven, or something inbetween,

or some combination thereof?

And what is the

nature of reason that it may be lost in the pursuit of
happiness?

Saint Preux is a confused philosopher, with a

confusing set of shifting priorities.

He is "in love."

The

first personage to appear on the stage of this long novel
represents the swirling beehive-like compactness of some of
the essential themes of love and happiness:
1.

"I must fly from you."

2.

"refuse me your presence."

3.

"Why then is it a crime to . . . love one whom I

must necessarily honor?"
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4.

"it is that justness of spirit and that exquisite

taste which derive their excellence from the purity of your
soul . . . which . . .
5.

I adore."

"Sometimes I dare flatter myself that Heaven has

brought about a secret sympathy in our affections."
6.

"the ardor of my desires lends to their realization

the possibility which it lacks."
7.

"I wish only to be cured or die, and I beg for your

severity as a lover would beg for your kindness."
8.

"Be, alas, other than yourself, in order that my

heart may be able to return to itself."
Following a second letter of similar contrivance to the
first, in which Saint Preux expresses his willingness to be
unhappy if renouncing his love is the only alternative and
in which he defines as unbearable his present state of soul-that between hope and fear— he writes a third in which he
recognizes

that

his

expressions

of

love

affecting Julie, even if for the worse.
goes further:

are

in

fact

But Saint Preux

He announces that Julie's sorrow has made him

realize that his love for her is no passing delirium soon to
be overtaken by reason, but that "with despair I feel that
the fire which consumes me will be extinguished only in the
tomb."

Moreover, he expresses a tenuous altruism born of

his sensitivity to Julie's suffering:

"either I myself am

mistaken or your happiness is dearer to me than my own."
(37)
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Saint Preux finally writes that the fatal passion which
consumes him does not matter, because he "who cannot make
himself happy can at least be worthy of being so." (37)

He

further insists that he will compel her to esteem him by his
making himself worthy.

He

then

bids

her

"adieu"

and

promises eternal adoration.
Saint Preux,

like a man fencing desperately in the

dark, has, in his attempt to win or even attract Julie,
appealed to God, nature, love, and the promise of his future
virtue.

Moreover, he has made much of his sensitivity to

and empathy for her.

But, finally, his missives are little

more than pleadings for recognition and for requited love.
It all seems like a sophisticated courtship.

It is at this

very moment— when Saint Preux promises to depart and to win
Julie's esteem by his becoming virtuous, that Julie has her
first brief, enigmatic, and forceful say.
Her entire first communication to
follows:

Saint Preux is as

"Don't seize upon the opinion of having made your

leaving necessary.

A virtuous heart would be able to subdue

itself or be quiet, and perhaps would become formidable
thereby.

But you . . . you may stay" (37)

The key question:

Does Julie want Saint Preux to

subdue his heart or does she rather want him to appear to be
doing so? Whatever the case, she is obviously interested in
Saint Preux; she seems to see through his "arguments," and,
though she "scorns" him in her very first note to him, she
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has entered into the love game.

In the battery fire of

missives that follow, Julie challenges Saint Preux to stand
his ground.

He takes refuge in a veiled threat of suicide.

Julie pleads with him to wait for her next letter.
We have learned much of the personage of Saint Preux:
He is passionate, though not necessarily profound; he says
more than he understands and is not below (unconscious?)
romantic demagoguery.

Of Julie we know that her wit is

concise, decisive, and penetrating.

Her first full-fledged

letter will tell us much more.
In that letter, which she had pleaded with Saint Preux
to wait for, Julie expresses the secret love she has been
harboring for him, ostensibly because she fears his suicide.
But, in professing her love, Julie says that she has lost
honor and has experienced a sort of death-in-life.
there a death more cruel than surviving honor?" (39)

"[I]s
This

is not the dying-to-the-world notion that we shall meet at
the end of the Julie, but it is a sort of death for a higher
purpose, a sort of fatal altruism:

Julie gives up her honor

(she breaks her word with herself by confessing her love)
for the sake of saving Saint Preux's life.
So the drama really begins with the consideration of
whether life is more precious than honor— more specifically,
should someone else's life be more precious to me than my
honor?
Julie

Can happiness be found through sacrifice?
goes

on

to

belie

this

understanding

However,
that

her

confession of love is for the higher purpose of saving her
lover's life; she, like him, is simply caught up in a "fatal
passion" which she cannot resist.
state of her desire,
game:

But she, whatever the

is aware of Saint Preux's "artful"

"Led step by step into the snares of a vile seducer,

I see, without being able to stop myself,
precipice toward which I am running." (39)

the horrible

Julie then calls

him a crafty or artful man whose boldness is motivated more
by his knowledge of her love for him than by his love of
her.

This noble young woman, not Saint Preux, seems to be

the one who is truly lost to love.
knowingly in love with her inferior.

She is,

it seems,

Nonetheless, she does

see some value or virtue in Saint Preux, which is expressed
in her statement that, if his heart were such that it could
peacefully enjoy this triumph, he would have never obtained
it.
So, now, we must consider the artfulness of Julie.

Is

she saying that she could just as well have maintained her
secret of love for Saint Preux?

Is she saying that, in

spite of her awareness of the cunning games he is playing
with her, she has always loved him and that she sees in him
at least enough goodness to justify her admission of love to
him?

If this is so, as I think it appears on close reading,

then our love story begins with love games which are prior
existentially either to a fatal passion or to a virtuous
life, but not to love itself.

In other words, the beginning
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of our story enacts a sort of chess game— Saint Preux
attacking, Julie defending.
ways,

are in love.

Both, in their own differing

(The novel may be portrayed as a

movement of Julie and Saint Preux toward an equality and a
harmony

in

love— perhaps

a

remnant

of

Aristotle's

friendship.)
But on what

level

of consciousness are Rousseau's

characters aware of the very games and artifices in which
they are engaged?
manipulation:

Surely,

Julie is not above blatant

She confesses her passionate love to Saint

Preux and demands that he be her only protector against
herself, that is, against the loss of her virtue.

And, like

Lafontaine's stork who extracts the bone from the throat of
the wolf, she writes:

"Your virtues are the last refuge of

my innocence."

(40)

Julie is, of course, hardly a coy,

unquestioning lover.

From her pen rebounds the first oath

of our long story, and it is in the paragraph headed by that
oath that Julie,

in effect,

challenges

Saint Preux

transcend his hedonistic desires:
"Oh God! am I not humiliated enough? On my knees
I write you; I bath the paper with my tears; I
hand up to you my timid supplications. And think
not, however, that I am unaware that they were
for me to receive and that in order to make
myself obeyed I had only to make myself, with
artfulness, scornful.
Friend, take that empty
victory, but leave me my integrity [honnetete]:
I prefer to be your slave and live blamelessly
than to buy your dependance at the price of my
dishonor.
If you deign to hear me, what love,
what respect must you expect from her who will
owe you her return to life?
How charming the

to
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sweet union of two pure souls 1 Your conquered
desires will be the source of your happiness/ and
the pleasures which you shall enjoy will be
worthy of Heaven itself (emphasis added)." (40)
Julie seems to be saying that mastery of the desires allows
for, but is not equal to, the most celestial of pleasures.
As Saint Preux artfully— even cunningly— tested Julie
for the presence of passion in her, Julie tests Saint Preux
for the presence, for even the germ, of virtue in him.

But

just as Saint Preux attempted to manipulate the mind and
emotions of Julie— to the point of threatening suicide!~
Julie also engages in such logistical structuring of this
incipient love affaire.

She ends her first letter with what

might be called a power play:

She says, in effect, that if

he takes advantage of her confused state of mind and the
trust she has placed in him, it would arouse in her scorn
and indignation, which, in turn, would cause her to regain
her reason and,

by implication,

reject him.

A strange

little bit of psychologizing, the bottom line of which is
the following:

"You will be virtuous or be scorned; I shall

be respected or cured; that is the sole hope which remains
to me besides that of dying." (41)

Julie, in her own way—

but apparently Aristotelian nonetheless— has bound together
virtue and happiness; and virtue is represented by mastery
over one's desires.

But, of course, the nature of what is

being overcome is somewhat confused and ambiguous at this
point:

Are they trying to overcome anti-social behavior
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(Saint Preux is not of the proper social class to court
Julie), or

are

they

trying

to

uncontrollable desire, or both?

overcome

excessive

and

Our ultimate judgment of

their success or failure will involve the object of their
guest.
These

letters often sound a little

negotiating

treaties.

In

their

very

like diplomats

first

epistolary

exchanges, both lovers have threatened or mentioned suicide
as tool of persuasion, or at least of manipulation.

The

only other interpretation might be that they— at the very
beginning of the romance and before consummation of their
love— are both somehow truly deranged; for nothing says that
a deranged person

is necessarily incapable of artfully

manipulating another, both through argument and emotion.
In Saint Preux's response to Julie's admission of love
for him, he uses "happiness" five times in the space of one
and a half pages.
his ecstacy.
precision
accidental,

He calls on "Heavenly powers" to express

In fact, it may be said with some degree of

that

Saint

Preux

is

given

if you will— taste of bliss,

an

unearned— an

for he sees in

Julie's last letter "how the most lively passions retain in
a chaste soul the holy character of virtue." (41-42)

And

this possibility— that is, the reconciliation of passion and
virtue— is the greatest hope set out in the Julie, ou La
Novelle Heloise.

As there cannot be, for Rousseau, virtue

without freedom, so there cannot be virtue without passion.
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Saint-Preux's apperception of Julie as the reconciliation of
passion and virtue is the first clear prefiguring of the
manner of Julie's death.
Somehow,

the

co-existence

of

passion

and

virtue

represents a "true happiness," whereas pleasure alone, or
virtue

alone,

is

lacking.

But what

accounts

for the

possibility of this reconciliation of opposing forces of the
soul?

It

is

Julie's

highmindedness

or

discipline

or

chastity which allows her to suffer the fire of passion
without submitting to it.

But what of our young philosopher

who

this

defines

himself

sensitive man"— not

in
as

a

letter

"vile

as

seducer"!

"a

simple
Is he

and
here

experiencing anything beyond a strong and fumbling passion?
I dare say yes, but to no great credit of his own.
Whereas Julie is disciplined
nobility)

(She comes from the lower

in her wearing of her

love by a chaste and

controlled character, Saint Preux's fires of love are, as he
writes, purified by the knowing of Julie.

(43)

That is,

she, through her manipulative admonitions, controls the very
sentiments of Saint Preux.

Before she announces her love to

him, he has been partially "purified."
mean for the notion of happiness and,

But what does this
beyond that,

for

political philosophy?
The classical dualism of mind and body is operative in
Rousseau's distinction between passion and virtue.

And, if

these latter cannot be reconciled, we are left with the

necessity of the tyranny of the soul over the body. If they
could be

reconciled,

such a feat would have

political implication.
happiness:

no

small

Aristotle offers us one road to

control of the passions by virtuous moderation.

Will Rousseau reject this complex of Aristotelian notions,
as well

as Stoic notions?

Rousseau's relationship to

classical eudaemonism will remain a concern through the
Julie.

Although Rousseau does not reject this classical

complex— not for routine political reasons anyway— he does
attempt to temper it with love, compassion, and feeling— all
of which might be said to be his Christian legacy of choice.
(His broader project, of course, would be to educate the
passions, as in Emile.)
But there is more than the political for both Aristotle
and for Rousseau.

Aristotle offers a sort of private

contemplative bliss— in distinction if not in opposition to
moral virtue and its accompanying happiness; Rousseau will
offer

the

possibility

of

the

sweet

sentiment of one's own existence;

experience

of

in another way,

the
that

experience might be translated as the sweet sentiment of
one's passions in such a way that they are never dissolved
and never fulfilled.
But

let

us

return

to

Letter

IV.

In

a

purely

exclamatory remark, Saint Preux calls out to "Happiness,
pleasures, ecstacies . . . !"

We may readily see within

this trio that "happiness" might be associated with an

Aristotelian sort of virtue; "pleasures" night be associated
with mere hedonism; and "ecstacy" with a sort of religious
bliss or "felicity" (a word Rousseau uses for the first time
in this letter). These two young lovers, though undoubtedly
experiencing love in some sort of amorphous form, are in
over their heads

(as are all first-time lovers).

Saint

Preux explicitly admits that they have no experience with
passion, and he asks rhetorically if the honor which is
guiding them is a deceitful guide.

That is, they are not

being led by past experience, but by an idea— that of honor,
the political virtue par excellence.

In other words, the

lovers are attempting a political resolution to a radically
private experience.

But is that not how Western man has

always dealt with the passions— at least until the birth of
romantic love?
Denis de Rougement,

in Love in the Western World,

claims that the twelfth-century couple Abelard and

(the

original) Heloise was the first historical, as opposed to
literary, instance of the living out of the quasi-religious
myth of romantic love.3
Heloise

must

consider

Any serious exegesis of The New
the

significance

of

Rousseau's

3Denis de Rougement, Love in the Western World
(Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, 1966, first pub.
1940). This work is more than helpful to an understanding
of Rousseau's notions of love and happiness. De Rougement
claims that Rousseau was writing within the tradition of the
passion myth, an allegory of religious longing, the origins
of which go back to a Christian gnostic heresy.
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medieval allusion.

How is Julie like the original Heloise,

and how is she different from her?

How each of these

heroines seeks happiness might be the focal point of this
investigation.4

In fact, our Heloise might be not only

"new" but better.
In Letter VI, her first to her cousin Claire, Julie,
already having demanded virtue from Saint Preux, reinforces
her

commitment

to

virtue

by

soliciting

the

aid

and

protection of Claire against what she sees as a dangerous
temptation, for Saint Preux is not only worthy, he is also
friendly and virtuous.

It is then his good qualities that

compose the danger of the temptation.

We might ask:

is the nature of virtue if it is to overcome the good?

What
Or

should we, as readers, have already surmised that questions
of wealth and social status had already made Saint Preux
into some kind of evil for someone of Julie's position?
Whatever, she plans to resist him, but she plans to continue
to see him.

Why?

Is Julie not so wise as we might be led to believe by
her intelligent letters?

Or is Rousseau not working out,

through the decisions and efforts of his characters, the
very drama of humankind: the dilemma of the incongruity of
nature (Julie's passion) and society (Julie's virtue)?

OC , II, p. 3, n. 1.

At

the beginning

of

the novel,

it

seems

that

the

social

disparities between the lovers are at the source of Julie's
resistance;
dilemma?

otherwise,

why

not

marry

and

resolve

the

But, as we progress through the story into the

rarefied regions of romanticism, we shall catch glimpses of
a sort of metaphysical exigency for resistance to passion—
something less necessary, but more rewarding than virtue.
If a categorical statement may be made about Rousseau's
characters,

it

is that they are

always,

more

or

less

consciously, pursuing happiness as they understand it at any
given moment in time.

They grow and change, both due to

external as well as internal forces, but they are always
consciously pursuing the elusive goal of happiness.

Claire

touches on this reality of the often changing perceptions of
happiness in her first letter to Julie.
In Claire's response to Julie

(Letter VII), after

adumbrating several dichotomies— such as prowess in reason
versus weakness of heart, or the claims of honesty versus
the

claims

of

friendship

and

fundamental question to Julie:

faith— she

poses

the

"What do you want?"

And

here we are at the root of the whole dynamic of the love
story:
virtue?

Why must there be a conflict between passion and
Yes, the disparity in social class between Saint

Preux and Julie disallows their marriage, especially given
the type father Julie has.

And Julie could, if she wished

to end this budding relationship, merely mention it to her

mother.

There are several questions here:

want a relationship with Saint Preux?

2)

1)

Does Julie

If so, what kind

of relationship? and 3) If not, how does she choose to
resist it? These are questions the answers to which involve
the

working

out

of

Julie's

happiness.

But

the

most

universal answer might be that romantic love demands a
conflict— an irreconcilable conflict— between passion and
virtue; and the end, and origin, of romantic love is, and
was, an experience of religious union— all of which may be
taken as the barest statement of de Rougement's thesis.
Claire

pinpoints

the

sporting

feelings when she says to Julie:

nature

of

Julie's

"I understand you; you do

not wish some expedient which concludes everything; you are
willing to take from yourself the power of succumbing, but
not the honor of fighting."

(I,VII,45)

(This line of

reasoning concurs with what Claire said immediately before
about the advisability of being virtuous because you wish to
be, as opposed to because you are simple or ignorant.)
Claire,

And

admitting that some would criticize her for not

protecting her friend by simply revealing the secret romance
to her mother, concludes that she values friendship over
honesty and then allows herself
morality and its relative nature:
relationship,

a short meditation on
"I imagine that each

each age has its maxims,

its duties,

its

virtues; that what would be prudence to others would be
perfidy to me, and that instead of making us good ("sage")
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would make us bad
(I,VII,46)

("mechant")

by confusing all that."

Then Claire develops the underlying metaphors of

warfare by considering strategies of attacking this growing
love affair.

In brief, she says that, if Julie's love is

weak, they will merely conquer it; if her love, however, is
of an extreme sort, a frontal attack could lead only to
tragedy.

Claire seems practical in the extreme; and she is

first and foremost "the friend."
So what is the quintessential cause or dynamic of our
story?

Is it that Julie,

because of her nature,

must

experience the honor of the fight, or is it because her love
is too "extreme" to be, with impunity,
summary fashion.

(Of course, these two reasons are not

mutually exclusive.)
Julie wants.

dealt with in a

We still, however, do not know what

Yes, she seems to will her virtue, but does

she will her love?
One almost has the impression that this love is like a
force

of

nature

attacking

the

integrity

of

Julie's

personhood. May we not see the story as not only a battle
between passion and society, but, beyond that, a conflict
between irrational nature (or passion) and the rational and
virtuous integrity of the person.

We might further say that

these necessarily protracted battles are rare, since both
strong passion and high reason must be found in both parties
to the affaire.

Rousseau's whole life, it might be argued,

was an attempt to reconcile these warring perspectives, to
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construct a small world where love and virtue would reign
together.

Such would constitute happiness.

The story of

the Julie is a record of successes and defeats in the
pursuit of that happiness.
Saint Preux's promise to Julie that, for the sake of
her honor, he would control his passion for her becomes too
much for him to bear.

In Letter VIII, he, in fact, formally

takes back his word (like renouncing a treaty) and puts her
formally on guard.

Saint Preux gives several reasons for

his change of heart:

1)

Julie has changed and seems so

happy, whereas he is so miserable; 2)

His two month triumph

of abstinence does not seem to be appreciated by her; and,
perhaps, 3)

Julie now has Claire to protect her honor (as

if it's now a fair fight).
But at the heart of Saint Preux's despondency seems to
be something more, his realization of the complexity and
illusiveness of happiness itself.

In spite of Julie's

professed love for him, Saint Preux must say of himself:
"This unjust heart dares to desire more, when it has nothing
more

to

desire;

it

punishes

me

with

its

imaginings

("fantaisies") and makes me uneasy in the bosom ("au sein")
of happiness." (47)

The task of happiness, then, appears to

be that of delimiting our desires to the possible, to the
non-imaginary and attainable, even if not to the virtuous.
We are even led to ask if Saint Preux, after consummating
his love, will be happy.

If he is motivated by desire, one
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night be

led to say that

he will

not be.

Or is not

happiness

a state of soul, as the Stoics would hold, as

opposed to an exercise of passion, reason, and will?

The

infinity of possible imaginings seems to demand that, in
order to attain happiness, we restrain our imaginations,
because "Whoever does what he wishes is not happy, if his
needs exceed his forces."5
Saint Preux, though he appears to have had a glimpse of
the

illusory

nature

of

happiness,

chooses— and

very

explicitly!— to develop his means to new-born desire as
opposed to restraining his desires.

Baldly put, he intends

to conquer Julie, and he tells her so!
this love,

Julie must resist

not ultimately because of family and social

barriers,

but because this love is

neither natural nor

virtuous;

it is

of

rather

a creature

imagination or fancy of Saint-Preux.
society for Rousseau,

the illimitable

It, like present-day

is an expression of chaos.

The

political teaching of the Julie, if there be one, will, we
must surely expect, be an expression of order.
In

her

reply

(Letter

IX),

Julie

clarifies

the

irrational or chaotic state of Saint Preux's soul and his
less than realistic approach to happiness.

"I understand:

5 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile. II. as quoted in Roger
D. Masters, The Political Philosophy of Rousseau (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968), 95. This citation
and a brief comment are all the space Roger Masters gives to
the subject of happiness in his major work on Rousseau.
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the pleasures of vice and the honor of virtue would be for
you an agreeable fate?

Is that your morality?" (49)

In

effect, Julie accuses Saint Preux of wanting to have his
cake and eat it, too.
awakening.

Julie claims to have had a sort of

Curiously, this letter begins with the words "I

understand" and concludes with the word "happiness."

And,

surely, the letter represents a summary of Julie's theory of
happiness— at least at that given point in her life and
love.6
Letter IX is truly a wonderful communication.

After

chiding Saint Preux for wishing to "reconcile" passion and
virtue— he gave no rationale for his basically confused
desire— she seems to contradict herself by saying that she
has

"discovered"

(somehow!)

that

"the

reconciliation

("accord") of love and innocence seem to me to be paradise
on earth."

(51)

But let us review this letter in some

detail, for in it is one view of just what happiness is— in
its relation to passion and virtue.

6 "Fundamentally there is only one difference between
[the letter-novel form] and that of the memoir-form:
the
perspective of time. The memorialist knows, at the moment
of writing, how all his adventures turned out. Seeing them
from a distance, he can now distinguish the incidents and
actions which mattered. He can explain things which puzzled
him at the time, and can judge how far his own hopes and
fears were justified or mistaken.
The character in a
letter-novel, on the other hand, usually writes under the
pressure of immediate events, and cannot see their outcome."
Vivienne Mylne, The Eiahteenth-Centurv French Novel
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 149.
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In sun, Julie says that she has "discovered" that her
religious upbringing on the subjects of love and virtue was
wrong.

"I was raised with such severe maxims that the

purest love appeared to me the height of dishonor."

Her

"troubled imagination" confused the avowal of a passion with
a crime.
But no longer . . .

"I recognized that I was wrong,"

she

concludes.

But how did she come to such conclusions?

Did

the presence of Claire make the difference?

Whatever

the case, the event of this letter represents a sort of
religious

counter-conversion.

Julie

is,

in

effect,

embracing a new religion— and one might prematurely say at
this point,

a religion of love.

Before examining the

content of this new dispensation, we should remind ourselves
that Julie— at the moment of her marriage, the moment of her
full

entry

into

civil

society— will

undergo

another

conversion, one quite unlike the one at hand.
Two months of "experience" have taught Julie that (for
her

happiness)

senses have no

"my too tender heart needs love,
need of a lover." (51)

but my

Like a self-willed

new Heloise (and different from the original one), Julie
jubilantly expresses her new-found power "to love purely."
She categorically proclaims:
happiness of my life."

"This state constitutes the

She wishes she could communicate it

to Saint Preux and thus make possible a "union of hearts."
Julie has overcome the religious repression of the body by
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means of a total abstraction from the body.

But even the

nature of such an abstraction does not shelter the lovers
from the vicissitudes of fortune.

Julie fears that they are

at present as happy as they will ever be.
in

so

many

ways,

equilibrium point:

is

a

love

and

a

Theirs, she says
happiness

at

the

"The moment of possession is a crisis

for love, and any change is dangerous to ours; we can no
longer do anything but lose it." (51)
This is not a stoic happiness based essentially on the
state of an independent and disciplined soul; it is rather
a fragile happiness which depends, in part at least, on luck
or fortune (an element of happiness clearly recognized, but
not enthroned, by Aristotle) . Nonetheless, Julie eloquently
extols their present for, we sense, as long as it might
last:

"The mind is adorned, the reason enlightened, the

soul fortified, the heart joyful:
happiness?" (52)

what is lacking to our

That question will echo to the end.

The irony of this letter of Julie's, when viewed within
the context of the whole story, cannot fail to escape us:
It is Julie who will eventually marry and live the life of
the body and family, and it is Saint Preux who will become
celibate.

But, it can be argued at this point, Julie's last

word on happiness contains elements of this early, rather
juvenile expression.

In this very early letter, Julie all

but says "I understand happiness."

And that happiness that
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she claims to understand is Platonic,

at least in the

popular sense.
Letter IX is most important for two related reasons:
1)

In it, Julie confesses to a religious conversion; and 2)

She also, thereby, professes to understand the nature of
happiness

(and

love).

Her

new-found

liberation

and

understanding of love and happiness allow her to enjoy what,
in a sense, she accused Saint Preux of fantasizing about:
she pretends to attain both love and virtue at the same
time.

She has her cake and eats it, too.

The difference,

of course, is that Julie's love is "pure" and, we might add,
consistent.

Julie is a Christian.

We must, then, ask if

she is going to the well of Christian thought for the
inspiration of her enlightened view of love, or is she (and
ultimately Rousseau) essentially independent of Christian
resources?
Saint

Preux,

for

all

of

his

stumbling

and

blind

Chaplinesque antics, will accurately dissect Julie's chosen
highroad to happiness.

The short of it is that Saint Preux

is the happiest of men (because he is loved by Julie), but
also the most desolate of men

(because he is unable to

consummate his love for her).

Because he feels that the

"greatest of goods" is to be loved by Julie, he attempts
both to understand and to accommodate what is in effect her
asceticism.

But he

is

compelled— perhaps

equally

for

subjective and objective reasons— to point out to her that
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what she proposes is against nature.

And nature, it seems,

is stronger than wisdom.
But that is not his final word; Saint Preux admits to,
or pretends to, a startling transformation— no less profound
than that of Julie's recent conversion.

"Beyond you alone,"

writes Saint Preux, "I see nothing in this earthly sojourn
which is worthy of occupying my soul and my senses; no,
without you nature is no longer anything for me (emphasis
added): but its rule7 is in your eyes, and it is there that
it is invincible." (53)

Saint Preux's love for Julie and

her reaction to it has denatured him, or so it seems.

But

still Saint Preux would like to be able either to draw Julie
down to his level or to elevate himself to hers.

His

transformation is only one of necessity; it is hardly a
conversion.

For him, Julie is a sort of saint ("adorable

object"), but it is Saint Preux who is called upon by the
situation, and who responds, to the demands of sacrifice:
"not being able to reconcile my happiness with yours— judge
how I love— it is mine that I renounce."

His feelings are

fraught with "inexplicable contradictions":

"I would like

to live for you, and it is you who are taking life from me."
(54)

He is unhappy in his happiness— surely an inexplicable

contradiction, perhaps given life by this new (Christian)

7This notion of "rule" is reminiscent of the sovereign
Lady of troubadour days. It will recur.
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element of sacrifice whereby Julie is demanding that Saint
Preux die to the world of the senses.
It seems that it is this life of sacrifice and denial
which,

Rousseau

imagination.

hints,

is

at

the

root

of

a

lively

Saint Preux indulges his wishes regarding

Julie in his imagination and never in her presence.

The

imagination becomes a sort of weapon by which he avenges
himself for the respect which he is constrained to have for
her! (54)
this

His happiness, if it may be called that, is, at

point,

restraint

hardly

and

a peaceful

sacrifice

when

one.
he

He

is

is

neither

called
Stoic

to
nor

Christian, but rather a young man in love.
Nonetheless, Julie begins Letter XI by addressing Saint
Preux as "My friend," for, however confused his psyche might
be, he is attempting to sacrifice for her.

(She actually

employs the word "sacrifice.")

But, after attesting to a

growing

Preux,

"attachment"

to

Saint

Julie

raises

the

labyrinthine question of the possibility of using love, or
expressions of love, as a weapon of conquest and seduction.
(54)

Julie always seems aware of such a possibility.

But

she immediately takes back the thought of it and declares
theirs to be a union of souls.
physics,

which

Valediction:

is

reminiscent

Using a conceit from
of

Forbidding Mourning,"

John

Donne's

"A

she expresses their
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mutuality and inseparability:

"like those magnets' of which

you spoke to me [in a physics lesson], that had, let's say,
the same movements in different places, we would feel the
same things at the two poles of the world." (55)
Not only their sensations or feelings but also their
happiness must forever be a mutual experience; they have a
"common destiny," declares Julie.

And reason should be in

the service of love in the conduct— preferably guided by
herself— of their pursuit of a common happiness.

Though

they may never achieve a mutual understanding, as they now
have a mutual sensibility, Julie, in fine Solomonic fashion,
declares that she is sure of one thing:

"I know that the

opinion (avis) of the one who least separates his happiness
from the happiness of the other is the opinion that must be
followed." (56)

So, Julie has given the couple a code of

conduct based on love and supported by reason.
opinion at work for the sake of happiness.

It is right

And it is a sort

of contract.
Julie makes several things clear in Letter XI:

1)

The

couple will find happiness together, or they will not find
it at all; 2)

The voice of love and the voice of reason

give like counsel in this pursuit of mutual happiness; 3)
Saint Preux must learn to follow the dictates of his heart
as opposed to the delirium of his heated imagination; and 4)

8 The word (amant) for magnet and lover is the same in
French.
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The whole question of friendship is broached.

It should be

clear by now that their deliberate and explicit concern is
happiness, in the sense of eudaemonism, as opposed to mere
pleasure.
In Letter XII, Saint Preux turns over to Julie the
control and "care of our common happiness" (56), though he
can still not think of her without experiencing an ecstacy
which

he

knows

he

must

conquer.

And,

surprisingly,

reclaiming his position of authority and responsibility, he
proposes a "method" to their program of studies which,
because of their year-long romantic concern with each other,
have suffered.

One might glimpse a certain irony in that,

in one breath, Saint Preux submits to Julie the control over
his very will and that, a moment later, he assumes the
consummate posture of (her) teacher by proposing to her a
new method for the project of their studies together.

He

is, paradoxically, taking an active part in his submission.
Just what is the gist of Saint Preux's "methode"?

Does

it relate in any specific way to the first part of Letter
XII wherein he submits his will to Julie's rule?

In other

words, does his method intend to promote in an explicit way
their common happiness? The presentation might be distilled
as follows:

1)

This method will repair the damage done to

our pursuit of knowledge— damage caused by our distractions;
2)

This "systeme" extracts much from little, as opposed to

extracting little from many things; 3)

Our knowledge will
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be converted to our use and nourishment, as opposed to being
a means to commerce or fame; 4)

"Read little, and meditate

much on your readings"— or talk a lot about what you read;
5)

Depend on yourself,

rather than on books,

for your

ideas.
Of course, nothing is ever as simple as it seems with
Rousseau.

The method, or system, proper takes about a page

to describe; following that are several pages of elaboration
and de facto adjustments— one might
contradictions.

even say,

allusive

For we have to keep in mind that this

method might not be merely for academic instruction, but
also for the attainment of happiness.
Saint Preux tells Julie that she, unlike many others,
is a worthy candidate for the prescribed method, because her
"active intelligence works on a book so as to make of it
another book, sometimes better than the first one." (58)

It

might be premature to conclude, within the confines of this
investigation, but our analysis of the Julie up to this
point lends some evidence to the position that in the Julie
Rousseau is, in fact, writing two books:

There is the

popular and romantic story of the two lovers, and there is
a philosophical subplot, treating essentially the notion of
human happiness, wherein the irony of the characters (as
Bloom might have been suggesting) is that they might express
in the subplot the very opposite of what they do or express
in the ostensible plot.

From the topic of self-reliance in reading and in the
generation of ideas, Saint Preux broaches the subject of
what might be called a moral aestheticism or an aesthetic
morality:

"As soon as we return back into ourselves, each

person senses that which is good ("bien"), each discerns
that which is beautiful; we have no need of being taught to
know either the one or the other. . . . But examples of the
very good ("bon") and the very beautiful are more rare and
less known, and it is necessary to go far from ourselves in
search

of

them."

(58)

Contrary

to

popular

opinion,

greatness does exist, and we must recognize its existence in
order to imitate it.

We should find our principles and

rules within ourselves and we should leave alone all vain
disputations on happiness and virtue; "let us give ourselves
great

examples

to

imitate rather than vain systems

to

follow." (59)
So, it is not all books from which we should maintain
a radical independence.

Rather, stories of heroes should be

cherished like a bible.
Then Rousseau takes off into what might itself be
called a "vain system."

"I have always believed," writes

Saint Preux, "that the good was only the beautiful put into
action.

. . .

It follows from this idea that taste is

perfected by the same means as is wisdom."
is hinted at:

An epistemology

The dichotomy between "seeing" and "feeling"

must be blurred; we must "try to judge the beautiful by
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inspection and the good by feeling"; but they are ultimately
the same.

Is such the only road to wisdom, or only one road

among many?
as well

At the least, we must learn to see and to feel

as to reason.

Not all humans are capable of

following this method or way to wisdom, for "it does not
belong to all hearts to be moved at the first sight of
Julie."

That is, all hearts are not put in the favored

position of being able to recognize the beauty and goodness
of Julie.
Saint-Preux

concludes

by

explaining

that

his

epistemology (the term is mine) is why he limits all of
Julie's studies to books of taste and mores, of virtues and
of good writing.
examples.

Everything in his method centers around

But, as we observed above, Rousseau's, or rather

Saint Preux's, rejection of the study of systems is based on
a sort of system itself:

the coincidence of beauty and

goodness, with no mention of a distinctive place for truth.
So, Saint Preux plans on cutting back on Julie's subjects of
study.

The rhyme and reason of his enumerated changes

hardly seem to follow from his method of examples only:

1)

He will eliminate languages (with the exception of Italian
which Julie already knows and loves); 2)

He will drop

algebra and geometry, but will retain physics; 3)

He will

"renounce forever modern history, except that of Switzerland
(and, by implication, he will retain ancient history); 4)
With a few exceptions, he will eliminate all poets, and,
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without exception, he will proscribe all romance novels.
Thus, for the most part, Julie will study physics and, we
assume, ancient history.

We are led to ask how the study of

physics could be grounded on examples?
because physics

offers— if not

Perhaps,

examples— then

it is

at

least

metaphors of nature, as in the case, mentioned by Saint
Preux in this letter,
magnets;

such

of the conceit of the lovers as

metaphors

are

somehow

natural

and

not

imaginary.
If our goal in education is to imitate— no, even to
become heroes, then Rousseau all but discounts the need of
formal education, even of the classics, at least for Julie
and him:

"true love is a devouring fire which carries its

ardor into the other feelings, and animates them with a new
vigor.

That is why it is said that love makes Heroes.

Happy the one whom fate has so placed as to become one, and
who would have Julie for a lover!" (61)
This equation of Julie and himself with the heroes
finds resonance in a general characterization of the Julie,
expressed in the Second Preface: Rousseau's interlocutor is
accusing the novel of having nothing out of the ordinary; in
effect, he judges the novel to be boring; Rousseau responds,
"That is to say, you demand common men and rare events?
believe that I would prefer the contrary." (13)
let us move back to Letter XII.

I

So, now,

Saint Preux is arguing that

men of all ages are not the same.

We do not admire the

99

ancients just because they are ancient; rather, "in days
gone by one did great things with small means, and, today,
one does the opposite." (60)
Does

the

above

not

enjoin

the

question

of

the

comparability of the personages of The New Heloise with
those of ancient heroics?

This may be another way of saying

that Rousseau's subjects are human happiness and the human
soul— both illuminated by human love.
ground of a new heroic!

For Rousseau, the

The frontier of greatness is within

and concerns only happiness,
method attempts to make clear.

as Saint Preux's pedagogic
In other words, to follow

the above analogies, great souls, in the microcosm of love,
comprise the true subject matter of the Julie.
of the

"events" are not at issue;

The rarity

only the nature and

development of the souls of the personages.

One might even

say that an inner monologue of a person looking both out on
nature and, simultaneously, within himself would be, for
Rousseau, a more appropriate literary form for his subject
matter.
form.)

(The Reveries seem, in fact, to be just such a
Is love, for Rousseau, merely a convenient physical

metaphor for the exploration of nature and happiness?

And

is the tableau of "heroes" portrayed in the Julie merely a
schema of the human soul?

Posed otherwise:

Is love, other

than love of self (amour de soi), necessary for happiness?
Just what is the status of the Reveries?
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In this Letter XIII, Julie, in effect, proposes a test
for happiness and she says that she is "reserving a little
surprise"

for

Saint-Preux,

ostensibly

because

of

his

apparent maturity in arranging their program of studies.
She opens the letter:

"I was in fact telling you that

we were happy; nothing instructs me of it so well as the
pain

that

situation."

I

experience

(61)

at

the

least

change

in

our

Years later, in The Reveries. Rousseau

posited a test for true happiness; it has to do with its
eternal nature:
it is known here.

"As for happiness which lasts, I doubt that
In our most intense enjoyments, there is

hardly an instant when the heart can truly say yes to us:
I would like this instant to last forever." (Butterworth, p.
68)

Julie openly assumes that Saint-Preux could also pass

the test, because she says that "she feels" his impatience
at their short separation— that is, at a change in their
situation.
Julie is won over, it seems, by Saint-Preux's program
of study, because it has nothing in it, we must surmise,
that would enhance a seduction.

Saint-Preux, Julie says to

him, you have made "sacrifices for virtue." (62)

As his

reward (She still knows that he is a child!), she will take
him into the woods, along with her cousin Claire, to offer
him "a little surprise."
engaged,

It is very probable that Julie is

consciously or unconsciously,

in a process

sublimating Saint-Preux's feelings for her.

of

Surely, he does
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not want the situation to remain exactly as it is.

So, if

that is the happiness test, then he is not happy, as it
seems that Julie is.
No sooner does Julie offer Saint-Preux a test for
happiness— "I would like this instant to last forever"--than
the reader is asked to apply the test to the behavior of
Saint-Preux,

subsequent to

allowed him.(XIV)

"the fatal kiss"

that Julie

As a result of the kiss, he is beside

himself— drunk, insane, disturbed— saying that "this memory
. . . will be the agony and the happiness of my life." (64)
Is it happiness, since he would have liked the kiss in the
arbor to have lasted forever; or is it not happiness, since
he is not "happy" to live with the memory of the kiss.

If

true happiness is a permanent state of the soul (as the test
itself implies), then Saint-Preux fails.

One could say, his

soul is not well disposed toward happiness.
Julie's response to Saint-Preux's delirious complaints
about the cruelty of the kiss is to ask him calmly, and
without explanation, to separate himself from her for an
unspecified period of time.

She also gives him money for

the trip, which he considers an insult to his honor.
In Letter XVIII,

Saint-Preux relates that he has

submitted to Julie's instructions to leave town in spite of
the pain

(and near delirium)

it caused him.

But, more

importantly, there are three statements of Platonism in the
letter:

1)

"each step that took me from you separated my
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body

from

my

soul

and

gave

(sentiment) of death." (68)

me

2)

an

anticipated

sense

"I have dragged into my

exile only the slightest part of myself:
in me remains ceaselessly near you.

all that is alive

. . .

it penetrates

everywhere like a subtle vapor, and I am happier in spite of
you than I was ever with your permission." (69)

3)

then he finishes the letter with an analogy of death:

And
"I

must fly from everything and live alone in the world, if I
cannot live in it with you." (69)
The point of these Platonic statements of duality may
be seen as a lover's desperate attempt to save for himself
what he sees as a failing love affair; it may be seen as a
true philosophic conversion; or it might be Saint-Preux's
answer to Julie's Letter IX, in which she announced that she
wanted only a spiritual relationship.
perhaps,

fighting

back,

for

between

Is Saint-Preux,
Julie's

professed

Platonism and this letter of Saint-Preux's, there is the
kiss in the arbor, which represents Julie's compromise with
her earlier avowal of only a spiritual relationship.

Is

Saint-Preux not here being "holier than the Church" in an
attempt to win back Julie's affection?
Saint-Preux fears that Julie has forgotten him (after
five days of separation), but he also dees some maturing:
He now realizes why, in novels, so much is made of lovers'
separations.(XIX)
can

properly

pass

"Today I feel how little a peaceful soul
judgment

on

the

passions,

and

how

103

senseless

it

is

experienced." (70)

to

laugh

at

feelings

have

never

Saint-Preux has at least discovered the

formal content of the Arabic aphorism,
where it falls."

you

"The fire only burns

He concludes the letter by consenting to

being tested by Julie.
Saint-Preux claims that from Julie one learns
"that divine union of virtue, love, and nature."

He also

points out to Julie that she is loved by and loves many
people, whereas he loves only her.

He says that, having no

happiness himself, he will share Julie's.

Needless to say,

Saint-Preux senses the vacuity of his own existence, in the
very act of experiencing his own existence for the first
time.(XXI)
Mountain habitation seems to give Saint-Preux's
thought and feelings a certain force and impetuosity.

He

speaks of "a mixture of savage nature and cultivated nature"
in the mountains where, he says, one loses oneself.
the process of sublimation continues:

Yet,

"Would that I could

right here bring my whole soul together in yours, and become
in turn the universe for you." (83)

One could say that this

manifestation of sublimation is the mere work of prolonged
separation.(XXIII)
Saint-Preux says that he cannot take payment from M.
d'Etange for his tutoring lessons, as the Baron now insists,
because it would either affect his behavior toward Julie or
because he might be forced to betray his employer.(XXIV)
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The question of honor regarding the money is addressed by
Saint-Preux:

"True honor

[unlike that based on public

opinion] is the essence of true happiness, because it alone
inspires that permanent feeling of inner satisfaction which
alone is able to make a thinking being happy." (84)

It is

this true honor which Saint-Preux appeals to in refusing
payment for his services, unlike the original Abelard.
When the letters of Heloise and Abelard fall
between your hands, you will know what I am
telling you of this reading and of the conduct of
that Theologian.
I have always pitied Heloise;
she had a heart made for love: but Abelard ever
appeared to me but a miserable creature who
deserved his fate and one knowing as little of
love as of virtue. After having judged him, will
it be necessary
for me to
imitate him?
Misfortune to whoever preaches a morality that he
does not wish to practice! He who is blinded by
his passion up to that point is soon punished by
it and loses his taste for the sensations
(sentiments) to which he has sacrificed his
honor.
Love is deprived of its greatest charm
when honesty abandons it; in order to feel its
full price, the heart must delight in it, and it
must elevate us in elevating the one we love.
Take away the idea of perfection, and you take
away enthusiasm; take away esteem, and love is no
longer anything.
How would a woman be able to
honor a man who dishonors himself? How will he
be able himself to adore her who has no fear of
abandoning herself to a vile corruptor?
That
way, there will soon be mutual distrust; love
will no longer be for them but a shameful
business: they will have lost honor and will not
have found felicity. (85-86)
Julie and Saint-Preux,
Heloise and Abelard.

ironically,

retrace the steps of

And they, like Heloise and Abelard,

spend their lives in an attempt to redeem their love from
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any dishonor.9 In retrospect, how pitiable is this portrait
of the young Saint-Preux, so sure of his right thought and
action and so critical

of the passions

of others:

a

prejudice which he claimed to have some understanding of
just a brief time ago!!
This show of strength by Saint-Preux seems almost to
have weakened Julie.

"I had predicted it, the time of

happiness is passed like lightening."
followed by a statement of grief:
weight of your absence crushing me.

This premonition is

"I feel, my friend, the
I cannot live without

you, I know, and this frightens me most." (88)
Saint-Preux answers Julie's letter of despondency with
a call to action— with the spectre of the possibility of

9In The New Heloise. the relationship between honor and
love replaces that, in the original letters of Heloise and
Abelard, of sanctity and love. Whereas Heloise and Abelard
achieve honor through a hard won sanctity, Julie and SaintPreux achieve a sort of sanctity through a hard won honor.
Sublimation is an arduous chore for the eighteenth-century
couple, whereas it is an expected mode of living for the
medieval couple, despite Heloise's difficulties at the
outset of their separation.
Heloise and Abelard reach
sublimation through Christ. For Julie and Saint-Preux, the
mystical heights are attained through a secularized, if one
likes, form of courtly love. It could almost be said that
happiness is more readily desired by Julie and Saint-Preux,
but less tenuous for Heloise and Abelard. Just what each
couple does in order to redeem its love from dishonor or
unholiness is not essentially different:
Heloise becomes
the bride of Christ; Julie, that of Wolmar; and both Abelard
and Saint-Preux begin journeys for some philosophicaltheological truth— journeys which, as far as we know, had no
final terminations.
See PC. II f p. 3, n. 1, for a
discussion of Rousseau's use of the medieval allusion of
Heloise and Abelard.
The Editors do not give as much
importance to this allusion as I do.
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losing happiness forever.
hedonist's posture.

Carpe diem!

He borrows the

He begins by describing the sad dilemma

of the "sensitive soul."

"He seeks supreme felicity without

remembering that he is a man:

his heart and his reason will

be incessantly at war." (89)

He says that without her he

would never have felt this tension between high and low.
Then he proceeds to convince Julie that the time is right to
act on this "eternal decree from heaven":

"it is the first

duty of life to unite with the person whose duty it is to
make life sweet for us."

(92)

Saint-Preux then attacks

Julie's commitment to chastity, saying that it robs her of
both reason and true virtue.
He reminds Julie that their youth is passing and tells
her that "You are seeking a chimerical happiness for a time
when we will no longer be."

(93)

Saint-Preux pressures

Julie to the maximum— with a slightly veiled threat of
suicide.
Claire informs Saint-Preux that the separation, coupled
with his last letter, has sent Julie to the brink of death;
she is so ill that her mother would even like him to return,
despite the presence of M. d'Etange.
and very ill.

Julie is hysterical

She complains of everyone close to her—

including Claire.

Her illness is apparently the result of

the separation from Saint-Preux.
Julie confesses to Claire to have lost her innocence.
Who,

she asks,

called that "cruel one" back?

But she
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eventually blames only herself:
remembered only love." (96)
with her.

"I forgot everything and

Julie asks Claire to come live

Claire tells Julie that her, Julie's, passion for

Saint-Preux was life or death— that is, she had to give in
to her passion or die.

She agrees to join Julie.(XXX)

Saint-Preux comments on how incompatible impulses can
be in one heart.

Of himself:

"Drunk with love and sensual

pleasure, my heart swims in sadness; I suffer and languish
in the midst of supreme felicity." (99)

He chides Julie for

having remorse for having obeyed natural and sacred laws.
He proposes that they give themselves to each other as
husband and wife, which would right any wrong.
himself her other half.

He calls

But their age of innocence is over.

As Julie writes, "our letters were facile and charming . .
. there was no need of artifice or coloring.
happy time is no longer." (102)

. . . That

Most of all, Julie regrets

having betrayed the integrity of her love— "my regret is
much less having given too much to love than having deprived
it of its greatest charm."
hedonism:

They have fallen into a form of

"We have sought out pleasure and happiness has

flown from us."

When all is said, Julie is hurt by the

realization that

she and Saint-Preux are no more than

"common

who

lovers"

experience

nothing

but

passion," as opposed to "a pure and holy flame."

"fits

of

(In Part

VI, when Julie proposes that Saint-Preux and Claire marry,
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he protests on grounds that he would become a mere "common
husband.")
Again in our reading, we must ask just what Julie
wants.

She never said she wanted marriage and she never

said, as far as the reader knows, that she wanted sex.

This

letter supports the Julie of the Platonic love, the Julie
who needs a lover for her spirit, but no lover for her body.
So it is for the second time that Julie asks Saint-Preux to
be her holy knight, in fact:

"Be then from now on my sole

hope. . . . May your worth erase my shame. . . . As long as
you will be worthy

of respect,

I will not be totally

contemptible." (103)

There seems little question that Julie

is resurrecting, to an unawares Saint-Preux,
notion of love:

a medieval

that of courtly love.10

The lovers,
social situations.

under the circumstances,

are uneasy in

Addressing Saint-Preux as "friend," as

she did in Letter XXXII, Julie observes that "we love too
much to be able to so restrain ourselves"; she goes on to
delineate a private from a public life, and concludes that
a solitary life would, for them, go further in nourishing
their passions.(XXXIII)

The grand Rousseauean theme of

10See Denis de Rougemont, Love in the Western World, for
one explication of the origin and nature of the passion
myth.
See specifically pp. 225-28 for an interesting,
though not always correct, interpretation of The New
Heloise.
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solitude11 is introduced in a grand way, as Julie suns it
up:

"All grand passions are formed in solitude."

It

nourishes love and melancholy; but /'oes solitude, we night
prematurely ask, nourish happiness?

(Julie concludes the

letter by writing cryptically of the possibility of her
pregnancy.)
The importance of the solitary, or private, life for
the achievement of happiness has been dealt with in our
earlier discussions, especially those of The Confessions and
The Reveries. Here, however, we are dealing with a relative
solitude— that is, one essentially of two lovers.

We may

eventually

direct

have

to

conclude

that

there

is

a

relationship between the attainability of happiness and the
degree of privacy or solitude (that is, apoliticality); but
we might also have to show a shifting notion of solitude as
the

particular

notions

of

happiness

come

forward,

specifically, ranging from radically private to radically
public.

Simply stated:

In The New Heloise. Rousseau is

portraying the pursuit of happiness of two people.

The

resolution of the work will have only partial, and perhaps
not ultimate, application.

Which, we might be led to ask,

“See PC. I I . p. 105, n. 1.
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is the higher form of life— solitary, partial association,
or political?12
Saint-Preux agrees to return to the solitary life and
even generalizes the value of the decision:

"the heart is

not at all nourished in the tumult of society."

(107)

Ironically, he asks if it is not preferable to meet for "a
single instant and then die" rather than take all the
precautions that would be necessary even in a solitary
milieu.

This calls to mind that mere solitude is no total

answer to the happiness of the couple.
require

a

disposition

of

the

soul

Happiness will

as well

as

of

the

environment.
Then, Saint-Preux writes on blindly about his inability
to fathom the nature of her secret [about her pregnancy].
It should perhaps also be pointed out— since I shall argue
for the importance of the notion of cortezia in the Julie—
that

Saint-Preux playfully portrays

the

young

men who

showered attention on Julie at a party as "cavaliers," a
word which in the seventeenth century was substituted for

,2If the love of two people is the best path to
happiness for most people and if that happiness is best
nourished in solitude, that might be a political problem in
an urban age. For a discussion of the life of the Golden
Age (the family) versus the political life of Sparta, see
Judith N. Shklar, Men and Citizens— A Study of Rousseau's
Social Theory (New York: Cambridge, first pub. 1968).

Ill

the old French word "chevalier."

This latter word means

simply "knight."13
Continuing

repeatedly

to

address

Saint-Preux

"friend," Julie wishes her fears of lover allayed.

as
She

wants not only a lover but a friend— not only his heart but
his faith.

And she proposes, as an "expedient," a sort of

initiation for Saint-Preux— in the presence of Julie and
Claire— into an order of knighthood.(XXXV)

Once he has

sworn never to commit an act of treachery against his love
for Julie, "you shall have the accolade and be acknowledged
as sole vassal and loyal Knight." (Ill)

By referring to

Saint-Preux as a "chevalier," Julie communicates doubly:

1)

She obviously accentuates the courtly nature of their love;
and 2)
of

She distinguishes the order of their love from that

the

"cavaliers,"

whose

"chevaliers"— now become clear.
on the times.

natures— as

degenerate

It is likewise a commentary

It will become progressively clearer just how

important a role the notion of courtly love will play in
Rousseau's notion of happiness— at least in the happiness of
the lovers.
Julie arranges a love tryst, so she must be comfortable
with Saint-Preux's profession of fealty.
(XXXVIII)

This

letter

from

Saint-Preux

dichotomies and ecstasy— if not happiness.

He responds.
is

one

of

He appears

13See G. Cayrou, Le Francais Classiaue (Paris:
1923), citation: "cavalier," p. 127.

Didier,
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profoundly

touched

by

between Julie and Clair.

the

spectacle

of

the

friendship

He compares their peaceful bliss

to voluptuousness, their friendship to love, and falls into
an exciting eroticism: "No, nothing, nothing on earth could
excite

such

a

voluptuous

tenderness

than

your

mutual

caresses, and the spectacle of two lovers would have offered
up to my eyes a less delicious sensation." (115)

The letter

ends with a paean to nature and a hedonistic description of
eternity:

"How happy we would be if Heaven removed from

life all the tedious intervals which separate such moments
[that is, their rendez-vous]." (117)

The thought of several

nights with Julie has sparked the "fire of love" which, in
turn, animates all of nature.

The abiding interest of the

dichotomies of this letter lies on the side of "pure bliss"
as opposed to "voluptuousness"; it is a harbinger of courtly
love and its role in this drama.
After that ecstatic song of nature's complicity in the
approaching love-making of our couple, the cold blast of
duty cleans the pleasurable prospects away.

Julie solicits

Saint-Preux's assistance in the rescue of a servant, Claude
Anet, from the obligations of an indenture, so that he and
a neglected charge of Julie's, Fanchon, might marry.

This

sacrifice for virtue— they must postpone their rendez-vous—
this altruism,

represents a "[rare] opportunity to make

people happy"; it is a sort of sublimation of the activity
of our couple.

It is a choice for virtue in the pursuit of

happiness.

It is, if not a turning point in the novel, then

a healthy respite and a sort of reality-test for the lovers.
Saint-Preux agrees to comply with Julie's wish to help the
couple.

He claims, however, to be doing it for Julie alone

and not for "hateful virtue" which is interfering with his
preferred plans.

He arranges the release of Claude Anet

from military service, and to Julie expresses what must be
termed a sense of happiness:

"How happy one is to do good

in serving her whom he loves and thus unite the charms of
love and of virtue in the same act of homage."14

Is this

not a solution to the Kantian riddle of how to unite
pleasure and duty?

Is this not happiness?

And is it not

based on the tradition of courtly love, though not yet fully
purified as a concept within our story?

As mentioned

earlier, Rousseau's characters do not always possess a high
degree of self-awareness; and this is especially true of
Saint-Preux.

Nonetheless,

after professing

a profound

pleasure in performing this virtuous service and after
announcing Julie to be divine,

Saint-Preux concludes by

raising the possibility of rescheduling their love tryst at
the chalet.

The effect is clearly comic, and the conflict

between appearances and reality shows itself in a profound
and, simultaneously, humorous fashion.(XLIII)

140n the use of the word "homage,"
Francais Classioue. p. 803.

see Cayrou,

Le
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Julie continues to extol their act of virtue, saying
that it is always sweet to have performed such an act and
that "never has anyone been seen repenting of a good deed."
Also, Lord Bomston's arrival is announced.
Letter XLVI,
disguised structure:

from Julie to Saint-Preux,

1)

has a

Men are always thinking of sex; 2)

This is because men are biologically— and, consequently,
also in their souls— different from women; and 3)

Because

of all this, women make better friends to women than do men.
And by telling Saint-Preux that Claire is "a hundred times
more learned" than he in friendship, Julie continues to
employ devices

intended to purify and challenge Saint-

Preux' s feelings for her.

Though the superior in matters of

love, Julie remains vulnerable to its heartache and she
seems desperate to raise Saint-Preux to her level of feeling
before it is too late for them both.

Julie's intention, I

feel, is to reconcile love and friendship— the existential
equivalent of the reconciliation of passion and reason,
pleasure and duty, the private and the public.
could

be

focused

this

way:

Does

love

or

The issue
friendship

constitute the happiness of the partial association?
Saint-Preux

confesses

to

Julie

his

feeling

of

uneasiness about Bomston's seeming infatuation with Julie.
Apparently, because of being under the spell of his love for
Julie, Saint-Preux also confesses to having enjoyed Italian
music for the first time.

Saint-Preux describes in rather

technical terms the superiority of Italian music over French
music.

This confession is deceptively important to the

development of our romance.

Simply:

Saint-Preux has

undergone an emotional conversion of sorts— concretized by
the abandonment of French harmony
melody.

in favor of

Italian

For him, his conversion represents the embracing of

a music of the heart, the soul, and their sentiments— and a
departure from a music of technicality.

We may say that

this conversion is not merely aesthetic, because Saint-Preux
radicalizes the importance of this music of the song of the
heart and the soul.
metaphysical, value:

He gives his preference moral, and even
"the pleasure [of Italian music] did

not stop at the ear; it penetrated to the soul." (133)

And

we may say that the artistic change of preference represents
some sort of change of heart.

He had heard the same birds

singing before, but to no effect.

In fact, Saint-Preux

makes no secret of the fact that he associates his awakening
to Italian music with his love for Julie ("I had only one
regret [while listening to the Italian music); but it would
not leave me; it was that another than you was making the
sounds that so touched me.11)

It seems that Saint-Preux has

taken one step more toward worthiness of Julie's love.
an ironic perversion of this episode:

But

It is a castrato who

teaches Saint-Preux the superiority of the Italian song and
ministers to the opening of the heart to new and deeper
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sentiments.

Claire's question reverberates:

Does the soul

have a sex? (See Chapter 5, Part II)
Whatever the case with Saint-Preux's conversion to
Italian music, Julie finds it exasperating that he fears
losing her to Lord Bomston and, at the same time, speaks of
"songs"!

And this becomes an occasion for Julie to return

to their night of love, when the loss of her innocence
precluded any further aspiration toward happiness.

She is

fed up with Saint-Preux, for he is not good at the game of
love.

He knows not how to protect love, only how to take

its pleasures.
is dire:

She must take the helm.

But her situation

"Is it possible ever to have happiness where shame

and remorse reign?

God! What a cruel state, to be able

neither to bear one's crime, nor to repent of it. . . . I am
from here on at the sole mercy of fate.

It is no longer

either a question of force or of virtue, but of fortune
(chance)

and of prudence,

and it is not a question of

extinguishing a love which will last my lifelong, but of
making that love innocent (harmless) or of dying guilty."
(136-37)

What would make her love "innocent"?

Julie provisionally defines happiness as depending on
innocence— an innocence which could, of course, be bought at
the price of repentance.
nor repent.

But she can neither bear her crime

The classical answer to the quest for virtue—

force or strength of soul— no longer applies, for she wishes
to overcome nothing.

The answer must be found elsewhere:
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It is in luck and in prudence that this love night play
itself out successfully.

Simply stated, the only way back

to the pursuit of happiness is to make their love both
innocent and harmless.

For, as the French expression goes,

Chase nature away, and she will return at a gallop!

Julie

is applying the lessons of Emile: Do not attempt to conquer
the passions, but rather raise them up to desire what they
should desire.

Julie, as has been pointed out before, is in

the process of raising Saint-Preux into manhood and into
love.

It seems that, in order to make her love innocent,

Saint-Preux must discover true love.

He must become Julie's

equal!
At a social function, Saint-Preux has evidently drunk
too

much

presence.

and

has

used

offensive

language

in

Julie's

She takes this opportunity to explain to him just

what "true love" is, for obviously he does not know what it
is.

The middle section of this letter (L) is a sort of

manifesto to and eulogy of "true love."

Its essence is

intimately bound to that of "true happiness" and, seemingly,
at least partially exclusive of that of "friendship."
speaks in a high tone:
I do not know if I am mistaken, but it seems to
me that true love is the most chaste of all
bonds.
It is true love, it is its divine fire
which
knows
how
to
purify our
natural
inclinations by concentrating them in a single
object; it is true love which rescues us from
temptations and which, except
for that
one
object, makes a member of the opposite sex no
longer anything for the other
sex. For an

Julie
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ordinary woman, every man is always a man; but
for her whose heart loves, there is no man but
her lover...They do not desire, they love. The
heart does not follow the senses, it guides them;
it covers their bewilderment with a delightful
veil.
No, [in true love], there is nothing
obscene such as debauchery and its gross
language. . . . Believe me, my friend, debauchery
and love would not know how to live together and
are not even able to balance off each other. The
heart makes true happiness when there is love,
and nothing can take its place as soon as love is
no more, (emphasis added) (138-39)
This

is

a radically

happiness.
question

sublime understanding of

love and

True lovers do not desire; thus, there is no
of

moderation

Aristotelian virtue.

of

this

love

to

a

sort

of

(It seems that rest, not motion, is

the proper state of man.)

We can only wonder just what a

love, which is not ultimately a passion, must be.

Surely,

we are in the vicinity of a neo-Platonic courtly love
tradition.

And love is not happiness, but it is the cause

of it, or is at least its context.

Nor should we forget to

point out that Julie, though continuing to address her lover
as "friend," seems to silently relegate friendship to a
level below the most chaste bond of love.

The non-desiring,

or restful, state of true love might well stem from its very
particularity:

the longing is allowed to come to rest in a

limited goal.
Letter L offers a rather transparent example of how
Rousseau employs a small incident, such as drunkenness, to
lay down notions of highly unorthodox import.

Whether or
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not, however, these notions are fully his own— as opposed to
those of a character he created--would be premature to say.
Saint-Preux claims, at great length, to have no memory
of having, while under the influence, offended Julie.

He

swears off wine forever and requests that he be punished
fairly and severely.
himself.

He is applying a stern ethic to

Julie answers that she thinks his renunciation of

wine to be, on practical and theoretical grounds, no less
than ridiculous and more unpleasant a thought than the
"wicked words" he spoke to her.

She releases him from his

vow and asks him merely to make an expiatory libation to the
Graces, in her presence.

She then turns to a discussion of

her encounter with Italian music, via Bomston's castrato
Regianino.
morality.

She seems more interested in beauty than in
And she seems to agree with Saint-Preux regarding

the superior nature of Italian music, but she speaks of it
in a more restrained and even rationalistic manner than had
he.

Julie is giving Saint-Preux a hard time on two counts:

the vow not to drink and his enthusiasm for Italian music.
Why?

Let us offer answers which merely fine-tune our

understanding of Julie's project of, let us say, educating
Saint-Preux:

1)

Just

before Saint-Preux's

letter

of

disavowal of wine, Julie had written to him not only of his
offensive

words,

but

she had

manifesto of "true love,"

also

written

as she understood it.

a

sort

of

He writes

back primarily defending himself and offering to take this
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heroic step of renouncing wine.

Julie probably thought the

occasion called for more substance— at least a passing
reference to her idea on "true love."
muted reaction to Italian music,

2)

And regarding the

it might be said that,

since the discovery of this music seemed to have made him
say and pretend to understand more about love than he truly
did,

Julie wants to

reaction.

slow him down with her manner of

(Be it noted that Julie repeatedly continues to

address Saint-Preux throughout these letters as "my friend,"
"my dear friend," etc.
It

is

interlude.

Julie

who

He does not generally follow suit.)
initiates

their

second

romantic

Because their plans for several rendez-vous were

disappointed, Julie proposes a drastic and dangerous plan:
that Saint-Preux meet her in her bedchamber.

She vows that

she is ready to die in his arms, if they are discovered.
Saint-Preux has a nervously excited time in Julie's chamber,
as he simultaneously writes of his emotions at being in this
sanctum.

(He has conveniently found paper and pencil, while

waiting for Julie.)
Saint-Preux writes about his second and his ultimate
night of love with Julie.

And here his sentiments seem to

catch up with the false conversion to that Italian music of
the soul.

He begins this recapitulation of the night of

love not by addressing Julie as "my love," but by "my sweet
Friend."

Immediately thereafter he refers to Julie as "the

beloved of my heart."

There is no way to summarize his
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expressive effusions, except to say that he is a convert to
"true love."

What he had thought was happiness was only

pleasure, he says; he was a child, now he is a nan.
What Saint-Preux claims to value most from the night of
love was "the close union of souls" (Remember Letter LI and
his cavalier appeal to "the union of our souls.").

He

questions his past "love" and announces that "My sentiments-do not doubt it— have since yesterday undergone a change of
nature."

In the hour after love, they talked and he says

that, at that time, "1 adored you and desired nothing."

The

happiness was "eternal" and "peaceful" and "of the soul":
"It is the first time in all my days that I experienced it
with

you;

and,

however,

judge

what

strange

change

I

experienced; it is, of all the hours of my life, the one
which is most dear to me and the only one that I would have
wanted to prolong eternally." (148-49)

(This is the same

definition or test for happiness that Rousseau gives in The
Reveries— to wish the moment to last forever.)
Saint-Preux then seems to pose a senselessly rhetorical
question.

In effect:

Was what I felt before love or is

what I feel now love? (149)

I contend that his questioning

makes sense only if we recast the question:
lover before,

and am I now your friend?

friendship be reconciled?
nature

of

his

present

Was I your
Can love and

Admitting the more peaceful

feelings,

Saint-Preux

says

sweetness of friendship tempers the frenzies of love."

"The
But
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the notions of love and friendship seem to become confused
in the ensuing paragraphs, or, at the least, he is speaking
(unawares?)

of

two

sorts

of

"love."

Friendship

is

associated with sweetness and peace, and love with frenzies
(emportements). But Saint-Preux tells Julie that he has the
suspicion that she knows how to love better than he.
has more deeply penetrated her soul.
makes her so enchanting.

Love

And it is that which

Then, does Saint-Preux not give

another way of defining happiness when writing of the love
that infuses Julie's being?

"How far away I am from that

charming state which suffices unto itself!

I wish to enjoy,

and you wish to love; I have ecstacies and you passion; all
my frenzies are not worth your delightful languor, and the
sentiment with which your heart is nourished is the only
supreme felicity." (149)
If he is aware of what he is saying, Saint-Preux must
be speaking of two sorts of love:
passion

(commonly

understood),

a love of frenzy and
and

the

love

Julie

symbolizes— a reconciliation of voluptuousness and eternity,
of passion and friendship.
sufficient unto itself.

And this latter is that state
In fact,

Rousseau closes this

letter to Julie with words that might have been reserved for
a God:

"You alone are worthy of inspiring a perfect love;

you alone are the one to feel it.

Ah give me your heart, my

Julie, so that I may love you as you deserve!" (150)
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We

now

seem

to

be

at

the

heart

of

Rousseau's

romanticism, for which happiness is something different than
for Greece or Rome or Christianity.15
Drunk, Bomston offends the name of Julie.(LVI)
Preux and he plan to duel.

Saint-

Claire advises Julie to break

off this two-year-old romance with Saint-Preux, before it
becomes public and ruins her good name and causes someone
harm.
Julie writes Saint-Preux a long and reasoned refutation
of the grounds for duelling.

However valid these numerous

arguments, they concern us only tangentially.

Does Julie

intend to replace the fashion of honor with the fashion of
love?— "your friend [Julie herself] wishes to examine with
you just how you should conduct yourself on this occasion
according to the sentiments that you profess and of which I
suppose you do not make a vain and false parade." (152)

And

honor is the principle from which Julie realizes that she
must reason.
After almost seven pages against false honor, Julie
broaches the subject of courage.

"Like all women, I think

that the fire of courage enlivens that of love.

But I want

valor to show itself on legitimate occasions." (158)

It

would not be too much of a leap to say that Julie is pairing
false honor with immature love and courage with mature love-

lsSee Bloom, Love, p. 65, for a discussion of love as a
substitute for morality.
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-especially if we recall that Julie arranged a test of
courage for Saint-Preux and herself, a test which seemed to
have caused their "true love" to flower.

And, if love is

necessary for happiness, then so is courage!

But what sort

of courage does Julie have in mind?
True courage has more constancy and less
eagerness; it is always that which it should be;
it is necessary neither to stir it on nor to hold
it back:
the good man carries it with him
everywhere— into combat against the enemy, into a
gathering where he stands for those absent or for
the truth, into his bed against the attacks of
sorrow and death.
The strength of soul which
inspires it is in evidence in all ages; it always
places virtue above events, and does not consist
in fighting, but in fearing nothing. (158)
Julie, professing to Bomston her love for Saint-Preux,
asks, in her own inimitable way, that he not duel and kill
her lover. Saint-Preux writes to Julie of his meeting of
reconciliation with Bomston who, in fact, prostrated himself
before Saint-Preux.

Important to note are Bomston's remarks

regarding Saint-Preux and Julie, after he had heard their
story from Saint-Preux himself.

Bomston admits that they

are no ordinary individuals and "cannot be judged by common
rules."

Their happiness will take another path from that of

others; for them, only "tenderness and peace" are necessary,
whereas

others

search

for

power

and

recognition.

Furthermore, their love is joined to an emulation of virtue
which elevates them.
did

not

love

one

And they would be less worthy if they
another.

The

practicality

of

the
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Englishman

speaks:

"Love will pass,

and virtues will

remain." (165)
They see themselves as extraordinary because of their
love; Bomston, though he recognizes the uncommon nature of
their "tenderness and peace," sees their enduring uncommon
quality to be that of virtue.

Bomston seems to admit that

their happiness comes from their love, but would he also
admit virtue as a basis of happiness?
will happiness also pass?

When love passes,

Is virtue unhappy and loveless?

Bomston seems to imply as much.

Our young couple, on the

other hand, believes in the creative force of their love.
The question, raised much earlier, of the reconcilability of
passion and virtue is raised again, but this time by a third
party— and at a time when our lovers are convinced of it.
Julie corrects Saint-Preux's salutation from his last
letter:

from "let us live in order to love each other" to

"let us love each other in order to live." (LXI) Love is
primary for Julie— the source of life, but not for that a
means as opposed to an end.
Claire describes a heated conversation between Lord
Bomston and the fathers of Julie and herself.

Bomston is

trying to arrange marriage between Julie and Saint-Preux.
Baron d'Etange violently objects on grounds that Saint-Preux
is not nobility, but a "quidam," or nobody.

Thereupon,

Bomston attacks the very foundations of nobility and even
raises the spectre and the crimes of Machiavelli's founding
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prince

(without mentioning Machiavelli).

Saint-Preux is

lauded as a natural aristocrat and therefore worthy of
Julie's hand; thus the gist of the argument is not that they
truly love each other.

Nonetheless, this attack by Rousseau

on aristocracy does show that 1)

the notion of aristocracy

can be— as it is in the case of our lovers— an obstacle to
true love and, thus, to happiness; and 2)

the foundations

of the institution are philosophically tenuous.

Here, then,

Rousseau's political and romantic theories complement each
other.
Claire advises that Bomston be sent away, for he, in
trying to be of assistance, is damning the cause of Julie
and Saint-Preux.
Julie writes

Claire

of

the

aftermath,

household, of the argument in Letter LXII.

in Julie's

Baron d'Etange

blames Julie for this idea of her marrying Saint-Preux, and
his fury reaches such proportions that he begins to beat
Julie mercilessly.

They eventually make up, but not without

his reminding her of the arranged marriage with Wolmar and
not without his forbidding her to ever see or speak to
Saint-Preux again.

At this point, Rousseau allows himself

a well-placed political comment:

"Ah, my cousin,

what

infernal monsters are these prejudices, which deprave the
best hearts and silence nature at every moment?"
Here,

Rousseau

relationship

explicitly

between

enjoins

political

the

order

question
and

of

(love

(177)
the
and)
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happiness.

Not only does Julie suffer physical abuse, but

she must also live torn between her family and her lover.
Her emotions are so contradictory that she lives in "A sort
of hebetude which makes my soul almost insensible and leaves
me the usage neither of the passions nor the reason." (145)
She is dehumanized!

Such is the denaturing effect of the

enforced prejudices of aristocracy.

Julie does not even

know whether to hope or to resign herself and her lover to
the compensations of love.
She closes with a post scriptum in which she suggests
that the fall suffered at the hands of her father might have
caused a miscarriage.
In the brief Letter LXIV, from Claire to M. D'Orbe, her
husband to be, Claire merely solicits his assistance in the
task

of

however,

separating
draw

a

Julie

and

distinction

Saint-Preux.
which

She

appears

of

does,

growing

importance in the analysis of the nature of happiness as
regards the two lovers.
However
Claire's

successful M.

esteem,

D'Orbe might

friendship,

and

even

be

in winning

"more

tender

sentiments," he should not delude himself— "as a woman I am
a kind of monster, and, I know not by what peculiarity of
nature, for me friendship outweighs love.

When I tell you

that Julie is dearer to me than you, you only laugh, and yet
nothing is more true." (179)
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And Claire must call upon her friendship for SaintPreux, friend of her friend, for courage in executing the
unnatural act of sending Saint-Preux away from his love:
"Oh divine friendship!

the only idol of my heart!

inspire my hand with your pious cruelty.
courage to be barbarous." (179)

Come

Give me the

This Machiavellian theme of

the necessity of performing barbarous acts is modified here
by a contingent necessity— depending on the prejudice and
stupidity

of

the

aristocratic

institution.

Whereas

Machiavelli sees the necessity for cruelty, Rousseau sees
that necessity itself as man-made.

This may be another way

of saying that Rousseau is, fundamentally, utopian.
Claire describes to Julie the scene during which SaintPreux is told that he must leave town and, of course, Julie.
Though she does not believe much in "verbose philosophy,"
Claire instructs Lord Bomston to prepare Saint-Preux with
some stoic philosophizing— such as:
within

one's

own

power.

One's own happiness is

Whatever

his

subliminal

preparation, the ordeal is frightful and pitiful for SaintPreux and, it may be said, meant to affect the reader into
a

veritable

hatred

for

the

institution

responsible.

Romanticism meets where "true love" and true merit (of that
love) meet— where there is no artificiality, political or
otherwise.
Nonetheless,

removing

the

political

obstacles

to

happiness would only be a first step to realizing happiness.
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If the pitfalls to happiness are writ large in society and
if their resolution seems obvious, the road to happiness on
an individual level— between two lovers, for example--must
always be purified and perfected, as Julie was attempting to
do throughout Part I of the novel.

Even if the only

challenge to the lovers was to love one another, it would
still be a challenge, and maybe a greater challenge than
otherwise.

Whether there are any obstacles to happiness,

which are not ultimately socio-political defects, only begs
the question, since humankind must ultimately "leave" the
socio-political in order to be happy— whether romantically,
solitarily, spiritually.

To the extent that humankind is

happy under the regime of The Social Contract, it is not
acting

and

living

as

a

political

species,

but

as

a

collective individual.
A provisional summary of Part I:
the underlying theme of the work.
is more ambiguous.

Happiness emerges as

How happiness is attained

The primary question might be,

Is

happiness more readily attainable through love or through
friendship? Attributes of love would be passion and motion;
those of friendship would be virtue and rest.

Honor and

courage seem necessary to both, unless we are to split them
up and say that honor regards friendship and courage regards
love.

This is another way of asking whether the way to

happiness is through the public or through the private modes
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of existence.

It cannot be ruled out that Rousseau is

"creating" a tertiary mode of being, as a new dispensation.
In any case, most of the elements of the romance and
its resolution appear, at least, in Part I:
virtue;

passion

versus

happiness;

love versus

imagination

versus

restraint; Platonism; courtly love; the happiness test; love
versus friendship; and motion versus rest.

These and other

themes, including that of the pleasure found in doing of
good works,

will be pursued by our author in Parts II

through VI.

In a sense, we shall end where we have begun—

only more simply and more aware.

CHAPTER 5
THE LETTERS OF THE SEPARATION
With Part I ends the actual love affair, though the
lovers are not aware of or resigned to that fact.
they maintain hope,

Though

Part II does begin as the lovers'

attempt to understand their love and to understand how it
might subsist unfulfilled.

And such meditations naturally

entail consideration of the nature of happiness, for the
link between love and happiness will be questioned but never
totally dissolved.
Part II
Now separated from Julie, Saint-Preux questions the
very value of happiness, but also questions the value of
life without it.

"It was better to have never tasted

felicity than to have tasted it and lost it." (11,1,190)

If

he had never known happiness, he might still have reason,
virtue, and sense of duty.

As it is, he is a deranged fool

with nothing— not even courage, or so he writes.
recants all those doubts.

Then he

"I prefer the pleasures which are

in my memory and the regrets which rend my soul to ever
being happy without my Julie."

He expresses the morality of

love and its invincibility— both foundations of happiness
but independent of happiness.
If I am dead to happiness I am not at all to love
which makes me worthy of it.
This love is
invincible like the charm which gave it birth.
It is based on the unshakable foundation of merit
and of the virtues; it cannot perish in an
immortal soul; it no longer needs hope as a
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support, and the past gives it powers for an
eternal future. (190)
But, then again, Saint-Preux falls from these lofty heights
of assurance back into despair, but not before questioning
the eudaemonism of his thought.

Is happiness the goal of

man; or is it love?1
If we shall ever become sure that the lovers have
resigned themselves to unfulfilled love, we shall have had
an indication that they have accepted this (Kantian) view of
happiness— something to be worthy of, though not necessarily
attained.

And will one of the lovers resign herself or

himself and not the other?

It should be remembered that to

maintain the eudaemonistic orientation does not mean being
hopeful of fulfilled happiness— it means only the nurturing
of the passion for it.
From this letter which prefigures Kant, we move to a
letter by Lord Bomston; he more than anyone else represents
a

sort

of

political

virtue

which

is

embodied

in

his

statement that "Every man is always master of his life."
(11,11,193)

Praising Saint-Preux's qualities, Bomston— in

fine rationalistic fashion— all but says that Saint-Preux's
salvation is that he is a potential philosopher:

"sublime

reason is only attained through the same vigor of soul which
gives rise to great passions, and philosophy is not worthily

*Of course, Kant would say that it is duty that makes
us worthy of happiness.
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served except with the same fire that one feels for a
mistress."

(193)

Is

love,

as

a

sort

of

source

of

philosophy, superior to philosophy; or is philosophy, as a
sort of end of love, not superior to love?
presentation argues for the latter.2

Bomston's whole

He is concerned for

the couple, not for the sake of their love, but for the sake
of justice and order which require that everyone be put to
the best personal and social use.
love!

Happy coincidence!

to the world.

And they were made for

They are meant to be an example

But this dictate of nature3 is thwarted by

"an absurd prejudice."

The conjugal tie is subject neither

to sovereign power nor to parental authority.

The political

Bomston is again attacking society in the name of society.4
(There is a curious gestalt at this point:

We have, on the

one hand, two lovers suffering the pains and even suicidal
distress of separation; on the other hand, we find Lord
Bomston pleading their case in a most rationalistic and

2See PC.II. page 193, n. 1 for a brief discussion of
the value of love.
3"These two beautiful souls left nature's hand made for
each other."
Cf. Emile, opening sentence, Allan Bloom
translation (New York:
Basic Books, 1979), P. 37:
"Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the Author of
things; everything degenerates in the hands of man."
4Man is the cause of his own unhappiness, but is he the
cause of his happiness?
From Letter XXIV (penultimate
paragraph) we see that chance plays an enormous role in the
calculus of free and natural happiness between two lovers.
Beyond certain macrocosmic reforms, it becomes almost
academic to contend that Rousseau even theoretically claimed
that social engineering would solve all human problems.
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political

manner.

We

may

surmise

that

Rousseau

is

juxtaposing two— ultimately distinct?— realms of existence:
the private and the public.)
Bomston,
process,

by

arguing

for

freedom

in

the

marriage

says that "character and temperament,,5~natural

attributes— make for happiness or unhappiness in the married
life.

And, some lines below, he calls for merit and choice

as the true principles of marriage and "social order."
Nonetheless, he does allow society (the paternal order) some
macrocosmic role:

the father should be able to inform the

daughter if her boyfriend is a complete fool.
then allowing to society a role as censor?

Is Rousseau
It seems so.

Nature must function within certain frontiers— not unlike
the fundamental educative principle of Emile.
A reasonable match must be joined to the absence of
obstacles or prejudices to combat.

Julie and Saint-Preux,

in spite of being driven by love, are a reasonable match.
But there is still a problem:
not

coincide,

as they

What if reason and passion do

fortunately do with our

couple?

Bomston implies that if love is prevailing over reason in an
affair, then "nature has already chosen."

We seem to be

left, for Bomston's part, with the best of the worst, though
he does not explicitly say so.

5See page 372 where Julie, after her conversion to
marriage and society, also speaks of "characters and
humours" as being more important for marriage than other
things, such as love.
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Such is the sacred law of nature [love] that it
is not permitted to man to transgress, which he
will never transgress with impunity, and which
consideration for positions and ranks can repeal
only at the cost of unhappiness and crime. (195)
Reason must bow to love, according to Bomston, because to do
otherwise would be disastrous— not because love is a more
sublime principle than reason.

"Happy are those whom love

unites as reason would have done and who have no obstacles
to surmount or prejudices to combat."

The ideal, for Lord

Bomston, is reason.
There is an irony that exists between what Bomston says
about the inviolability of the sacred law of nature— love—
and his ongoing action of distancing Saint-Preux from Julie.
So a second order of unnatural and unjust actions is being
undertaken in reaction to the first order "evil" of Julie's
father.

This little drama is a demonstration of just how

rapidly the good things of nature (in our case, love) can
degenerate under human hands.

For example, Saint-Preux has

all but become mentally deranged.

He has (temporarily) lost

his humanity to a prejudice.
The nature of love, and consequently the nature of
nature, undergoes some scrutiny in this time of trouble and
separation for the

lovers.

Bomston has

an ambivalent

attitude or idea of love; he seems to stand in awe of it,
but, perhaps like an ancient Greek, he views it as a sort of
illness (as he says, "corrosive acid") which has progressed
too far in the noble hearts of Julie and Saint-Preux.

He
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offers them an estate in England where they might live out
their "true happiness."

They are beyond repair, one might

say. (II,III)
Even when love is viewed as a true expression of
nature, it is seen in conflict with other aspects of nature.
In dire straits, Julie describes herself as being between
love and nature.

And nature must be read to mean family or

"blood." (II,IV)

Whatever course she takes— choosing love

or family— Julie sees herself as condemned to unhappiness
and

guilt.

Claire

confirms this

conflicted and disharmonious:

view

of

reality

"in this case,

as

whatever

course you take, nature both authorizes and condemns it,
reason both blames and approves it, duty either is silent or
contradicts

itself."

(II,V,203)

Asked for her advice,

Claire refuses, saying that reason itself imposes silence on
her and that the only rule to follow here is for Julie to
listen to her own inclination.

There is, then, more than

one nature, and irreconcilable conflicts result.
This questioning of nature is radicalized when Claire,
speaking of her fiance, asks, "Does the soul have a sex?"
Earlier, Saint-Preux had, in effect, answered that it did.
Here,

Claire

doubts

it.

This

Platonic-like

question,

dropped in passing, so to speak, signals the preoccupation
of the remainder of the novel:
outside of physical union?

How is love to survive
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Whereas, in Part I, a strong and direct relationship
was established between love and happiness, in Part II that
simplistic relationship begins to break down as the disunity
of nature begins to show itself.

Julie declines Bomston's

offer of an idyllic retirement estate; she says:
offer]

is

a

great

deal

for

love;

is

it

"[Your

enough

for

happiness?" (II,VI)

There was a time for Julie when there

was no difference.

But shame— even in love— disallows

happiness.
In II,IV, Julie spoke of the conflict between love and
nature,

with

family playing the role

of

nature.

Now

(II,VI), she speaks as if love were the reflection of
nature:

"when before has virtue thus had to balance the

rights of blood and of nature?"

Now, love and family seem

to be of equal value in the heart of Julie.

The ascendancy

of the family bond grew as it was being threatened, not
unlike the growth in the status of passionate love in Part
I.

It is as if nature, when endangered from whichever side,

moves to protect itself.6
But what of our other lover?

After the separation,

Saint-Preux engages in immature, despicable, and ultimately

6For a discussion, within the context of Rousseau's
Confessions, of this diversity or incoherence of human
nature, see Samuel S. B. Taylor, "Rousseau's Romanticism" in
Reappraisals of Rousseau, S. Harvey et al., ed. (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1980), pp. 16-17. He refers to
this apprehension of nature as the first move "towards
Baudelaire's discovery of the beauty of the taboo."
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delusional behavior

(See Letters II,VII,VIII,IX and X).

Julie's training of him into maturity did not withstand the
violence of his separation from her.

Eventually recognizing

the

Saint-Preux

weakness

of

his

character,

attribute it to his upbringing in philosophy.

seems

to

He professes

to Claire in a passing manner a conversion from philosophy
to, it seems, love:
Speak to me no more of philosophy! I scorn that
deceiving show which consists only in empty
words; that phantom which is only a shadow, which
stirs us to defy passions at a distance and which
leaves us like a blustering bully at their
approach. (220)
In the following paragraph, Saint-Preux gives substance to
his conversion:

"Chaste love and sublime friendship will

restore the courage that a cowardly despair was ready to
take from me."

(220)

So,

love and friendship replace

philosophy as ruling principles of his life.
From this letter in which philosophy is rejected as a
way of life, we come to a restatement of the relationship of
philosophy to happiness and find that Plato, not the Stoics,
represents the proper way.

Letter XI represents Julie's

farewell and final counsel to her beloved; we can only
expect a letter of substance.

Even her short counsel—

"Never forsake virtue, and never forget your Julie"— may be
read as an intended reconciliation of nature (Julie/love)
and society (virtue) . It is a call to the impossible:
reconciliation of duty and inclination.

the

Only if we contrive
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to

make duty

the

object of

our

love is

any

sort

of

reconciliation possible; and Julie will eulogize several
ancients who did just that.

But, first, Julie dismisses

rationalist philosophy and calls on Saint-Preux to return to
the depths of his soul.
[I]t is there that you will always rediscover the
source of that sacred fire that so many times
embraced us with the love of sublime virtues; it
is
there that you will see that
eternal
simulacrum of true beauty the contemplation of
which enlivens us with a holy enthusiasm, and
which our passions defy incessantly without ever
being able to efface it. (223)
At

this moment,

Footnotes.

Rousseau injects

He writes:

that of

Plato;

another.

A

of

his

Editor's

"The true philosophy of lovers is

while the spell

man

one

who

is

lasts, they never have

moved

cannot

forsake

this

philosopher; a reader who is cold cannot endure him."
How seriously do we take this footnote of Rousseau's?
Whatever the ultimate answer, it is definite that in this
Letter XI, Julie goes to some effort to offer a Platonic
interpretation of happiness and love.
grouped with Brutus,

Regulus,

For one, Socrates is

and Cato,

as examples of

beauty which does not perish— as examples of a "divine
model" which everyone carries within himself.
Secondly, Julie asks, "if the true pleasure of the soul
is in the contemplation of the beautiful, how can the evil
man love it in others without being forced to hate himself?"
(224)

One might ask at this point:

Can we be the object of
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our own love?

That is, if man can be happy by contemplating

the "divine model" of the beautiful within himself, might he
not be self-sufficient?

Julie seems to have this question

in mind when she writes the following.
[T]he source of happiness is not totally in the
desired object nor in the heart which possesses
it, but in the relationship of one and the other,
and . . . as all the objects of our desires are
not capable of producing felicity, all the states
of the heart are not capable of feeling it. If
the purest soul is not alone sufficient to its
own happiness, it is surer still that all the
delights of the earth would not be able to make
[happy] a depraved heart; because there is on
both sides a necessary preparation, a certain
coming-together from which comes this precious
sentiment sought after by all sensitive beings,
and always ignored by the false sage who limits
himself to the pleasure of the moment in the
place of knowing a durable happiness. (225)
When read in conjunction with Julie's letter, Rousseau's
footnote seems to be making the following point:

For

lovers, love is the quest of the beautiful; and happiness
must consist in the courage to continue that pursuit in
spite of obstacles.

"[W]ould it not be better to cease to

be than to exist without feeling anything?" (226)
Whereas Saint-Preux had, in Letter X, totally rejected
philosophy

in the

name

of

love

and

friendship,

Julie

demonstrates to Saint-Preux that there is a philosophy which
is the very essence

of love and friendship.

One may

tentatively conclude that Julie rejects the rationalism and
self-sufficiency of Stoicism, for the essence of life is to
feel— to love.

And Rousseau understands Julie to be talking
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about Plato; for that is the significance of his Editor's
Footnote.
But this Plato is interpreted in the most fatalistic
and romantic of ways,

if we are to take Saint-Preux's

formulations of their love as being consistent with the
formulations of Julie.

That is to say, in the context of

discussing the happiness surrounding Claire's marriage to M.
d'Orbe, Saint-Preux writes to Julie of their contrastingly
tortured love (II,XVI,245):
[T]he powerful transports of two hearts toward
each other always have a secret (sensual)
pleasure unknown to tranquil souls. It is one of
the miracles of love to make us find pleasure in
suffering; and we would regard as the worst of
misfortunes a state of indifference and oblivion
which robbed us of all the feelings of our
misery.
The above is not a gratuitous masochism,

but rather an

indication of the role of the obstacle (to love) within the
passion myth

as

set

forth by Rougement.

satisfied love dissipates totally its passion.
Preux

takes

the

interdependence

of

lover

The

totally

But Saintand

beloved

further— to a sort of Platonic sublimation of passion and to
its relation to happiness:

"like the divinity draws all its

happiness from itself, hearts warmed by a heavenly fire find
within their own feelings a sort of pure and delicious
enjoyment, independent of fortune and of the rest of the
universe."
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So, the union of two souls makes it god-like or selfsufficient.

Over-riding all notions in the above citations

is the concept of independence and sufficiency of the two
loving selves.

For, as Saint-Preux had said in the previous

Letter XV, "we shall be united in spite of our separation;
we shall be happy despite fate." (236)

But this is not the

god-like Stoic happiness of the lone individual (impossible
according to Julie); it is, rather, the happiness of the
couple.
It is fair to ask if Rousseau is here speaking of love
in his own name, or whether he is creating (or recreating)
and propagating an ethos or ethic of love which he thinks
salutary.

And will the course of the novel retract, in

effect, these romantic notions?

And, of course, since the

question of de Rougement's passion myth has been brought
into the discussion, will Rousseau find a resolution to the
passion myth?

De Rougement notes that, unlike the pure

myth, The New Heloise ends in a conventional marriage— at
least for Julie.

Whether or not that marriage dissolved the

passion is more problematic, as any reader of the novel may
surmise from Julie's deathbed admission of continuing love
for Saint-Preux.

Nonetheless, it should be clear by now

that the social obstacles to union of the lovers, though
important for an exposition of Rousseau's socio-political
observations, serve ultimately as a context within which the
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romantic

myth

of

unfulfilled

love

is

explored

and

expounded.7
Part III
The discovery by Julie's mother of her daughter's cache
of love letters radically twists the fate of the young
couple.

Julie, the essence of the good daughter, grieved

over the pain she has caused her bed-ridden mother, becomes
the ghost of herself.

Claire writes Saint-Preux, insisting

that he cease causing such misery and that he renounce Julie
forever.
He writes back to Madame d'Etange an impassioned letter
of contrition and a promise to neither see nor write to
Julie as long as the mother requires.

Saint-Preux claims

that he is able to "break the sweetest, the purest, the
holiest tie that has ever united two hearts," because, in
effect, "Julie has taught me too well how one must sacrifice

7The remaining Letters XVII-XXVIII of Part II of the
novel seem to be of marginal value to the topic of
happiness.
I would only comment that Letter XVII, the
central letter of the work, contains a sort of epistemology
of the difficulties of studying the world.
That it is
reminiscent of Plato's Allegory of the Ship of State is
interesting; but more interesting would be to apply the
lessons of the difficulty of studying the world to the
difficulties of studying love (and happiness). And one
might also wish to evaluate Saint-Preux since his
renunciation of philosophy as his guiding principle.
Whether there is a relation seems impossible to determine,
but the fact that he falls in with some prostitutes would
seem to some highly unphilosophic.
He is, however,
functioning: he is writing long letters on Parisian life
and the Parisians themselves home to Julie, and letters on
French politics to Lord Bomston.
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happiness to duty." (111,11,311)

If happiness represents

the reconciliation of duty and passion, it is evident that
the present situation called for a sacrifice of passion or
inclination.

In fact, Saint-Preux says that he has learned

"that cruel art of conquering love" from Julie.

So, it is

love itself that had to be sacrificed to duty, and, though
he wishes that happiness be restored to Julie,
according to our notion of happiness, impossible.

it is,
Fate has

decreed that love and virtue would not coincide in the life
of Julie

and Saint-Preux.

generously obliges,

If,

in fact,

fate ever so

if de Rougement is right about the

passion myth, the love and faltering happiness would never
be so (bitter) sweet as that of our couple.

That is another

way of saying that without the obstacles to love there is no
love story . . . and no love.
Along with his letter to Julie's mother, Saint-Preux
wrote an accompanying letter to Claire, the "cruel one."

In

that letter, it is as if Rousseau wanted to show his reader
the rabid nihilism of unbridled romantic love.

Saint-Preux

justifies sacrificing all of humanity to his love alone.
"Ah, what is a mother's life, what is my own, yours, even
hers, what is the existence of the whole world next to the
delightful

sentiment

which

united

us?"

(111,111,312)

Threatening a sort of suicide of his human nature, SaintPreux concludes this most bitter message to Claire with:
"it is better to renounce humanity." (313)
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What has Rousseau just done with those Janus letters?
He has from the same envelope shown us two faces of the
passionate lover.

The one sacrificing himself for another;

the other, willing the sacrifice of all of humanity for his
love.

If there were ever any questions about the easy

acceptance of romantic love by Rousseau, they should be put
to rest.

One might even argue that the general intent of

The New Heloise is to bridle romantic love with an ethic,
but with an ethic suitable and acceptable to itself.
Claire understands the extremes of Saint-Preux7s anger
and despair; she writes to compliment him on choosing the
prudent course of virtue, as opposed to the course of love.
She writes:
there

"you have a hundred times proved to us that

is no road to

virtue."

happiness more

surethan that of

She follows by implying that love is a bad gamble:

"If one succeeds,

the happiness is

purer,

sounder, and

sweeter because of virtue; if one fails, virtue alone can be
the compensation."

(Ill,IV,314)

The logic of Claire's

reasoning seems tenuous, even bogus; virtue is always— win
or lose— the winner over the course of love.

What would the

practical Claire say that love has to offer, even as an
outside bet?

Probably nothing, for,

chooses friendship over love.

as we remember, she

She is one character whose

character is unchanging.
From the death of Madame d'Etange until the marriage of
Julie to Wolmar,

the

exchanges

ofletters possess

the
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character of desperation.

Blaming Saint-Preux for her

mother's death, Julie venomously and dramatically announces
that death to Saint-Preux, as well as the end of their love:
"It is done:

the empire of love is extinguished in a soul

given over to despair."
"Adieu."

(Ill,V,316)

And she bids him

As we shall see, through to the end of the story,

the empire of love never abandons Julie.

The irony of her

statement of the death of love is total.
Now in a passionate rage, Saint-Preux writes Claire of
his loss of Julie, but he is convinced that she cannot be
happy without him.
Love the conquering was the misfortune of her
life; love conquered will only give her more
suffering.
She will pass her days in sorrow,
tormented at the same time by empty regrets and
empty desires, unable ever to satisfy either love
or virtue. (Ill,VI,318)
Here we have the image of disunified man, mentioned in
Chapter I of this study:

"Always in contradiction with

himself, always floating between his inclination and his
duties, he will never be either man or citizen.
will be nothing." (Emile I 40)

...

He

Rousseau more than intimates

here that what he has been talking about all along in this
novel is not only love and virtue, but nature and society,
man and citizen.

From Claire's Letter IV we learned that

love and virtue were two different roads to happiness; but
might we not ask if happiness is less generic and rather a
pole of the dichotomy:

happiness-duty.

That is what Kant
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would like to do with Rousseau:
means to a way of life.
happiness

that is, make happiness a

I think, rather, that for Rousseau

is the end of man,

though the morphology of

happiness might vary and require mostly psychic unity only.
To continue with the letter.

Saint-Preux gives Julie

over to Claire— that is, to "holy friendship." (318)

And he

hopes that with Claire Julie will be able to recover "her
original virtues, her original happiness." (318)

It is as

if leaving the state of first love is equivalent to leaving
a sort of state of nature.

He is hoping, in effect, that

she regain some form of psychic unity or innocence, taken
from her not so much by love as by the failure of love.
wishes for her to be something and not nothing.

He

He wishes

her to return to her metaphorical state of nature, in which
she was authentically and wholly virtuous.
Claire responds in reconciliation and love.

She thanks

him for teaching Julie and her to think, as they taught him
to feel.

She assures him that Julie and he were not

responsible for Madame d'Etange's death.

Then Claire, as an

outsider to love, surmises from what Julie and he have told
her that
If love is a desire which is enflamed by
obstacles, as you were still saying, it is not
good that it be content; it is better that it
last and be unhappy than that it extinguish
itself in the bosom of pleasure.
Your (love)
fire, I swear, has stood the test of possession,
of time, of absence and of sufferings of all
kind; it has conquered all obstacles except for
the most powerful of all, which is to no longer
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have anything to vanquish, and to nourish itself
solely from itself. The universe has never seen
a passion stand up to that test; what right did
you have to hope that yours would? (111,711,320)
Claire's observations are within the strict anatomy of the
passion myth.
pain

As with Tristan and Iseult, separation and

represent

not

the

death

but

the

life— even

resurrection— of Julie's and Saint-Preux's love.

the

All this

seems quite fatalistic, and one is compelled to ask if there
might not be the possibility of a happy issue to such a
passion.

Strictly

speaking,

no,

but

there

possibility of indefinitely sustaining the love.

is

the

It is then

as if cruel fate were the only salvation of the passion.
But could one not ritualize the sustenance of the passion,
as in the courtly love tradition?

In any case, the above

observations by Claire on the "fires of love" do much to
substantiate de Rougement's contention that Rousseau was
writing within the tradition of the ancient passion myth.
After receiving a note from Julie and her father,
Saint-Preux, of course much against his will, sends a brief
sentence back to the Baron, by which he restores to Julie
her freedom.

Another letter from Julie immediately follows:

She was forced to ask for her freedom; she still loves him;
and she bids him another last adieu.

So, the obstacle— the

Baron— has done his work for the fires of love.

If not

happiness, then the chance of happiness is sustained.
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The storyline develops with Julie contracting smallpox
and Saint-Preux, alerted by one of her letters, travelling
from Paris to see her, which he does when Julie, on her
sickbed, is only semi-conscious.

Claire finally admits to

Julie that her dream of seeing her lover at her bedside was,
in

fact,

reality.

The

illness

and the

long road

of

obstacles to their love turn Julie to a course of submissive
resolution.
In Letter XV, Julie, surrendering to love, confesses to
being "tired of serving a chimerical virtue at the expense
of justice." (334)

She resigns herself and her love to him

forever,

has

for

affections.

he

the

"legitimate"

And that claim is of nature:

nature, resume all your rights!

claim

to

her

"Nature, ah sweet

I abjure the barbarous

virtues which annihilate them." (335)

She goes on to oppose

nature to reason which has often misled her.

But Julie is

in the process of giving all and, therefore, in a sense,
nothing.

"[L)et not the rights of blood and friendship be

extinguished by those of love."
nature-society,

passion-virtue,

extended into a triad:
that friendship

(335)

The dichotomy of

love-blood,

love-blood-friendship.

(with Claire)

has

been

It seems

represents what is often

called partial association, a surrogate for actual political
and civic association.
love and blood.

So, nature has been divided into
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When all is said and done, Julie refuses to choose
between the demands of the various orders of life.

She will

love her lover forever; and she will not abandon her father
or her dear cousin.

This is perhaps Julie's attempt to

preserve her psychic unity,

her very identity.

She is

fighting the harsh realities of life with the acceptance,
resignation, and all-encompassing embrace of a buddhistic
quietism.
Duty, honor, virtue, all that no longer speaks to
me; but yet I am not a monster; I am weak and not
denatured. My decision is made; I do not want to
sadden any of those I love. Let a father, slave
to his word and jealous of an empty title,
dispose of my hand as he has promised; let love
alone dispose of my heart; let my tears not cease
to flow into the bosom of a tender friend. Let
me be vile and unhappy; but let all who are dear
to me be happy and content if it is possible.
The three of you constitute my only existence,
and may your happiness make me forget my misery
and my despair. (335)
Julie is pretending to live life on her and not life's
terms, for her course is impracticable, lacking reality, and
even benevolently nihilistic.
that,

by rights,

In effect, Julie is saying

she should not have to choose between

lover, father, and friend.

Therefore, she will not choose!

She is here a utopian, for the utopian does not seek, in
strict terms, what is impossible, but rather what could be,
if only

. . .

Her way of dealing with the de facto

impossible is to do the impossible.
And what is Saint-Preux's reply to this strange letter
from Julie?

He regards her profession of love as a partial
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victory, but knows that Julie's utopian resolution could
\

never satisfy him.

He admits that remaining to their

relationship is only love (and sorrow), but that would be
enough for him if only Julie would be realistic.
Alas, a heart less pure would not have led you so
astray! Yes, it is the integrity of yours which
causes us to be lost; the upright feelings of
which it is full have chased out wisdom.
You
wanted to reconcile filial tenderness with
indomitable love; in giving yourself over at the
same time to all your propensities, you confuse
them instead of harmonizing them and you become
guilty because of virtues. . . . you deserve
esteem because of your faults. (Ill,XVI,336)
Later in the same letter, he is more succinct, if still
enigmatic, about what would be the nature of their fulfilled
love:

"Well then, we shall be guilty, but we shall not be

evil; we shall be guilty, but we shall always love virtue."
(338)
There is much to discuss in this letter, for it not
only adumbrates a paradoxical ethic of love, it also— by
omission— draws

attention

to

friendship

central propensities of human life.
point:

as

one

First,

of

the

the latter

Julie had written Saint-Preux that she was resigned

to sharing her life as best she knew how between lover,
father (and his choice of husband for her), and friend.
When writing of her "penchants" in his response to Julie,
Saint-Preux mentions only blood and love.
does not see the friend Claire as a threat.

Apparently, he
But should he

not see friendship as a threat or at least as an alternative
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to passionate love?

(Remember Claire's announcement to M.

d'Orbe that she would always love Julie more than him.)
This neglect of friendship represents a portent of things to
come.

It

is

friendship

that

constitutes

the

partial

association— the closest association, except for that of the
farm hands at Clarens, to the purely political that we have
any sustained contact with throughout the novel.
One might say that this lover is so caught up in his
love that he can entertain only the intense demands of
nature:
underwent

blood or erotic love.
a

catharsis,

Julie, on the other hand,

caused

by

the

diverse

irrepressible demands being made on her heart and soul.

and
In

a very meaningful sense, the strongest of the two was the
first to "fall."

And her collapse made her existentially

aware of the necessity of respecting all the propensities:
love, blood, friendship.

Julie is preparing for her entry

into society.
If Julie was utopian in her resignation, Saint-Preux
was idealistic.

Though his love was more than an idea, its

fulfillment was not— not as long as the indomitable father
was there to object or, if necessary, to kill him.

Saint-

Preux wants them to live out the myth in the most dramatic
way:

dying together on some metaphorical island.

He is

resolutely— and will remain so throughout— apolitical.
remains vertically

oriented,

whereas

Julie,

accepts an equality among the propensities.

He

in effect,
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A brief note from Claire, or rather from the now Madame
d'Orbe, informs Saint-Preux that "Your lover is no longer,
but I have recovered my friend. . . . Julie is married. . .
. Now is the time when I shall learn if . . . your heart is
sensitive

to

(Ill,XVII,339)

a

pure

and

disinterested

friendship."

The importance of friendship then becomes,

not as an alternative to love, but as a substitute for it.
Friendship, even during the early days of their love and
happiness,

represents

a

sublimation

of

love,

whereas

marriage, according to the passion myth, is its death, its
complete resolution.
One of the most important letters of the novel follows
this note from Claire.

Letter XVIII (25 pages) of Part III

is from Julie and is described by the Pleiade editors (340,
n. 1) as being composed of three large parts:
and

examination

of

their

past

together;

1)
2)

A resume
A

moral

meditation containing a description of her marriage and
conversion, followed by a religious meditation and a prayer;
and 3)
and

the

Reflections on the necessity of conjugal fidelity
evils

of

adultery,

followed

by

some

personal

considerations.
I would go further and say that this letter, among what
the Pleiade editors propose,

is a document of allusions
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which tell us much about the general nature of the Julie; ou
la Nouvelle Heloise.8
With the general outline of the letter in mind, let us
examine segments of interest to the topics of this study:
1)

Julie tells Saint-Preux how it came to pass that

she consented to marry Wolmar.
voice of nature

At one point, "the wailing

[the loss of her mother due,

as Julie

thought, to her discovered love affair] muffled the murmurs
of love."

She was resolved to renounce Saint-Preux; but she

regained her strength, so to speak, and, for the first time
in her

life,

marriage.

stood up

to her

father

in

opposing

Her father fell, crying, to his knees.

feet, he pleads.

the

At her

We learn that between the time the Baron

had promised his daughter to Wolmar and the present time,
Wolmar, because of a revolution in his homeland, has lost
almost everything.

If the Baron refused him Julie now, it

would appear that it was because Wolmar was now penniless.
It is now not only a question of her duty but of his honor;
"honor has spoken, and, coming from the blood that you do,

8Speaking in the most general terms, Julie, in this
letter, embraces marriage to Wolmar and requires that her
former lover sublimate his passion for her into a dear
friendship; moreover, Julie takes the high ground, a
religious pose, and speaks with utter confidence and
assurance.
It is only natural to compare this selfassurance with Julie's deathbed admission that she was never
able to overcome her love for Saint-Preux. The importance
of this comparison is not in what it says about Julie (We
know that she is an exceptional person!), but in what it
says about the religious faith that she embraced
simultaneously with her liberation from her passion.
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It is always [honor] which decides." (350)

Julie has to

write asking that Saint-Preux release her from any promises,
for, even according to the Baron, such promises are a matter
honor.

Julie falls ill; later Saint-Preux visits her, and,

when Julie realizes that his visit was not a dream and that
Saint-Preux had in fact inoculated himself of smallpox by
kissing her hand, her love for him revives.

As she writes,

I saw that I had to love in spite of myself; I
felt that I had to be guilty; that I was able to
resist neither my father nor my lover, and that I
would never reconcile the rights of love and
those of blood except at the expense of integrity
[honnetete]. (351)
So now we see that it was radical acts of solicitude by both
her father and her lover that led her to the sort of
paralysis that we saw in Letter XV.

Strictly speaking, the

tension was created by her father's "honor" and by her
lover's risking his life because of love for her.

She felt

responsible for both and therefore decided to accommodate
both in the only way she saw possible.

She was aware that

being all things to all people would not secure happiness
for her, but she had hoped that it would assist her loved
ones.

(It is ironic to note that passionate love has no

ceremonial closure; and that might be why Julie chose to
marry Wolmar and not merely stay with Saint-Preux.)
2)

The central portion of this central letter contains

the account of Julie's marriage and religious conversion.
Having arrived at the Church, I felt on entering
a sort of emotion that I had never experienced. .
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. . A sudden fright made me shiver . . . I felt
my anxiety increase during the ceremony . . . I
believed I saw the instrument of providence and
heard the voice of God in the minister . . .
everything made upon me such an impression that I
believed I felt internally an unexpected upheaval
[revolution] . . . All of a sudden an unknown
power seemed to correct the disorder of my
affections and reestablish them according to the
law of duty and of nature. (353-54)
When asked if she would promise obedience and fidelity, she
writes to her former lover that her mouth and her heart
promised it; and "I will hold to it until death." (354)

So,

it took a religious conversion to reconcile duty and nature,
irreconcilable on a naturalistic plane.
As far as their relationship is concerned, Julie claims
that she feels for Saint-Preux as much, if not more, love
than

before,

blushing.

but

she

can

feel

that

love

now

without

But it is her conversion that she seems more

concerned with:

"I believed I felt myself being reborn; I

believed I was beginning another life.

. . . Sweet and

consoling virtue, I rebegin life for you. . . . Ah, I have
learned too well what it cost to lose you to abandon you a
second time!" (355)

It took a miracle of sorts but it seems

Julie has returned to her former state of virtue— shall we
say, innocence or nature.

Has Julie in fact "recovered her

former virtues, her former happiness," as Saint-Preux wished
for her (III,VI), or is this a quasi-recovery— a further
removal in fact from her original state?
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We are approaching what is for Rousseau a fundamental
political and human question:

To what extent can a person

(or humankind) regain lost innocence, and how?
regained, how secure is it?

And, if

In the Letter XVIII Rousseau

offers some indications of what is happening to Julie.
3)

The religious nature of this letter cannot be

overemphasized, even though this analysis abstracts from it
exceedingly

and

gives

philosophical content.
her

undue

weight

to

its

source

religious or whether it is philosophical.

philosopher at home.

is purely

She says that,

she was devout at Church and a

So she has found a unifying principle

of both thought and action.
earlier Platonic

small

It is unclear what Julie means by

"interior principle"— whether

before her conversion,

its

letters,

(357)

Reminiscent of much

Julie writes:

"Only if the

character and love of the beautiful be imprinted by nature
in the depths of my soul, I shall have my rule as long as it
[the beautiful]
beautiful.

is not disfigured."

Her guide is the

But how do we preserve the integrity of the

beautiful in a world of changing tastes and prejudices,
Julie asks?

Her answer is facile:

"Everything that you

cannot separate from the idea of this [infinite] essence is
God; all the rest is the work of men." (358)
In

fact,

Julie

exhorts

Saint-Preux

to

abandon

philosophy— empty sophisms of a reason that relies only on
itself.

The nature of the attacks on philosophy make it
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clear that she is attacking a way of life, not just the
reliance on an academic reason.

The lowering of philosophy

is the obverse of the elevation of marriage (and religion,
though not a strictly orthodox religion).

In attacking

adultery, Julie writes that the adulterer, among other sins,
"violates the public and sacred faith of marriage without
which nothing in the legitimate order of human affairs can
subsist."

(360)

Julie,

not unlike Rousseau after his

experience on the road to Vincennes,

seems to be taking

responsibility

for the welfare of the human species.

If

this is so— if

Julie's conversion is meant to be compared

with Rousseau's— some textual support should be forthcoming;
and it is.

The last three pages of this letter contain the

allusions mentioned at the head of this analysis.

The first

is to Heloise and Abelard; the second, to On the Social
Contract: and the last, to Emile.
Before the allusion to Heloise and Abelard, Julie has
some blunt words for Saint-Preux:
A sentiment [that is, the love they had for each
other] so perfect must not perish of itself; it
was worthy only to be immolated to virtue...
I shall tell you more.
Everything has changed
between us; it is absolutely necessary that your
heart change. (363)
Then, Julie quotes his own words to him.

They are from Part

I, Letter XXIV, before the love affair had progressed to
intimacy.

Saint-Preux was commenting on the Letters of

Heloise and Abelard and describing Abelard as "a miserable
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creature" and a hypocrite.9 The passage quoted emphasizes
that love must maintain its integrity and especially honor.
If not, love becomes a mere "shameful business."

And then

Julie seems to quote her own words, also from Part I, when
she writes:

"Yes, my good and worthy friend, in order for

us to love each other forever we must renounce each other.
Let's forget all the rest and be the lover of my soul.

This

idea is so sweet that it offers consolation for everything."
(364)

This echoes from the time when Julie wanted a lover

for her soul, but not for her body.
It seems clear that Julie has become the "new Heloise"-not in the least because she, and not her lover, is the
leader into this new and virtuous life.

She even speaks of

having a rule (une regie) which, in context, one might be
justified in translating as "a rule of an order."
I believe I have a surer rule . . . I listen in
secret to my conscience . . . and never does it
mislead a soul who consults it sincerely. . . .
How did this fortunate change come about? I am
unaware of it (Je 1'ignore.) (364)
So Julie has developed or has been given an infallible
conscience.

How did this happen?

She is ignorant of that.

This begins to sound surprisingly like the first paragraph
of Chapter One of On the Social Contract:
Man was born free, and everywhere he is in
chains.
One who believes himself the master of
others is nonetheless a greater slave than they.

9There are only three references to Abelard in the
novel, and this one is the most extensive and substantive.
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How did this change occur?
I do not know (Je
1'ignore).
What can make it legitimate?
I
believe I can answer this question.
What Julie does know about her change from a bad to a good
conscience is that "I keenly desired it.
rest."

God alone did the

She continues, however, by speaking in what might

just as well be psychological categories.
I would think that a soul once corrupted would be
so always, and would never return to the well
being of itself; unless some sudden upheaval
[revolution], some brusque change of fortune and
situation suddenly changed its relations, and by
means of a violent shock assisted it in
recovering a good disposition.
All its habits
being broken and all its passion modified, in
that general confusion one regains sometimes his
primitive character and becomes like a new being
recently out of the hands of nature.
And the
memory of his preceding baseness can serve as a
preservative against falling again. (364)10
It was her marriage, Julie says, that made her experience
something similar.

She encourages Saint-Preux to purge by

Christian morals the lessons of philosophy,

for she is

convinced that "there is no happiness without virtue."

She

confesses that she could never be happy if he were not
happy.

He has lost a "tender lover" but has gained a

"faithful friend."
A third allusion:
follows:

The first sentence of Emile reads as

"Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the

Author of things; everything degenerates in the hands of

10This passage is reminiscent of conversations I have
had with psychiatrists and psychiatric patients regarding
the purgative and rejuvenating effects of mental breakdowns.
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nan."

But, as Rousseau goes on to say in so many words, a

deliberately half-deformed creature is better than if "a man
were abandoned to himself in the midst of other men from
birth."

And the Emile is meant to make one "like a new

being recently out of the hands of nature." (364)
What we are stalking is the relationship between the
Julie and On the Social Contract and Emile, not to mention
the Letter of Heloise and Abelard. Surely, in Letter XVIII,
Julie

has

become

the

bride

of

Christ,

but

without

sacrificing the married life; and that is partially what
makes her the "new Heloise."
us

that

religion.

society

is

almost

This Letter XVIII also teaches
tantamount

to

marriage

and

In a sense, Julie left the state of love— a sort

of state of nature— in order to consciously accept religious
and social principles as a way of life.

She did on her own

what the original Heloise did only reluctantly, though of a
sort of necessity.
Julie attributes to God what Rousseau reserves to his
On the Social Contract— that is, making a legitimate society
out of what was a general state of slavery.

And Julie seems

to attribute to fortuitous psychic forces and upheavals what
Rousseau would attribute to his Emile— that is, the return
to a sort of quasi-wholeness of the individual human being.
Can

the

Julie,

in

fact,

not

be

seen

as

a

sort

of

serendipitous Emile for late adolescent girls already gone
wrong in love? Whatever the case, falling out of passionate
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love does seem to be, for Rousseau, a fortuitous event, not
totally manipulatable.
The entire discussion of Letter XVIII relates to our
central issue of happiness, for the former relation of love
to happiness has been broken in favor of the relation of
virtue to happiness.

And it is a virtue intimately bound to

religion and societal norms.

At this point suffice it to

say that as the story progresses, the extremes of love and
society as bases of happiness will be mitigated into the
elevation of friendship as the basis of happiness and even
of society.

In fact, friendship has already become, among

other things, the sublimation of love.

It will eventually

resemble courtly love, as a visionary re-creation of Julie.
These conclusions are reinforced by a letter from
Julie, in reply to a letter by Saint-Preux urging her not to
divulge to Wolmar the story of their love affair.

Julie

claims that the only thing lacking to her happiness is his
happiness.
ultimate

She then describes her husband as a man of
rationality— never

gay

and

never

everything Saint-Preux is not— in fact,
detachment,

sad;

he

is

in his god-like

he is the very opposite of passionate love

itself.
Julie has borrowed, as if from him, a new temperament
if not a new character.

As she writes:

"That which has

long misled me and which perhaps still misleads you is the
idea that love is necessary to form a happy marriage."
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(III,XX,372)

In fact, she says that love, being unstable,

is little suited to marriage and its many duties.

Marriage

is a question of fulfilling the duties of civil society; the
only thing lovers can do is love one another.

But what does

Julie now think of love in itself, outside of marriage?

It

is, she says, the ardor itself of love which consumes it; it
wears out with youth; it passes with beauty and age; early
or late, lovers cease to adore each other.
have truly fallen out of love with love.

Julie seems to
She even has the

heart to tell Saint-Preux that even if she felt for him as
she did before and with the knowledge she has now, she would
choose Wolmar over himl
She seems to have chosen what she, under the tutelage
of her husband,

now views as virtue and happiness,

opposed to love and eventual unhappiness.

as

And, since Saint-

Preux will not agree that she tell Wolmar of their affair,
Julie sees fit to discontinue all "commerce" between them.
In

her

farewell,

Julie

distinguishes

between

a

happiness brought by fortune and one brought by God, as well
as between true and false virtue.
Adieu, my dear and good friend; if I believed
that fortune were able to make us happy
(heureux), I would say to you:
run toward
fortune; but perhaps you are right to disdain it
with enough treasures to do without it. I prefer
to tell you:
run toward felicity, it is the
fortune of the wise; we have always felt that
there was
none without virtue; but be on guard
that this
word virtue, too abstract, not have
more bang
than solidity, and that it not be a

164

word to parade around, which serves more to
dazzle others than to content us ourselves. (376)
Soon afterwards, she bids him a last farewell.

They will

not exchange letters again until Part VI of the novel.
The next letter is a justification of suicide, written
by Saint-Preux to Lord Bomston.

There are some curious

conclusions that he draws from both philosophy and religion,
but suffice it to put down the fundamental proposition on
which he bases his argument:

"Seek your good and avoid your

bad in that which does no offense to others." (Ill,XXI,378)
Bomston writes back with his list of arguments, the first
being:

Do you not believe that the goal of human life has

a moral object and that we must make an effort to attain
that objective?

A disappointment in love is not grounds to

end a life— and besides, on your own grounds, you cannot
leave, for you would be harming your friends.
Bomston does allow suicide in two instances:

But Lord

explicitly, in

cases of extreme physical disability; and, implicitly, in
order to save one's country.

It is clear from these letters

that Bomston is the political being and that Saint-Preux
remains radically private.
When Julie reaches hopelessness, she turns to civic
virtue, religion, and marriage.

When Saint-Preux reaches

hopelessness, he turns to a meditation on suicide.
conversion kills

Julie's

romantic love just as surely, it seems,

as Saint-Preux's suicide would.

Both characters are still
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consciously pursuing happiness.

It is evident in Julie's

case; and a study of some of Saint-Preux's arguments would
point toward his continued preoccupation with happiness.
Simply put, he argues that he will be happier in the next
life than he is in his unbearable misery in this life.
Saint-Preux's immediate fate is decided when he accepts
an offer arranged by Bomston:

to undertake a three-year

(hopefully healing) tour of the world on an English warship.
He will hire on as engineer of landing forces, his specialty
of study.

So, he writes to Claire (also addressing Julie as

Claire's friend),

informing them of his sea voyage and

hoping that on the high seas he will be able to rediscover
the calm which forsakes his troubled heart.
This second segment of the novel (Parts II and III)
ends

with

the

finalization

of

the

separation of Julie and Saint-Preux.

physical

or

sexual

Julie's marriage is

irrevocable? and adultery is unthinkable for both of them.
They are finally in that new world toward which they have
been moving in spite of themselves— the world of spiritual
love, surely a world of imagination and emotional ingenuity.

CHAPTER 6
THE LETTERS OF REUNION
Part IV
The prelude to Saint-Preux's return— after a six-year
absence— is an exchange of letters between Julie and Claire.
Julie's letter is nostalgic:
happiness that it offers

"life flows by, the fleeting

is between our hands,

neglect to enjoy it." (IV,I,398)
their

friendship,

and

how

the

and we

She writes to Claire of
passage

concentrated their feelings for each other.

of

tine

has

One dies little

by little, "But a sensitive heart defends itself with all
its force against this anticipated death." (399)

She says

that the thought of the past "humiliates me so that I lose
courage," but she encourages herself with the honor that she
has gained from six years of marriage.

She feels herself

cured of those old wounds and dares to believe herself
virtuous.

She cries, but assures Claire that they are tears

of pity, regret, and repentance— "love is no longer a part
of them; love is nothing to me now." (403)

(Her life with

Wolmar is not strictly speaking one of love.)
Without calling Saint-Preux by name, she confides to
Claire that she thinks he is probably dead.

And almost too

sympathetically for a married woman, she writes as if in a
sigh:

"Ah my dearl What a soul he had! . . . how he could

love!" (403)

Julie pleads with Claire, now a widow with one

female child, to come live with her at Clarens.
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And Julie
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expounds the first statement of what might be called the
cult of friendship:

"Do you not know that the communion of

hearts imparts to sadness something indefinably sweet and
affecting which contentment does not have?" (404)

She goes

on to say that friendship is a solace and consolation for
one's misery and pain.

Writing Claire that, without her,

she is nothing, Julie asks that she be allowed to await the
next life in the midst of "innocence and friendship." (405)
It seems clear that Julie, though contented in her
marriage with Wolmar,
happy.

is not,

or does not feel herself

Wolmar is her superior, not her friend per se, and

she needs a friend in order to be happy.

Whether or not she

still feels that love could make her happy, she dare not
even mention.
Claire responds that 1)

Saint-Preux is probably alive,

for he was seen two months ago off the Canary Islands, and
2)

she plans to move to Clarens, Julie's estate, after the

summer.

So they can both share the hope of "an eternal

reunion."
It is at this point that a letter arrives to Claire
from Saint-Preux.
sailor.

He returns the well-travelled and tested

"Am I returning freer and wiser than I left?

dare believe it and can not affirm it." (IV,III,415)
returns as a friend, conquered by Julie's virtue.

I
He

But he is

aware of the dangers of the blurring of the past and the
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present.

He asks for permission to see Julie so that he

will, in effect, know himself.
Wolmar, now advised of the former love affair between
Julie and Saint-Preux, invites Saint-Preux to his house,
where "innocence and peace" prevail.

Saint-Preux is assured

that he will find friendship, if his heart is ready for it.
But there is more, as an accompanying letter from Claire
explains:

Not only does Wolmar offer his friendship, he

intends to "cure" Saint-Preux (of his passion), for none of
them can be perfectly happy before that occurs.

Thus,

Saint-Preux will enter an environment of peace and order,
where the most intense relationships are those of friendship
and maternal affection (Julie is the mother of two young
sons.).
After

their

first

meeting,

ecstatically to Lord Bomston:

Saint-Preux

writes

"I have seen her, my Lordl

My eyes have seen her! . . . She showed joy at seeing me;
she called me her friend, her dear friend."

(IV,VI,418)

After having time to recover himself and observe Julie, he
finds

that

"In place

of

that

suffering

modesty

which

formerly made her lower her eyes incessantly, one sees the
security

of virtue

ally

itself

sweetness and sensitivity . . .

in her

chaste

look to

a freer air and franker

manners have succeeded that constrained behavior mixed with
tenderness and shame." (421-22)

Then he meets Julie's two

children— "more beautiful than the day" and already showing
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resemblances

to

their

mother.

"A thousand

delightful memories divided my heart."

cruel

and

He realizes that it

is a mother of a family to whom he is speaking.

From that

moment of realization, Saint-Preux writes that he knew that
they were no longer the same and he began to feel better
about himself.
Thus, it is established that both Saint-Preux and Julie
still feel something for each other, but both feel that it
is something different from their former and passionate
love.

But Claire's statement that Wolmar intended to "cure"

Saint-Preux more than implies that at least Wolmar somehow
claims to know that Saint-Preux is still lovesick.
as it may, what might this cure consist of?
will

not be

an attempt to have

disfavor Julie.

Be that

Obviously, it

Saint-Preux

forget

The cure can only be one thing:

or

He must

come to know the joys of friendship; he must transform
himself from lover to friend.
of this cure?

And what will be the nature

It is, in fact, given voice in Letter VI from

Saint-Preux to Lord Bomston.
The situation surrounding the enunciation of Wolmar's
first principle of morals is a conversation between Julie
and Saint-Preux.

At Julie's request, he spoke of Bomston,

which led him to speak of his, Saint-Preux's, sufferings and
Bomston's assistance;

this led Julie to enter into her

"justification" for all she had done.

At that moment,

Wolmar

Julie

returned

to

the

conversation.

continued
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speaking

as

before.

Wolmar

discerned

Saint-Preux's

astonishment.
You have just seen, says Wolmar, an example of
openness which rules here. If you sincerely want
to be virtuous, learn to imitate it: That is the
only request and the only lesson that I have to
give you.
The first step toward vice is to
shroud innocent actions in mystery, and whoever
likes to hide themselves sooner or later has
reason to hide themselves.
A single moral
precept can take the place of all others; it is
this: Never do or say anything that you do not
want the whole world to see and hear.(424)
Clasping Julie's and Saint-Preux's hands together, Wolmar
announces "Our friendship now begins."

To consecrate this

bond, Wolmar instructs Saint-Preux to "Embrace your sister
and friend."

He urges them to be familiar with each other,

"But act alone as if I were present, or before me as if I
were not." (424)
Wolmar has, in effect, given Saint-Preux a conscience,
for as Saint-Preux confides to Lord Bomston:

"I began to

understand with what sort of man I was dealing,

and I

resolved to keep my heart always in a state to be seen by
him."

(425)

enjoying

the

He comments tellingly that he was finally
pleasure

of

Julie's

presence,

uneasiness, fear, or anything to disturb it.

without

He is finding

a new "innocence"— without suffering, without the obstacles
to fulfilled passion.

For now, he is outside the myth.

He

puts himself to bed at the end of this day of reunion,
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vowing to leave the Wolmar house if he ever becomes too fond
of it.
It is clear that our story has entered a new realm,
after that six-year hiatus.
change is this:
does.

The baldest statement of the

Whereas love had reigned, now friendship

And we have been given some precise indications of

how to comprehend friendship as opposed to love.
ask the question thus:

How is friendship most unlike love?

The most general answer:
public.

Love is private; friendship is

Or to put the issue in terms of Letter VI:

secretive; friendship is open.
love one another.
(Of

We might

course,

we

Love is

All that lovers can do is

Their relationship thrives on secrecy.
continue

to

speak

of

romantic

love.)

Friendship, as Aristotle put it, is the basis of society.
A

friendship

of two

is

always

likely to

network

into

thousands of relationships, even if not of the same depth
and intensity.

Question:

Does all this make marriage but

one friendship among others?

And what is the relationship

between openness/friendship and happiness? And, more to the
point of Wolmar's cure, does openness cause the sting of
love/secrecy to go away?

One thing is clear:

If Julie and

Saint-Preux are to find happiness, between themselves or
absolutely,

they must find it in openness/friendship as

opposed to secrecy/love.
the "cure.11

That, simply, is the challenge of
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Secrecy,
represents

a

as Wolmar suggests,
sort

of

loss

of

accompanying passionate love.

leads to distrust;

Innocence,

as

does

it
its

Openness leads to trust and

to a sort of innocence regained.

In even broader terms,

love is, for Rousseau, a loss of innocence, for, in its
absolute privacy,

it says

"This

is mine!"

It is the

beginning of the comparison of oneself with others; it is
the beginning of amour-propre.

In a state of openness, one

regains one's original innocence— ironically, one's interior
as opposed to external life.

It is living outside the self-

-in

alienates

the

loved

one!— that

the

self.

But,

ultimately, passionate love causes alienation only because
its fulfillment is deadly to itself.
But to return to the more practical matter of just how
the couple

(Julie and Saint-Preux)

is to

act.

Wolmar

advised that they should act as if he were there when he was
not, and as if he were not when he was there.

This seems

like a conundrum, for if he is there and they act as if he
is not there, this is tantamount to being alone and acting
as if he were there.

Moreover, he says that when he is

there he will tell them what he thinks.

Therefore, Wolmar

will always be there as a conscience or, as we might say
today, as an alter-ego.1

But of essential importance is

*See Judith N. Shklar.
Men and citizens (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 90-142 passim, for a
discussion of Wolmar's god-like qualities.
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that the goal of this moral principle of openness is virtue,
and, we can surmise, the ultimate goal is still happiness
(but Wolmar has not explicitly expressed that conclusion).
Whatever, Wolmar is in the process of laying down the law!
Following the train of the story,

we can say that,

as

lovers, Julie and Saint-Preux attempted to follow love and
nature to happinesd; as friends, they will be forced to
follow virtue and moral principle.
The

subsequent

letter from Julie to

interest for several of Julie's comments:

Claire
1)

is

of

She loves

Saint-Preux as tenderly as ever, without loving him in the
same way; 2)

She finds him to be a matured man of the

world, more assured and less prone to general philosophical
propositions; and 3)

She finds that, next to virtue, Saint-

Preux loves her best in the world.

But there is a "post

scriptum" to the letter in which the theme of censorship is
developed. (430)
Julie was resolved to take the precaution, what with
Saint-Preux

returning,

of

choosing her

husband

as

her

confidant and of writing every letter as if he did not have
to see it and showing it to him nonetheless.
it,

this

self-imposed

but

virtual

censorship

application

of the principle

rejects the

plan for

too serious

a state to admit of openness in

matter

the

of

heart,

of

openness.

a number of

as

is the

On the face of
an

But Wolmar

reasons:

case

seems

1)Marriage is

every little
with

"tender
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friendship"; 2)

It is good that a wife have a faithful

woman friend whom she may confide in, independent of her
husband;

3)

because

it

It is dangerous to make a law of openness,
could

become

confidences less sweet,

an

undue

restriction,

because too extended;

making

4)

Some

secrets are best shared between two people at a time, even
though three should know them; 5)

The letters risk being

eventually written to Wolmar and not to Julie's friend, such
that Julie will be at ease with neither one nor the other;
and 6)

If Julie does not show her letters to Wolmar, she is

more likely to speak kindly of him in them.
A

central

objection

that Wolmar makes

to

Julie's

proposal of censorship is that making openness into a law is
unadvisable— primarily,

because it would take a certain

sweetness out of life.

For the proposal would extend the

number of people involved in a confidence.

As a legislator,

Wolmar seems sensitive to privacy, at least insofar as he
allows

a

sort

friendships.

of

semi-privacy

within

the

So Wolmar bends his moral law.

circle

of

And not

surprisingly, for it is his own personal moral authority on
which Wolmar depends, more than on any inflexible moral
principle.
Julie's

letter-writing proposal

also

shows us

how

thoroughly even Julie places herself in Wolmar's guiding
hands.

In fact, it tells us that Julie, as well as Saint-

Preux, sees herself as in need of a cure.

For she admits to
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the possibility of needing to be censored in what she writes
even to her best friend.

In a sense, Wolmar is mentor to

Julie and Saint-Preux, not unlike Rousseau the tutor was to
his Emile.

The difference, of course, is that our couple

grew into adulthood without a mentor and now has to be
returned to some sort of state of quasi-innocence, if not of
nature.
Thankful

for

the

tranquil

life

of

friendship,

as

opposed to that of impetuous passions, Saint-Preux describes
to Lord Bomston the world of peace and order and innocence
of Clarens— where everything is in harmony "with the true
end of man." (441)

It is as if Rousseau were dusting off

his Aristotle in an attempt to circumscribe the person and
world of Wolmar.

Saint-Preux, in Letter X, attempts to give

Bomston an idea, in detail, of a domestic economy which is
the felicity of both the Wolmars and of their employees.
Much of what is discussed would be called today land and
personnel management.

Over-riding all the insights into

conflict resolution, worker motivation and loyalty, is a
benevolent and effective paternalism. (447)

One also sees

this distrust of explicit laws restraining the behavior of
workers, just as we saw in the application of the moral
principle of openness.

For example,

In order to prevent a dangerous familiarity
between the sexes, they are not constrained here
by positive laws which would tempt them to break
them in secret; but, without appearing to do so,
customs (usages) more powerful than authority
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itself are established.
They are not forbidden
to see each other, but things are arranged such
that they have neither the opportunity nor the
will. This is done by giving them occupations,
habits, tastes, pleasures entirely different (one
from the other).
At this point, the reader might wonder just how Wolmar
would react to his daughter having a love affair.

The

answer, of course, is that his daughter would never do such
a thing.

But his wife did have an affair, and in a very

real way is still under its spell;

in effect, Wolmar7s

actions toward Julie and Saint-Preux are lessons in how to
manage "dangerous familiarity between the sexes."
Saint-Preux points out a difference between the purely
political and purely domestic economy when he writes,
In the Republic, citizens are restrained by
manners, principles, virtue: but how to contain
domestics, mercenaries, other than by constraint?
The whole art of the master is to hide this
constraint under the veil of pleasure and of
interest,
such that they think they want
everything they are obliged to do. (453)
One might ask, without going beyond the confines of the
text, whether Wolmar7s cure of Saint-Preux (and Julie) is a
virtue of the citizen or a quasi-virtue of the servant?

It

seems that with the principle of openness Wolmar has given
the situation a chance to be worked through in an authentic
manner.

That is, he has given Saint-Preux and Julie the

chance of becoming (or remaining) full citizens of Clarens.
And such a citizenship entails a certain happiness.

On the
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other hand, openness is also a principle to be upheld by the
servants; as Saint-Preux writes,
[I] think . . . that whenever there is mixing of
the sexes every public entertainment becomes
innocent simply by being public, whereas the most
praiseworthy business is suspect in private
(tete-a-tete). (456)
It remains unclear just what difference there is between
governance of one's family and of one's city.

But there is

one error which pertains to both domestic and civil economy:
It is a big mistake in domestic economy as well
as in civil [economy) to want to fight a vice
with another one or make between them a sort of
equilibrium,
as if that which sapped the
foundations of order were able ever to serve to
establish it! All one does by this bad policing
is to reunite all the unwanted things.
Vices
tolerated in a home do not rule there alone; let
one take root and a thousand will follow. (461)
But we just saw that the art of the master was to hide
constraint
interest.

of

servants under the veil

of pleasure

and

What does this mean for the status of openness as

a principle?

Not being open with servants must not be a

vice, even though covert action looks like one vice trying
to correct another.
Summing up his little treatise on the Wolmar estate,
Saint-Preux concludes:

"Only the order and the rule that

multiplies and perpetuates the use of goods can transform
pleasure into happiness." (466)

And it is evident to him

that it is "a happy being" who rules Clarens.

In fact, only

in such a setting can one, according to Saint-Preux, be
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happy or contented:

The surest sign of true contentment is

a domestic life of retreat.
"Alone among all mortals"

The father of a family is
master

of his

own

felicity,

"because he is happy even like God, with nothing more to
desire than what he enjoys." (466-67)

This master wishes to

acquire nothing new, but rather to better possess what he
has.

And one thing he does is to form or shape those around

him. (467-68)
Julie and Saint-Preux are reunited,
Clarens— under the all-seeing eye of Wolmar.
dealings

with

them

be

open

(appealing

of course,

at

Will Wolmar's
to

manners,

principles, and virtue), or will they be closed (hiding the
motives of pleasure and interest)?

This might be another

way of asking if we can be tricked into happiness (even by
a god-like master). Or if true happiness does not demand a
totally open road and a totally open conscience.

Whatever,

it is somewhat ironic to read Saint-Preux as he writes about
the first chore of the master of the house:

to allow only

honorable people who harbor no secret desire to trouble the
order of the house.

And how do you find such servants?

No,

you "make" them, you form and shape those around you!

Of

course, that— education— is the first political art.
Saint-Preux is a witness to the frank and open nature
of the Wolmars' communication with the servants.

Since they

do not have a different morality from the one they want to
give others, they have no need of circumspection in their
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speech.

They do not "tell all," but they do tell freely all

their maxims. (468)

But does Wolmar, we might ask, tell his

servants that, on principle, he hides what he wants from
them under the veil of pleasure and interest?

The first

principles of governance of Clarens do not, at least on
Saint-Preux7s
Saint-Preux

telling,

tells

seem

Bomston

clear

that

or

there

non-problematic.
is much

more

to

describe— how the Wolmars themselves live and raise their
children— and that "all that forms a tableau so enchanting
that in order to love to contemplate it I need no other
motivation than the pleasure I find in it." (470)
reminded

here,

incidentally,

that

pleasure

We are
is

not

necessarily an ignoble motivation.
Saint-Preux writes a second letter to Bomston about
life at Clarens; he begins by reaffirming his first most
general observation:
which

does

not

"One sees nothing in this household

join

the

agreeable

to

the

useful."

(IV,XI,470)

But useful is not limited to that which brings

profit;

consists

it

also

of

"any

simple

and

innocent

amusement which nourishes the liking for seclusion, work,
and moderation . . . and . . .
from

the

anxiety

of

the

a healthy soul, a heart free

passions."

(470)

Labor

and

recreation are equally necessary to man.
But Letter XI is specifically about Julie7s Elysium, a
wooded area where art has improved on nature, or at least
brought the illusion of the beauties of nature to a place
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decided upon by nan.

If the unity of the whole of Clarens

is happiness, Elysium is the place to find that principle
written large.
considered:

Only one datum from the Elysium will be

the tamed birds that stay in the garden as if

there were an actual aviary.
Wolmar explains that, with the help of nature (some
birds were there to begin with), it took "patience and time"
to

perform

the

"miracle"

of

taming

wild

birds.

The

additional birds were attracted by anticipating all their
needs, by never scaring them, by allowing them to make their
nests with security, and by not disturbing the little ones.
(476)

This, of course, could be a description of how Wolmar

provides for his domestics and servants.

Their peace and

security— their happiness— is the immediate concern of the
master.

No

doubt,

a paternalism.

(477)

And

neither

paternalism nor constructing Elysia are natural

in the

strict sense; in taming it, a certain violence (480) is done
to nature.

But that is the only way the less adventurous

are able to experience nature, for she hides herself in
rugged and secluded places. (480)
Saint-Preux has an objection to Elysium.

He says it is

a superfluous amusement.

That objection is, in effect,

given two responses:

In so many well-chosen words,

1)

Wolmar reminds Saint-Preux that the other woods, outside
Elysium, were the site of his and Julie's first kiss.
avoids that wood.

Wolmar concludes:

She

"this place was

planted by the hands of virtue." (485)

Is that not another

way of closely comparing a rather unnatural place like
Elysium with the nature of virtue?

Is virtue not like tamed

wild birds— acted upon by a sort of violence and existing as
a sort of illusion?
objection
response.

was

the

Wolmar's response to Saint-Preux's
right

of

virtue,

or

the

political

Julie's response will be quite different.

2)

Julie tells Saint-Preux that when she became a mother, her
zeal for embellishing Elysium augmented.

She thought of one

day turning over the care of Elysium to her sons.

She

thought of her children returning to her those attentions
that she bestowed on them, "and the joy of their tender
hearts in seeing their mother walk with delight along the
shady paths formed by their hands."
positions herself beyond Wolmar:

(485)

Then Julie

"In truth, my friend, she

said with emotion in her voice, days spent that way have to
do with the happiness of the next (literally: other) life,
and it is not without reason that in thinking of it I gave
in advance the name of Elysium to this place."

(485-86)

Thus, Julie justifies Elysium for the maternal and religious
sentiment it engenders, whereas Wolmar justifies it on moral
grounds— that is, it helped keep Julie virtuous and free
from thoughts of her former love.
The next day, Saint-Preux entered Elysium alone.

He

spent two hours there, he says, and he preferred that time
to any other time in his life.

(The reader might realize
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that Elysium has preempted that sublime hour spent with
Julie in Part I.)

Saint-Preux reflects on the nature of

revery and finds that
there is in the meditation of honest thoughts a
sort of well-being that wicked people have never
known; it is that of being pleased with oneself.
. . . I do not know another pleasure which could
equal that one. (487)2
A

further

reflection

almost

allows

him

to

draw

the

conclusion that those who love solitude are more likely to
be virtuous, because 1)

the enjoyment of virtue is wholly

internal and, therefore, most accessible to the solitary;
and 2)

non-virtuous activity would be a torment for the

solitary.
Whereas Wolmar spoke of virtue in relation to Elysium
and Julie spoke of happiness, Saint-Preux speaks of "wellbeing" and "pleasure."

"Being pleased with oneself" becomes

the greatest pleasure that man can experience.
pleasure

is not happiness,

accompanies happiness.
point.

for Aristotle

Though

at least,

it

But Saint-Preux is silent on that

Only to the extent that Elysium reminds him of the

once-beloved Julie does that place seem to be more than the
Epicurean garden.
The

following

Letter

XII,

though

it

gives

us

an

extraordinary profile of the person of Wolmar, is prompted
by Julie's misgivings at being left alone for a week with

2What of the pleasure of knowing you have done good, as
in the Claude Anet/Fanchon episode?
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Saint-Preux while her husband makes a trip.

She writes to

Claire for advice, because she begins to distrust reason and
understanding as much as the passions and sentiments.
The letter is mostly a narration of what takes place
when Wolmar proposes that he, Julie, and Saint-Preux take a
morning walk in the very woods where Julie and Saint-Preux
experienced their first kiss.

They all sit down, near that

fatal spot, and Wolmar, somewhat uneasily, begins to talk.
He says that he envisions the possibility of the three of
them being able to live together, but he thinks they should
know him better.

He describes himself as naturally having

"a tranquil soul and a cold heart." (490)

"My only active

principle is a natural liking of order. . . .
ruling passion it is that of observation:
the hearts of men."

If I have any
I like to read

He says that society is pleasing to him

for the sake of contemplation, not for being a part of it.
Ideally, he would be a "living eye." (491)

Because of his

virtual need to observe, humankind may not be dear to him,
but it is necessary to him.

He went to great pains— even to

changing his name and station in life— in order to observe
men.
I felt, as you have remarked in one of your
Letters, he says to Saint-Preux, that one sees
nothing when he is content to look only, that it
is necessary to act oneself in order to see men
acting, and I made myself an actor in order to be
a spectator. (492)
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This reference is to the central letter of the collection,
Saint-Preux's

Letter

XVII

of Part

II.

Wolmar

begs

a

comparison between the attempts of the two young but very
different men to study the world.

Wolmar gives Saint-

Preux' s Letter XVII more focus and importance as a treatise
on methodology within The New Heloise. So let us return to
that so important Parisian letter;

afterwards^

we shall

return to the continuation of Wolmar's story about himself
and his understanding of how to "know" the world.
Saint-Preux has been separated from Julie against his
will.

He is living in Paris.

Their love is reciprocal at

this point— both implicitly and explicitly.

In the turmoil

of big-city life, he says that both love and reason give him
an aversion to the tumult around him, which he has time to
neither feel nor examine. (245)

This raises the question of

the difficulties of studying the world.
The philosopher is too far from it; the man of
the world is too close to it. The one sees too
much to be able to reflect, the other too little
to judge the total picture.
Each object that
strikes the philosopher, he considers separately,
and being able to discern neither the connections
nor the relations with other objects which are
beyond his reach, he never sees that [object) in
its place and senses neither the reason of it nor
its true effects.
The man of the world sees
everything and has time to think about nothing.
The mobility of objects permits him to perceive
them only and not to observe them; they wear away
together and rapidly, and there remains to him of
everything only confusing impressions which
resemble chaos. (245-46)
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So Rousseau makes the evident but ironic point that the man
of the world sees more than the philosopher and that the
philosopher— in spite of his superior powers of reflection—
cannot fully know the world without a knowledge of its very
materiality.

But there is another methodological problem-

more epistemological
meditate

in nature:

alternatively,

because

"Nor can one see and
the

spectacle

demands

continuous attention, which interrupts reflection." (246)
And, if a person wanted to divide his time between the world
and solitude, "always disturbed in his retreat and always a
stranger in the world," he would be nowhere.

Even dividing

his entire life into two big parts— the one for seeing, the
other for reflecting— is "almost impossible":

the reason

cannot be turned off and on so easily. (246)
Moreover, it is foolish to try to study the world as a
mere spectator who— "useless in business and unwelcome in
pleasures"— is never given entre.
One does
one acts
in that
what one

not see
oneself;
of love,
wants to

others act, except insofar as
in the school of the world as
one must begin by practicing
learn, (emphasis added) (246)

Then Saint-Preux presumably gives his chosen course of
action:

as an idle foreigner he must assume the manners of

the world and he must make himself agreeable, for he is good
for nothing else to anyone.
rules of social etiquette.

And he must fulfill various
Having done that, he says that

he has gained access, even to the more exclusive "private
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suppers."

So he studies Parisian society and theater, and

what does he find?
In general, there is much discourse and little
action on the French stage; perhaps it is that,
in effect, the Frenchman speaks more than he
acts, or at least that he gives much more value
to that which is said than to that which is done.
(253)
Because of the Frenchman's valuation of word over deed,
Saint-Preux
Parisians.

cannot

claim

to

know

the

hearts

of

For deeds do not (always) resemble speeches.

sees then only appearances.

the
He

He is still too much of an

outsider to claim to know and pronounce on the Parisians.
(The above,

of

course,

assumes

that

deeds

are

a more

accurate portrayal of a man's soul than are his words.)
His chosen method of studying the world has failed, at
least in this instance.

But what toll has that method

exacted from him as a person?

He says he is beginning to

feel the intoxicating effects of being of the world.

He

sometimes forgets who and what he is, for he plays a role
each day, to the point of perverting the order of his moral
affectations.

"I thus see disfigured that divine model that

I carry within me, and which served at the same time as
object of my desires and as rule for my actions." (255)
is like a small ship on the high seas. (255)

He

Confused and

humiliated at how he has fallen from his love of Julie, he
tries to return within himself to determine if his former
affections are still alive— in short, to see if he still
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loves Julie.
identity.

That is the test of his authenticity and

And when he finds Julie still on her "throne of

glory," "I believe to have recovered my existence and my
life."

(256)

The privacy of love, as well as its very

existence, is threatened by the whirlwind of worldly living,
of city life.
But what is Saint-Preux's life?
Is he a man of the world?
philosopher?

What is Saint-Preux?

Obviously,

Less obviously, not.

not.

Is he a

He is something apart:

he is a lover, for as he himself distinguishes,

"in the

school of the world as in that of love, one must begin by
practicing what one wants to learn." (246)

So what is the

true object of philosophy, if not the world and not love?
Or is philosophy epistemologically possible?

If you cannot

philosophize about what you are doing and if you cannot know
without doing, is philosophy then not an illusion— or at
best a wish.

Did not Saint-Preux reject philosophy for love

and friendship?

Perhaps there are sounder (?) reasons for

doing so than mere lovesickness.

But what, one might ask,

is wrong with Saint-Preux's method of studying the world, as
presented in Letter XVII?

Does he not at the end of each

intoxicating day sober up to find himself and his sacred
love intact?

He does until Letter XXVI of Part II, when he
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becomes the willing victim of Parisian prostitutes!

The

dangers of studying the world are too greatI3
But to return to Wolmar's account of himself in Julie's
Letter XII of Part IV.
Preux:

Wolmar agrees, then, with Saint-

to know, you must act.

Wolmar was also able 1)

intensify his love of order by acting and 2)

to

to acquire a

new liking for the good by means of contributing to it
through actions.
"idle

stranger"

accentuated,

it

unbearable to him.

Unlike Saint-Preux, Wolmar was not a mere
in

the

seems,

world.
by

But

his

good

solitude— even
actions— became

It was the vision of an old age without

consolation that made him uneasy and sad for the first time
in his life.

It was then that Julie's father offered

Julie's hand in marriage to him.

Wolmar describes meeting

Julie and experiencing the first and only emotion he had
ever had, when Julie embraced her father with such great joy
and emotion.

He explains to Julie and Saint-Preux that, if

that emotion was only slightly felt by him, it was unique,
and "feelings (sentiments) only need that force for acting
in proportion to those feelings that resist them." (492-93)
Wolmar

loved,

though
other

feebly,
passions

he
to

admits,

but

contained

no

sentiment.

Thus, his love totally conquered him.

his

counterbalance

soul
that

He admits

3Though Julie forgives Saint-Preux for the prostitute
incident, it is immediately after that incident that all
turns sour. Mme d'Etange discovers Julie's cache of letters
and Julie breaks off the romance.

189

that, if he had ever had another passion,

it would have

derailed him.
He takes the opportunity to meditate out loud about the
psychology of the philosopher as opposed to that of the man
of the world.

And he brings the brief discussion to a

synthesis or answer— though still ambiguous in its terms.
only fiery souls know how to struggle and
conquer. All great efforts, all sublime actions
are their doing; cold reason never did anything
illustrious, and passions are overcome only in
opposing them one against the other. When that
[passion] of virtue comes to the fore, it alone
dominates and keeps everything in equilibrium;
that is how the true wise man is formed, who is
no more than another who
is sheltered from
passions, but who alone knows how to conquer them
with themselves, as a pilot sails by adverse
winds. (493)
From

this

account

the

man

of

reason

might

be

the

philosopher, but surely not the wise man, who is a man of
passion— even if the passion of virtue.
seeks the Good passionately,
Platonic metaphor.

He is the man who

erotically, to allude to a

He is, in short, the lover.

Wolmar

admits to being neither a man of love, nor a man of the
world.

In fact, he is living in that in-between world of

partial association, whereby he creates his own world with
the self-sufficiency of a god.
After a long prelude in which Wolmar confides that 1)
he realizes that Julie and Saint-Preux could never forget
each other without losing much of their worth, 2) the good
can be obtained from sensitive souls with confidence and
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sincerity, and 3)

they should not fear themselves, he,

Wolmar, brings Julie and Saint-Preux to embrace at the spot
of their first embrace.

This kiss in the bosquet is surely

meant to be a dose of the cure, and it appears to work on
Julie, for she writes that the kiss was nothing like that
first one, that she sadly congratulated herself for having
such an altered heart.
But Julie's reaction to news of an upcoming trip of her
husband— which would leave her and Saint-Preux alone at
Clarens— belies her profession of an altered heart.
asks Claire for advice:
Preux?

She

Should she stay alone with Saint-

Should she ask her husband to take Saint-Preux with

him, and thereby show her weakness?

She confesses that she

no longer trusts anything that she sees or feels.

"I am

experiencing with sorrow that the weight of an old failing
is a burden that must be carried for life." (499)
More than anything else, Letter XII offers a comparison
of the "modi vivendi" of Saint-Preux and Wolmar.
that to know we must act,

Both agree

but Wolmar's action is of a

decidedly different order from the passive participation in
Parisian society engaged in by the young Saint-Preux.

In

fact, Saint-Preux seems to think that he can experience the
world as he does the passion of love.

And, ironically, his

pursuit of the world ends in a prostitute's bed.

Whereas

Wolmar's action on the world for the good (of the world and
of himself) ends in marriage to Julie.

Saint-Preux is a
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lover; he wants to love the world.
being is loving.

His mode of seeing and

Wolmar seems to be a legislator; he wants

to order the world.

When they speak of action, Saint-Preux

and Wolmar are speaking of two distinct activities: the one,
a passion or feeling; the other, an action or ordering.

The

only passion that Wolmar seems to recognize, except for his
unique love of Julie, is that of virtue, but exactly what
the "passion of virtue" is remains unclear.

The wise man

possesses it and he seems the ideal synthesis of thought and
action, or, rather, of thought, action, and feeling.

In the

midst of the Enlightenment, Rousseau is bringing to bear the
necessity of feelings for the purposes of knowledge, virtue,
and happiness.

Whereas Wolmar blends thought and action

well, it is Saint-Preux who seems closer to a synthesis of
thought and feeling.
Wolmar writes a rare letter (XIV) to Claire, in which
we experience Wolmar, as the Enlightenment-like personage,
in the process of applying not only science, but applying
the science of man to the cure of love.

What a sacrilege!

Yet it is brought to us by him who is ostensibly the most
respected and benevolent character of the novel.

Let us

trace the cold though not ill-intended reasoning of Wolmar
as regards the state of the lovers' souls and the course of
action required to resolve the love.
Wolmar

is not unaware of Claire's rather humorous

opinion of his observations of love (508); but he hazards

the following ideas regardless, because he is so sure of
himself.

First, he contends that he has made a discovery:

the couple burns more ardently than ever for each other, and
there reigns between them nothing more than an innocent
attachment— "they are still lovers and are no more than
friends." (508)

(If this is true, it is most important, for

it heralds the reconciliation of love and friendship; if it
proves false, it might be Rousseau's indication that loveand-friendship is a non-synthesizable dichotomy.)

Wolmar

qualifies his statements by specifying that he is speaking
mostly of Saint-Preux,
through conjecture:

for Julie can only be spoken of

"A veil of wisdom and innocence is

folded so around her heart that it is no longer possible for
the human eye to penetrate to it, not even her own eye."
(509)

Secondly, as for Saint-Preux, he is not in love with

Julie de Wolmar, but with Julie d'Etange.
the past tense:

"He loves her in

that is the true clue to the enigma.

away his memory and he will no longer have love." (509)

Take
He

is confusing the times and tenses, and loves only a memory.
Thirdly, Wolmar must make a decision in his approach or
cure:
I do not know if it is better to succeed in
curing him or in disillusioning him. . . . To
show him the veritable state of his heart could
be to teach him the death of that which he loves;
it would give him a dangerous affliction in that
the state of sadness is always favorable to love.
(510)
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Does Wolmar intend to cure or merely disillusion SaintPreux?
I thought . . . it necessary to make him lose
memory of the times that he must forget, by
substituting adroitly other ideas for those that
are so dear to him. (511)
Wolmar makes it clear that it is Saint-Preux's imagination
that must be changed.

In place of seeing his mistress, he

must see the spouse of an honest man and the mother of his
children.

*'I erase one painting with another, and cover the

past with the present."

In such a way, he will dissolve the

fear in the hearts of the couple, which fears are caused by
the fires of the imagination outlasting those of the heart.
When he is finished with them, their monsters will disappear
at their approach. (511)
Wolmar goes on to say that he thinks he judged right by
planning to leave the couple alone together at Clarens.
"The more they see each other alone, the more they will
easily understand their error by comparing that which they
will feel with that which they would have formerly felt in
a similar situation." (511)
The question of happiness is boldly addressed by Julie,
as told in Letter XV from Saint-Preux to Bomston.

Alone

with Saint-Preux after Wolmar's departure, Julie confides in
Saint-Preux:

"My dear friend

happiness on earth."
concludes:

. . . there is no true

She catalogues her blessings and

"Favored in all things by heaven, by fortune,
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and by men, I see everything converging toward my happiness.
A secret sorrow, a lone sorrow poisons it, and I am not
happy." (513)

(We shall discover later that the cause of

this unhappiness is the atheism of her husband Wolmar, who
is a scientist to the core.)
While Wolmar is away, Julie writes him a brief note 1)
suggesting that he visit Claire on the way back in order to
hear from her what happened while he was gone,

and 2)

chiding him for sporting cruelly with his wife's virtue.
(Claire obviously told Julie of Wolmar's tactics of the
cure— that is, the plans to leave the former couple alone
together.)

And what happened while Wolmar was away?

the cure work?

Did the love grow dimmer?

Did

In brief, Julie

was tested in such a way as to test Wolmar's theories about
her and Saint-Preux.
Along with three oarsmen and a servant,

Julie and

Saint-Preux set out on a boat ride on Lake Geneva.

There

came a storm and by the hardest they reached the far shore
and Meillerie, the place where Saint-Preux spent his first
separation from Julie (Part I).

He and Julie took a walk

while at Meillerie, and he confesses to Lord Bomston that
his secret motive was to visit the spot with Julie and to
show her the memorials of his constant and unfortunate
passion.

In the most romantic fashion, Rousseau describes

this mountainscape which should have been "the refuge of two
lovers who alone escaped the confusion of nature." (518)

He
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showed her her initials engraved in a thousand places and
pointed out and memorialized the moments of his love in
exile.

As Saint-Preux begins to talk of the regret he

feels, Julie seems to think he is too close to the edge of
the mountain.

She pulls him back and asks that they leave.

As the moon rose, they boarded the boat for Clarens.
He took her hand and would not have let go of it until
death— that only resolution of the passion myth— took hold
of him.
the

The process that Saint-Preux seems to undergo on

crossing

is

realization

as

opposed

to

cure4

or

disillusionment— a sharpening of lost love as opposed to a
dulling of it by continued contact,
rationalistic wisdom, had predicted.
wide-eyed realization:

as Wolmar,

in his

The process is one of

"It is done, I said to myself; these

times, these happy times are no more; they have disappeared
forever . . . yet we live, and we are together, and our
hearts are still joined." (520-21)

To be with her and know

her lost to him was more unbearable than being distanced
from her.

"That was what threw me into fits of furor and

rage which agitated me by degrees to the point of despair.
...

I was violently tempted to throw her with myself into

the waves." (521)

At this point, Saint-Preux lets go of her

hand and goes to the bow of the boat.

4Cf. Duffy, Rousseau
differing interpretation.

in

Englandr p.

103,

for

a

Tenderness overcame despair.

He began to cry.

later, when composed, he joined Julie again.
hand.

He saw that she too had been crying.

And,

He took her

He said to her:

"I see that our hearts have never ceased to hear each
other."

"It is true, she says in a changed voice; but let

this be the last time that they will have spoken in this
manner."

(521)

miscalculated.

It

seems

that

Wolmar

partially

Yes, Julie was able to stave off her and

Saint-Preux's emotions, but the process that the lovers
underwent was one of sad realization, even tragedy— surely
not that

of displacement

passions.

of memories

or

a dulling

of

And the disillusion went beyond the pain of

resignation, without resigning itself.

Perhaps Wolmar is

not the infallible all-seeing eye that he is pretended to
be.

For one, Julie chides him for his irresponsibility!

And one must say that the irresponsible miscalculation is
born not only in the pride of philosophy, but in a total
lack of understanding and experience of passionate love.
Wolmar is a consummate public man5; but he has no notion of
the private.

His principle of total openness is based, it

seems, on a lack of appreciation of the private which is
circumscribed by romantic love.
Saint-Preux tells Bomston that on that day of the boat
ride, he "felt without exception the most lively emotions

5Philosophy is public in that its knowledge is not
essentially esoteric.
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[of his life]."

And he hopes that they will be the crisis

which will restore him totally to himself.

He ends with

praise

victory

of

Julie's

(and

his)

virtue

and

over

temptation.
Several observations may be made after a reading of
Part IV:
love; 2)

1)

Friendship is presented as a substitute for

Though Julie and Saint-Preux have changed somewhat

in their affections, they still harbor deep feelings of love
for one another; 3) Wolmar, the philosopher par excellence,
has ultimate confidence in his ability to "cure" the couple;
4)

Questions of epistemology and of the true and,

implication,
understanding

happy
of

life

love,

are

raised;

and thus

of

and

5)

lovers,

by

Wolmar's
is tacitly

questioned.
Part V
Saint-Preux concludes Part IV with praise of and thanks
to Lord Bomston for his example of virtue and resistance to
his mistress— the thought of which sustained Saint-Preux
during his long day of temptation with Julie.

Part V begins

with Bomston's two-pronged reply to his friend:

1)

He

exhorts Saint-Preux to grow up, that is, to become a man of
thought as opposed to one of experience and feeling; and 2)
He asks Saint-Preux if he is mature enough to help him,
Bomston, with problems centering around his love life.

It

is curious that Rousseau ends this letter with an Editor's
Footnote that questions both Bomston's intelligence and
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sensibilities, all of which night urge the reader to ask if
Bomston's advice is not untrue, or wrong, or inpractical.
In brief, Letter I of Part V nay be viewed as a continuation
of the previous discussions on method— that is,

on the

proper manner of studying the world and, by implication,
dealing with it.
"Leave your infancy, friend, wake up," begins Bomston's
strident reply to Saint-Preux.

He asks him not to give his

entire life over to the long sleep of reason.

"My dear,

your heart has for a long time imposed on your thoughts.
You wanted to philosophize before being capable of it."
(523)

Bomston admits that the heart is primary for the

truth, for "he who has felt nothing can learn nothing."

The

sentiments deal with the true relation of things to man, but
it is to limit oneself to the first half of this
science not to study, beyond that, the relations
that things have among themselves, in order to
better judge of the relations that they have with
us.
It is a small thing to know the human
passions, if one cannot appraise the objects [of
those passions]; and this second study can only
be done in the calm of meditation. (523)
Bomston proceeds to elaborate one of the alternative
methods presented by Saint-Preux in Part II, Letter XVII
(246).

Bomston says:

The youth of the wise man is the time of his
experiences, his passions being the instruments
of them; but after having applied his soul to
exterior objects in order to feel them, he turns
his soul within himself in order to consider
them, to compare them, to know them. (523-24)
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To this alternative method of dividing one's life into
halves— one half for seeing/experiencing,

the other for

reflecting/knowing— Saint

the

Preux

objection (as early as Part II):

offered

following

"But that even is almost

impossible; for the reason is not a piece of furniture that
one moves around at his whim, and whoever has been able to
live ten years without thinking, will never in his life
think." (246)6 And the same may be said for feeling!
Bomston thinks that Saint-Preux, more than anyone else,
is at the point in his life when he should begin to study
the objects of the passions, for he has exhausted all the
feelings and sentiments that could fill up even a long life.
In short, he has the raw experience of an old man.
In spite of his many experiences and travels, the first
object of his passion— Julie— still rules.

Saint-Preux's

wide experiences are a sort of gage of the ultimate worth of
Julie.

As Bomston argues, "You no longer have anything to

feel or to see which merits your attention." (524)

The only

object left for him to study is himself; the only enjoyment
to taste is that of wisdom.

*When all is said and done, we seem to be left with
three distinct methods for knowing the world:
1) Wolmar
chooses to perform good actions; 2) Bomston would have one
divide his life into an active and a meditative half; and 3)
Saint-Preux chooses to participate (in Paris) as an idle
stranger, clearing his mind each night of the affairs of the
world. They all seem to be mutually exclusive.
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In the past, Julie was the source of Saint-Preux's
virtue, but, Bomston asks, "Will you not go toward the good
on your own strength, as Julie has done?"

Or will you, he

continues, content yourself to make good books instead of
performing good actions?

Bomston sees weakness in his

friend, as regards his feelings for Julie.

Hating weakness

above all things, Bomston claims that there is no virtue
without strength.

Bomston seems to suggest that courage is

the master virtue.

"Do you dare count on yourself having

heart without courage?" (525)
Stepping back from this first part of the Bomston
letter, we see that he is asking Saint-Preux to attempt to
abandon his very identity, which is that of a person who
feels the world as opposed to knowing it.

(Did Saint-Preux

not renounce philosophy for love and friendship?)
Saint-Preux

wrote

in

Part

II,

whereas

it

is

And, as
almost

impossible to turn one's reason off and on at will, is it
not also just as difficult to turn one's feelings on and
off?

Thus,

impractical.

Bomston's

advice might

be both wrong

and

For Bomston, experience and feeling are no

more than means to the objectives which are wisdom and good
actions.

For Saint-Preux, living a life of "sentiments" or

feelings

is

an

end

in

itself;

it

is

even

a

life

of

dependency on the love object, whereas Bomston's philosopher
would be self-sufficient— dependent only on his or her own
strength.

Bomston, baldly stated, is a public man or citizen— and
thus useful to others; Saint-Preux is a private man and
lover and of no use to others, except perhaps the beloved.
Bomston is attempting to make a public man of Saint-Preux;
he is, if we do not push the implied argument too far,
asking Saint-Preux to analyze Julie to death— to analyze
erotic love to death.
friendship.

And,

Replacing it will be, of course,

though the subject is not explicitly

raised in Letter I, it is acted out when Bomston essentially
asks Saint-Preux if he is capable of being his friend and of
advising him on his, Bomston's, love life.

Self-sufficiency

and friendship are not mutually exclusive.

Bomston must

know if Saint-Preux's judgment can be trusted (He.knows he
has a good heart.).
affairs.

He wants only reason to rule in his

And he gives at least one definition of or role

for the friend, while discussing his needs.

He says that he

is not afraid of the passions which make open war on us, or
which allow us consciousness of what we are doing; he fears
the

illusion of the passions which fool us

fighting us.

instead of

The friendship of a wise man serves the

purpose of seeing for us, from another point of view, the
objects that we have an interest in knowing well.7

7Bomston is asking Saint-Preux to be his friend, just
as Bomston has just furtively been a friend to Saint-Preux:
that is, Bomston argued that Julie was a person of strength
and self-sufficiency and, thus, we could conclude from
Bomston's point of view, not a person of passion or love.
In other words, Bomston gave Saint-Preux a different view of
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As was mentioned, Rousseau concludes this letter with
an Editor's Footnote, which reads as follows:
The galimatias of this Letter pleases me in that
it is totally in the character of good Edouard
[Bomston], who is never so much the philosopher
than when he does silly things and never reasons
more than when he does not know what he is
saying. (526)8
If there is one conclusion to be drawn from reflection on
Bomston's dogmatic remarks to Saint-Preux, it is that we are
not always free to choose our manner or method of approach
to life and to study of the world.
share

the

exact

same

nature

Rather, all men do not
(Cf.

Emilel,

and

the

contingencies of life and the world do not affect all in the
same manner.
This whole question of method of study of the world and
of living in the world is, of course, intimately bound to
the question of happiness.

In other words:

In which

epistemological (and psychological) mode is happiness to be
found? And are there, correspondingly, different species or

the object of his passion.
8It could be argued that the Editor's Footnote is a
veiled reference to the fact that soliciting Saint-Preux's
assistance in Bomston's affairs is a mere ploy to test his
maturity, judgment, and self-mastery.
Perhaps so, but it
may also be a flippant indication of the fallacious, and
irrelevant, nature of Bomston's arguments.
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nodes

of

happiness?

Or

can

one

shape

himself

to

a

preconceived method or mode?9
In his reply to Bomston's letter of exhortation (V,I),
Saint-Preux claims to be (partially) cured by Wolmar of his
passion for Julie.

But the caveat is more important, it

seems, than the bulk of his words.

He declares that "the

scene of Meilleries [i.e., the boat ride and promenade] was
the crisis of my folly and of my ills." (527)

Wolmar had

explained to him the true state of his soul— evidently, that
he was in love with a mere memory.

"This too weak heart,"

he tells Bomston, "is cured as much as it is possible to be,
and I prefer the sadness of an imaginary regret to the fear
of being ceaselessly beset by crime."

That is, he is only

capable of a partial cure, which consists in knowing and
accepting

the

fact

that

his

love

is

imaginary10.

He

professes to have found peace, through the aid of Wolmar,
whom he now calls friend.

Living in the simplicity and

equality of the Clarens household, his heart, by degrees,
comes into union with those of Julie and Wolmar, "as the
voice, without thinking of it, takes on the tone of the
people with whom one speaks." (527)

9It should not be forgotten that Rousseau is the father
of a school of developmental psychology, the primary
principle of which might be formulated simply as follows:
Development cannot be forced.
I refer to the thought of
Jean Piaget.
10What nonsense!
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So the cure administered by Wolmar leaves Saint-Preux
with an imaginary love of the past that he happily accepts
as such, but still with an ability to live in the present
with that same woman as a heartfelt friend.

He then goes on

to speak of life at Clarens and of the wisdom and goodness
of Julie and Wolmar.

If there is in this world a happy life

it is theirs— a life in retreat surrounded by one's family.
But

one

must

know

how

to

employ

"the

instruments

happiness" and must know how to taste of happiness.

of

So, it

is the art of being happy, in a particular situation, that
Saint-Preux proceeds to describe to Lord Bomston.
In Part V, happiness will be pursued in two directions-from the public and from the private aspect.

The communal

life at Clarens represents the public enterprise; and the
love of Julie and Saint-Preux, the private.

On the one

hand, country life, it is argued, makes for a simpler and
happier life; on the other, Saint-Preux and Julie attempt to
cure themselves of misdirected passion, at one time thought
to be the way of happiness itself.
more amenable to happiness?

But why is country life

Briefly stated, because, in the

country, people accept their positions and stations in life;
whereas, in the city, they are continuously torn by real and
imaginary ambitions.

Stated otherwise, in the country, life

is simple and its desires easily fulfilled.

And that state

of affairs more generally allows that our strengths be as
great as our wishes:

one Rousseauean formula for happiness.
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It is a life according to nature that Rousseau pretends to
.portray in his descriptions of the Clarens household.
On

another

level,

the

psychological

drama

of the

ascendancy of love over friendship seems to be playing
itself

out.

This

process— the

attempt

to

enthrone

friendship— is similar to the dynamics of country life:

the

goal of controlling the imagination (and thus ambition).
The couple must- replace the memory of what was love with
current memories of friendship.
One might ask:

Does Rousseau link the success of

country life in controlling the imagination with the success
of the couple's love cure?

Mutual success seems to be based

on the absence of a loss of innocence.

If the country

peasant has not seen the city and if the lover has not ever
been in love, the imaginations of both will probably be dull
and their ambitions minimal.
general
Clarens.

principles

by

Rousseau demonstrates these

various

descriptions

of

life

at

But the cornerstone of all arguments (if they are,

in fact, that) is Julie.

She is raised to the level of

heroine or saint, at least in the mind of Saint-Preux.
There will never be but one Julie in the world.
Providence has watched over her, and nothing of
that which regards her is the effect of chance.
Heaven seems to have given her to the earth in
order to show at the same time the excellence of
which a human soul is susceptible and the
happiness which it can enjoy in the obscurity of
the
private
life,
without
the
help
of
extraordinary virtues which could raise her above
herself, nor with the glory that could honor
them. (V,II,532)
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Julie becomes symbol— of what humankind can and cannot do.
In being what she is, she is both horizon and limit.

If

humankind can be happy or saved, this Julie— this child of
Providence— can surely be also.

(This privileged position

of Julie in the scheme of things might well be kept in mind
as we approach the end of the story of this search for
happiness.)
The first ingredient of country happiness is given as
Julie's grand maxim:

Do not favor changes in condition, but

rather contribute toward making each person happy in his or
her present condition; and prevent the villager from leaving
the countryside.
gives

diverse

conditions

in

Saint-Preux objects to Julie that nature

talents

to

life.

men

without

Julie responds

happiness must be given precedence

regard

to

their

that morality
over

talent.

and
And,

besides, if we hold that all talents should be developed, we
must

also

believe

that

necessary jobs of life.

talent

must

coincide

with

But this does not seem so.

the
Who

would work the fields if we waited for agricultural talent
to fill the positions?
this

line

of thought

We could stretch the implications of
to

say that Providence

does

not

distribute the talent and that the development of talent
does not necessarily lead to either happiness or morality.
In fact, "the most vile [of all talents] is the only one
that leads to riches." (536-38)

Julie's ideas on talent are

often similar to Rousseau's of the First Discourse:

What
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we, in our "fallen state," want is often not in our best
interests.
The above night well prepare us for a discussion of a
practice of Julie's which night be called ascetic pleasure.
But this discussion of self-inposed privation for the sake
of heightened pleasure is prefaced with a sort of anti
cartesian hymn to Julie.
Julie's soul and body are equally sensitive. The
same delicacy reigns in her feelings and in her
organs.
She was made to know
and to taste
the pleasures, and for a long tine she has not
loved
virtue
so
dearly as
the
sweetest
voluptuousness. (541)
Nonetheless,"the

art

of

enjoying

is

for

privation," though not a painful privation.

her that

all

of

Julie believes

that when a pleasure becomes a dull habit it ceases to be a
pleasure

and

becomes

a need. Therefore,

she deprives

herself of a pleasure and, when she partakes, partakes in
moderation— all with the purpose of enhancing the pleasure.
But
A more noble objective is proposed by her in all
that— to remain mistress of herself, to accustom
her passions to obedience, and to shape all her
desires to the rule.
It is a new11 means of
being happy, for one only enjoys without anxiety
that which one can lose without pain, and if true
happiness belongs to the wise man, it is because
he is, among all men, the one from whom fortune
can take the least. (542)
There is no question that Julie's art of enjoying
echoes of Aristotelian moderation, but what do we make of

“Compared to Aristotelian moderation?
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Rousseau/Saint-Preux's claim that it represents a new means
of being happy.

By way of answer, it could be said that for

Aristotle pleasure was not taken in the fulfillment of
individual desires, but in the awareness that one was master
of oneself.

But Julie— a sort of voluptuary, according to

Saint-Preux— was not one to separate mind
morality from pleasure.

Moderation, even self-mastery, was

in the service of pleasure/happiness.
makes

the

argument

from body, or

that

Julie

had

Saint-Preux even
improved

on

vulgar

Epicurians who never lost an opportunity to follow a desire.
(542)
The secret of the happy life, in the midst of country
retreat, seems to be restrained ambition.
A small number of nice and peaceful people,
united by mutual needs and reciprocal goodwill,
converges by diverse services to a common end:
each finding in his state all that is necessary
to be content and to not wish to leave it, one
attaches himself to it as being necessary to
remain there all his life, and the only ambition
that one keeps is that of successfully fulfilling
one's duties. (547-548)
The chores of country life are one's duties and pleasures.
(549)

The useful is joined to the agreeable.

Repetition

and the love of repetition is the hallmark of this simple
life:

Content with today, Julie asks nothing different from

tomorrow.
She does always the same things because those
[things] are good, and because she knows nothing
better to do.
Undoubtedly she enjoys every
happiness allowed to man. To take pleasure for
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the whole length of one's state in life, is it
not a sure sign that one is happy in it? (553)
As

we

saw

expressed

duration— to

the

in

ideal

the
point

Reveries. the
of

wished

for

everlastingness— of

a

particular state attests to the genuine happiness of that
state.

Rousseau would have us assume that the city-dweller

is bored by repetition,

probably because what the city

dweller does each day is not inherently good, or natural, as
well as because of an unbridled imagination.
dweller

is "the man of man,

in place of

The city

[the man]

of

nature." (554)
As is evident enough, Letter II recapitulates much of
the teaching of Rousseau's first two discourses.

But, in

Letter II, he takes some steps toward describing his answer
to the degeneration of contemporary life,
example.

in Paris,

for

Before On the Social Contractf he prepares his

ground with a eulogy of agrarian society, but that country
life, with the Wolmars as reigning king and queen, is hardly
one of liberty and equality, even if it is blessed with
benevolence.

Perhaps Rousseau offers the paternalism of the

Wolmar estate as the best that the European could achieve as
it waited for the introduction of "the general will" and
democracy.

The New Heloise went on sale in January of 1761;

On the Social Contract was published in April of 1762.

And,

as we shall see in Letter III of Part V, Rousseau was also
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concerned at this tine with the ideas of his Emile, which
was condemned by the Paris court on June 9, 1762.
In the beginning of Letter III,

Saint-Preux,

again

writing to Bomston, discourses on what we have called the
theme

of private

happiness

or,

more

specifically,

happiness of the couple Julie and Saint-Preux.

the

Musing on

the supremely pleasant life that he is living at Clarens, he
allows himself a meditation on his former love.
If extinguished love throws the soul into
emptiness, subjugated love gives to it, with the
consciousness of its victory, a new elevation and
a more lively attraction for all that is grand
and beautiful. (V,III,557)
And, justifying his very life, he concludes:

"I feel that

it was necessary to have been what I was in order to become
what I want to be." (557)

One cannot help asking just what

Saint-Preux wants to be.

Is it the much admired Wolmar or

the adored Julie?
Whatever his wishes for himself, he immediately begins
for

Bomston

l'anglaise"

a

description

during which,

of
after

the
the

famous

"matinee

departure

of

a

some

guests, Wolmar, Julie, and he are— just the three of them—
reunited and in silence.
that few people know.
words— that

is

contemplation"
other:

It is a state of being he feels

It is a friendship that requires no

beyond

words!

It

is

"a

in which friends are gathered

state

of

into each

"the least distractions are disheartening, the least
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constraint is unbearable." (558)

The presence of a stranger

restrains the feeling of this state.
Two hours passed between us in this immobility of
ecstacy, a thousand times sweeter than the cold
repose of the Gods of Epicurus. (558)
This is at least the second time that Rousseau has
compared the pleasures of his sort of friendship to the
pleasures of Epicurean philosophers who were known to value
friendship

above

all

else.

Even

Rousseau's

brand

of

friendship is categorically different from anything that
went before.

It is a communion of souls, but not within the

bosom or brotherhood of any religion or philosophy.

It is

as if Rousseau embodied that anomaly of the secular mystic—
whatever that might mean.12
The happiness of the individual and the happiness of
the human species are different and,
exclusive goals.
microcosm,

in

the

it seems, mutually

This is demonstrated,
discussion

of

or revealed,

Julie's

theories

in
of

education which follow more or less immediately upon SaintPreux 's description of the happiness of the three of them in
a garden even more sublime than that of Epicurus.
Beyond the constitution that is common to the
species each person brings at birth a particular

12A1 s o , these "two hours" of communion of souls might
relate to the two hours Saint-Preux spent in Elysium and to
the one hour spent talking with Julie after their lovemaking. These times involved one, two, and three persons,
respectively; and they were each decidedly heightened
experiences for Saint-Preux— three different experiences of
happiness, we are tempted to conclude.
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temperament which determines his genius and his
character, and it is not a question of changing
or constraining it, but of forming and perfecting
it. (563)
Furthermore,
everyone

there

fits;

necessarily.

is

there

"a universal
are

no

system"

faulty

or

into which

errant

souls

"Every man has his place assigned in the best

order of things; it is a question of finding that place and
not perverting that order." (563)

This sounds a little like

Plato's Myth of the Metals, and, sure enough, two pages over
Plato is explicitly cited for the insight that knowledge and
philosophy "can do no more than draw out from a human soul
what nature had placed there." (565)
Wolmar steps in to elaborate on this Platonic notion of
education

(Saint-Preux is relating these theories as if

Julie and Wolmar agreed on everything.).

Referring to two

dogs of the same litter, which were raised the same, but
which act so differently, Wolmar concludes:
The sole difference in temperaments produced in
them [the difference] in character, just as the
sole difference in the interior organization
produces in us [the difference] in intelligence
(esprits). (565)
In order to change a mind or spirit, it is necessary to
change the interior organization of the person;
change a character,
temperament.

(566)

and to

it would be necessary to change the
Reason must be a major element of

temperament, because it is reason "that makes character come
out and gives it its veritable form." (566)

And each person
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is an individual;

education must address itself to the

particularities of each individual.

"One man is made to

carry human knowledge to its furthermost point; to another
it is fatal to know how to read." (566)
All this seems simple enough:

Nature gives certain

latent characters and talents; it is for the educator to
bring them out.
the Metals

However, our allusion to Plato's Myth of

becomes more problematically

operative when

Wolmar (and Julie?) begin distinguishing between education
for country life and education for city life.

Men destined

for the simplicity of country life have no need, in order to
be happy, of developing their faculties, and their talents
are like legally non-exploitable gold mines.
requires otherwise:

But city life

All talents must be developed for

diverse and more complex chores— for the survival of the
individual!

But the main point is this:

villager regards the

species;

Education of the

whereas education of the

urbanite regards the individual.

What Rousseau does not

have his characters conclude here is that, in the country,
the happiness of the individual and of the species coincide;
whereas,

in the city, the individual flourishes and the

species dies.

In a sense, the type of person one might

become depends less on naturally constituent metals as on
the accident of place of birth (for not all talented country
boys make it to the city).

One begins to wonder about the

"universal system" wherein all works for the best, where
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everyone has a place and will find it, if only nan would
follow nature.
tautological:

The

argument begins to sound

Nature

is perfect;

if something is not

perfect, it is not nature, but man-made.
might be this:

somewhat

Another conclusion

If there is a "universal system," it does

not seem to be one, necessarily, of individual happiness.
Whatever the case, Rousseau is aware that a right education
(something unnatural but done naturally) is dependent on so
many contingencies that "wisdom depends much on happiness."
(585)

This seems to make happiness dependent, at least to

a great extent, on contingencies.

The element of chance,

regardless of Rousseau's use of the notion of Providence,
plays a large role in the pursuit of happiness.
An

earlier

mention

"matinee a l'anglaise."

of

mysticism

sprung

from

the

In Letter V, Saint-Preux formally

discusses the subject within the context of religion—
specifically,
Julie.

the unbelief of Wolmar and the belief of

We shall deal briefly with the latter, since it

addresses Rousseau's ongoing pursuit of happiness.

Saint-

Preux claims that one might say that nothing of this earth
is sufficient to fulfill Julie's need to love; and that this
excess of sensibility, by which she is devoured, is forced
to

return

to

its

source.

Comparing

Saint

Theresa

unfavorably with Julie, he writes that Julie's heart is
truly inexhaustible, that neither love nor friendship could
consume it, that it looks to the only Being worthy of it.
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What is singular about Julie is that the more devout she is
the less she believes herself to be, and "she complains of
feeling within herself an arid soul which does not know how
to love God." (590)
It is no use, she often says, the heart attaches
itself only by the mediation of the senses or of
the imagination which represents them, and the
means of seeing or imagining the immensity of the
great Being! When I wish to raise myself to him,
I do not know where I am; perceiving no rapport
between him and me, I do not know how to reach
him; I no longer see nor sense anything, I find
myself in a sort of nothingness, and if I dared
judge others according to myself, I would fear
that ecstacies of the mystics not come less from
a full heart than from an empty brain. (590)
Julie continues by saying that, in order to rescue herself
from the phantoms of a reason which leads her astray, she
substitutes a crude cult which is within her reach for those
sublime contemplations which surpass her faculties.
Regretfully, I lower divine majesty; I interpose
between it and myself sensual objects; not being
able to contemplate it in its essence, I
contemplate it at least in its works, I love it
in its good works; but whatever approach I take,
in the place of pure love that it demands, I have
only an interested acknowledgement to offer.
(590-91)
Saint-Preux

steps

in to

draw

account of her religiosity:

conclusions

from

Julie's

"It is thus that everything

becomes sentiment in a sensitive heart . . .

if the God of

the universe escapes her weak eyes, she sees everywhere the
common father of men." (591)
Before the novel ends, Julie will confess to a sort of
world weariness,

which seems to relate to both

failed
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religious aspirations as well as to (the related) failed
romantic passions, for just as romantic love seems to be
metaphoric for knowledge of the divine13, so desire for
knowledge of the divine seems here a metaphor for the
frustrations of the inherent impossibilities of a fullyfulfilled romantic passion.14

If happiness depends either

on apperception of the infinite or on the satisfaction of a
passion for absolute union, then there is no happiness here
below for Julie.

Perhaps, there is simply no happiness here

below.
But what of the happiness of country life?

As was

stated above, these last few letters deal intermittently
with the happiness of the species and the happiness of the
individual.

They are two almost equally impossible chores,

given the present developed state of the species and the
mere nature of what would be a conscious and non-alienated
human.

This is not to deny that, as we saw in Chapter 2,

Rousseau,

especially in the Reveries. expresses that he

found for himself, finally, some form of happiness— even if
it involved the absence of all other human beings

(or,

should we say, required the absence of all other humans?).
It does seem to mean that the species can only achieve a

13Cf. the more Platonic-erotic passages of Part I of the
novel.
14This impossibility relates to the very nature of the
passion myth itself.
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very tenuous happiness
increased

unhappiness)

(or a slowdown
and

that

in the rate of

Julie's

elaborate

and

seemingly paradigmatic life proved an inadequate means to
earthly happiness.
It was

during

the

first

of

their

discussions of

religion that Saint-Preux envisioned the most formidable
obstacle to any "guilty desire" which he might still harbor
for Julie:

"She was surrounded by the supreme majesty;

incessantly I saw God between her and me . . . my heart was
purged by the fire of her Zeal, and I shared her virtue."
(593)

The first obvious obstacle to their love had been

Julie's

father; this last (?) obstacle— God— may also be

said to be her Father.

This is the novelist's way of

absolutizing the physical separation of the lovers, while
allowing

a friendship of

spiritual

communion.

We

are

returned to the sort of dualistic Platonism that permeated
Part I, but now they are, one might say, soul friends as
opposed to soul lovers (Julie had, we might remember, asked
Saint-Preux to be the "lover" of her soul.).

While a "veil

of sadness" covered the union between Julie and Wolmar,
because

of

his

disbelief,

Julie

could

still

converse

sympathetically in tete-a-tetes about religion with her
former lover.

He has, in fact, by necessity, become the

lover of her soul.
him happy?

But does this state of the affair make
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In Letter VII, from Saint-Preux to Bomston, the grape
harvest becomes the setting— a celebration that returns one
to "the time of the patriarchs" (603) and, as the Pleiade
editors express it,
the evocation of an Edenic community where beings
live in an atmosphere of celebration, joy, love
which possesses something of the sacred.”
It

is

within

the

context

of

the

harvest

that

the

reconciliation between Saint-Preux and the Baron (Julie's
father) is announced by the novelist.

Wolmar's second test

of Saint-Preux was whether he would embrace Julie's father;
he did,

and as a curious Editor's Footnote,

quoting an

uncollected letter where Julie quotes Wolmar, says:

"From

that instant, I counted on him totally." (605)
It is only too ironic that just four pages further on,
Saint-Preux, while listening with Claire and Julie to the
peasants singing old familiar ballads, falls into a lover's
melancholic revery.
Casting my eyes on [Claire and Julie] and
recalling distant times, a shiver takes hold of
me, an unbearable weight suddenly falls on my
heart, and leaves me with a deadly impression
that I cannot undo with impunity. (609)
This might be a foreshadowing of the customarily accepted
foreshadowing of Julie's death (i.e., Saint-Preux's veil
dream; see below), but it is also an indication that he (and
Julie, for she blushes at the sound of the singing) is not

15OC II 602, n. 2.
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fully in control of his imagination; he has not, as Wolmar's
theory of the cure requires, replaced old memories with new
and harmless ones.

And,

as if to weave perfectly the

questions of private and public happiness (or lack of it),
Saint-Preux ends the letter with an echo of Rousseau's test
of happiness.
Everyone drinks to the health of the victor
[judged to have done the most work at harvest]
and goes to bed, content with a day passed in
work, gaiety, innocence, and [content] not to be
sorry to recommence the next day, and the day
after, and for one's whole life. (611)
Ostensibly, there is both public and private happiness
in Letter VII, unified seemingly by the fact that SaintPreux

"truly

felt himself

in the country"

happiness seems at least possible.

(602)

where

If this is so, what is

the import of Saint-Preux's "deadly impression"?

Could it

not be a premonition that there will be no happiness either
for Julie or for him?

And the seemingly happy peasants sing

their way into another happy tomorrow.
romantic frustrations because 1)

They do not have

their masters work to

prevent them from germinating and 2)
developed imaginations (or talents).

they do not have
It seems that only

persons autocratically controlled have a chance at anything
that might be called public happiness.

(Of course, this is

before the offered solution of On the Social Contract.)
It should be clear enough by now that on the success of
the "cure" of Saint-Preux and Julie hinges the symbolic
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possibility of the reconstitution of fallen (or degenerate)
humankind for a happy social as well as private life.
protagonists
civilization1

are
It

something
is

in

like

the

Letter VIII

guinea
that

pigs

Our
of

Saint-Preux

proclaims to his benefactor Wolmar that the cure has been
successful M l

As critics, we must not only question whether

the cure has finally taken, but also why.

Whatever the

truth about the cure, Saint-Preux writes to Wolmar in almost
unexplainably hyperbolic fashion.
Enjoy, dear Wolmar, the fruit of your labor.
Accept homage from a purified heart, that, with
so much trouble, you have made worthy of being
offered to you.
Never has man undertaken what
you have undertaken, never has man attempted that
which you have achieved; never has a grateful and
sensitive soul felt what you have inspired in me.
[My soul] had lost its energy, its vigor, its
being; you returned it all to me. I was dead to
virtue as well as to happiness:
I owe you this
moral life into which I feel myself reborn.
Oh
my Benefactor! Oh my Father!
By giving myself
entirely to you, I can offer you, as if to God
himself, only the gifts that I have because of
you. (V,VIII,611)
Saint-Preux is telling Wolmar that he, Wolmar, has turned
back the march of progressively degenerative history by
curing Saint-Preux of his malady of the imagination and
memory.16 But how can Saint-Preux say what he does, and is
it true?
Saint-Preux confesses that, just eight days before, he
had thought all was lost— that the cure had failed.

But now

16We might be reminded by Saint-Preux's hyperbolic
language that for Nietzsche forgetfulness was a blessed art.
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he believes himself cured not only because Wolmar tells him
so, but because he, Saint-Preux, feels it.

He says that he

has written Claire the details of what he terms as his "last
fault."

(The fault is a dream of Julie's death, all to be

analyzed shortly.)
cure?

But what could have finally clinched the

It might be that, first, he has learned that the

education of the Wolmar children will be turned over to
him17, and, secondly, he realizes that his friend Bomston,
normally considered his superior, is in need of his wise
assistance.
Perhaps Saint-Preux's elevation to those two positions
of responsibility has given him an assurance of himself and
of the cure.

But, as we learn in Letter IX, the drastic

change in him is more enigmatic— mysterious even.

What is

it that cures Saint-Preux of his passion/love for Julie?
Though the answer will remain ambiguous within the context
of the novel, it might have been something as simple as the
love of another woman.

If that is, in fact, the case, it is

a sort of "elective affinity"— not the machinations of a
wise man— that finally resolves Saint-Preux's passion.
is the import of this seemingly trivial question:
cures nature,

or nature cures nature.

Such

Reason

Rousseau stands

l7In mentioning the education of the boys, Saint-Preux
points out the fundamental principle of Emile: "everything
consists in not spoiling the man of nature while
appropriating him to society." (612) He seems to say that
he was spoiled, but that Wolmar brought him back to
innocence, so to speak.
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between the Reason of the Enlightenment and the Romantic
Naturalism of the nineteenth century.

What we finally

discover to be Rousseau's answer for the cure of life
itself— Reason or Nature— within the context of The New
Heloise should help to crystalize a definition of Rousseau
himself.
In Letter IX to Claire, Saint-Preux relates the story
of his "last fault" and of his final cure.

He is travelling

with Lord Bomston to settle Bomston's affairs; they stay
over at Villeneuve and Saint-Preux finds himself in the same
hotel room as he occupied ten years before on the way to
Sion, when he was first separated from Julie.
uncommunicable impression seized him.

An almost

He instantly became

what he had been; his present unhappiness left him at first,
but then all of the intervening misery overcame him.
I delivered myself up, in the peace of innocence,
to the ecstacies of a shared love: I savored at
length the delicious feeling which made me live:
The sweet vapor of hope inebriated my heart.
(V, IX, 615)
He describes a sort of delirium,
Julie's death.

in which he envisions

If she were dead at least he would have the

hope of meeting up with her.

"But she lives; she is happy1

. . . she lives, and her life is my death, and her happiness
is my torture."

(615)

Thus far is Saint-Preux's waking

dream.
There is no question that his imagination and memory
have not been reconstituted.

In fact, he is living not only
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in the past, but also in an agonizing present.
he goes to sleep,

In any case,

and those "sad ideas" follow him and

transform into a most cruel dream.

He believed he saw

Julie's mother on her deathbed and Julie, mourning at her
side.

After some conversation, Julie is in the place of the

dying mother, but her face is covered by the ubiquitous
"veil."

Trying desperately to rip the veil away, Saint-

Preux hears Julie say to him, "The formidable veil covers
me,

no

hand

can

take

it

away,"

and,

drenched

in

perspiration, he wakes in tears.
This same dream recurred that night a second and a
third time, after which he gets up and eventually enters
Bomston's room with the prophetic words— "It is done,
shall see her no more." (617)

I

As soon as Bomston learned

the situation and the seriousness with which his friend took
it, he treated Saint-Preux to an old-fashioned blessing out:
"You merit neither my friendship nor my esteem. . . . if I
had given to my lackey a quarter of the attention that I
have given you,
nothing."

I would have made a man;

Saint-Preux agrees

that he

but you are

is nothing,

but

because he will never see Julie again— and Julie is the
source of all that is good in him.

Bomston smiled, embraced

Saint-Preux, and soon had them in a coach headed back to
Clarens,

so that Saint-Preux could see for himself that

Julie still lived.

"Do not come back," Bomston tells him
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when they have reached the gate of the estate, "until you
have torn that fatal veil in your brain." (617)
The next page or so must contain the key to the success
of

the

cure

to

Saint-Preux's

romantic

melancholy.

Approaching the house and worrying just how he is to present
himself, he heard the gate of Elysium open and close.

He

writes that he heard both her (he is writing to Claire) and
Julie talking; "without being able to distinguish a sole
word, I found in the sound of your voice I do not know what
of the languishing and the tender, that stirred my emotions,
and in [Julie's voice] an accent affectionate and sweet as
is ordinary with her, but peaceful and serene, which brought
me back to the present and which was the true awakening from
my dream."

(618)

Exactly what wakens him from his dream

(constituting the "cure"?) is still not totally clear.

It

would seem that it was the peaceful and serene voice of
Julie, but could it not also have been Claire's voice that
was described in a more charged and mysterious way?18
Whatever the truth of the matter, Saint-Preux declares
in the very next sentence that "Then and there I felt myself
so changed that I made fun of myself and my false alarms."
And, as a show of his new-found strength and confidence,
Saint-Preux decided not even to seek a look at Julie.

He

18Claire was confessing her love for Saint-Preux at this
very moment, but the reader and Claire are led to believe
that he heard not a word of it. (See OC II 618, n. 1)
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left having only heard her voice.

He felt entirely cured,

and he felt that he had finally raised "that veil by which
my reason was for a long time dazzled (offusquee)."

His

ecstacies are extinguished, and he sees and loves his duty—
a clear sign of his entry into the public realm.

"Both of

you," he expresses to Claire, "are dearer to me than ever;
but my heart no longer distinguishes one from the other and
does not separate the inseparables." (619)
Why does he no longer distinguish between Julie and
Claire?

What in fact lifted the veil?

What cured him, if

not the realization that he loved Claire as well as Julie,
or that they loved each other?

If this is the case, if love

of Julie is displaced, so to speak, by love of Claire, then
Wolmar's cure, which called for new memories of Julie to
replaced old memories of Julie, was not operative here;
instead, nature healed itself:

It replaced or at least

neutralized one love by another.

Of course, this is no

marvelously new revelation on lovesickness, but, within the
context of this philosophical novel, its importance cannot
be over-estimated,

for

it confirms Rousseau's faith in

nature over reason (Wolmar).
Because Saint-Preux might not understand the meaning of
events he himself lived through only means that the valid
interpretation is not in the mouth of any one character (not
even Julie's), but between the lines of the text.
Bloom

remarked

and

as

we

quoted

early

on,

As Allan

Rousseau's
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characters do not always possess a high degree of selfawareness.

That Saint-Preux never satisfactorily explains

just what it was that freed him leaves it to the reader to
discover within the text.

That our interpretation reaffirms

a long-standing naturalistic interpretation of Rousseau's
thought as a whole lends it a sort of validation that the
creative interpretation of one brief text could not give.
But the interpretation of this brief text also supports the
former

unfavorable

interpretation

rationalist philosophy and method.
depths,

of

Wolmar

and

his

The surface reflects the

as Leo Strauss has written,

and this

"romantic

novel"— paradoxically enough and as far as it can go— offers
a philosophical justification of what later became known as
Romanticism.

Love cannot be the object of any scientific

method, however astute; rather, it has its own laws, one of
which seems to be that only varying degrees of love or
despair can replace or neutralize love.

It is a sort of

naturalism, if not a strict romanticism.
In her response to Saint-Preux,

Claire

is equally

puzzled by what moved Saint-Preux to have such a disturbing
experience and by what all of a sudden reassured him.

"You

were alarmed without reason; you are reassured in like
manner."

(620)

In a post scriptum, Claire, covering all

possibilities, admonishes:
Moreover, if it is true that you heard nothing of
our conversation in the Elysium, it is all the
better for you; for you know that I am alert
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enough to see people before they perceive me, and
clever enough to nock the eavesdroppers. (621)
Perhaps Claire, like this interpreter, surmises that the
otherwise unexplainable recovery of Saint-Preux was due to
his overhearing Claire's profession of love for him.
Wolmar's reaction to Saint-Preux's dream is perfectly
rationalistic:

If you were not thinking of your former

lover during the day, you would not be dreaming of her at
night.

Not only does this understanding beg the question,

but Wolmar, though he mocks philosophical system builders in
this Letter XI, is a Newtonian through and through.
Saint-Preux writes not so much in reply to Wolmar as to
inform him of the pitiable state of Edouard's love life.

He

speaks of Bomston's misplaced love for Lauretta Pisana (a
reformed prostitute) in much the same way as one might have
been speaking of him, Saint-Preux, some eight years before.
Saint-Preux vows to save his noble friend from his own
passions.

We learn that Bomston's lovesickness is faked in

order to test Saint-Preux's resolve and maturity.

He passes

with flying colors— even to the point of an independence
that, for the first time in his life, allows him to keep a
secret from the two Cousins.

It is almost as if to say:

Saint-Preux is now a man; he is no longer in love.
The story of Saint-Preux and Claire does not formally
begin until Letter XII

(from Julie to Claire), in which

Julie not only urges Claire to marry Saint-Preux, but in
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which she indirectly divulges her own feelings for him.

She

tells Claire that she can discern that Claire has been
•'taken” by Saint-Preux; and she compares Claire's present
situation to hers of old. (V,XIII,625)

The danger of living

in close proximity (at Clarens, that is) to "a cherished
object" cannot be over-estimated.
It is my turn, now, my sweet friend, and I have
moreover the sad authority of experience to make
me listened to. Listen then to me while there is
still time, out of fear that after having passed
half of your life deploring my faults, you do not
pass the other half deploring yours. (628)
Returning to Claire's expressed preference for friendship
over love, Julie speaks to the heart of that position:
my

child,

the

soul has no sex;

distinguish them."

(629)

but

"No,

its affections do

Julie goes so far as to tell

Claire that Claire would have fallen in love with SaintPreux,

if Julie had not done so first.

And this newly

kindled love could well help cure her, says Julie!

(631)

But it must be avowed and openly acted upon, Julie presses.
Alluding to one of Saint-Preux's "speeches" from early in
Part I of the novel— the context of which was one of the
rare references to Heloise and Abelard— Julie insists that
"One must honor oneself in order to be honored; how can one
merit the respect of others without having any for oneself;
and where will she stop when the first step on the road to
vice is taken without fear?"

(632)

Yours is an upright

feeling, Julie tells Claire, that only needs to be declared
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to be made innocent.

"[IJs it shameful to marry him whom

you love or to love him without marrying him?"
It is toward the end of the letter that Julie defines
a situation which resembles one expressed by Saint-Preux
when he said he could no longer distinguish the inseparable
Cousins from each other.
Ah Cousin! how charming for me to reunite forever
two hearts so well made one for the other, and
which have merged for a long time in mine. May
they merge even more so, if it is possible; be no
longer but one for each other and for me. Yes,
my Claire, you will continue to be of service to
your friend by crowning your love, and I will be
surer of my own feelings when I will no longer be
able to distinguish them between you. (634)
At least two observations need to be made:

1)

Whereas we

hypothesized that it was Claire's love of Saint-Preux that
neutralized his passion for Julie, here Claire's love for
Saint-Preux— when seen under the prospect of marriage—
neutralizes Julie's love of him.

In neither case is the

memory tricked into falling out of love, as was Wolmar's
proposed cure for love; rather, in both cases, it is a third
party to the love that softens or, say, tames the love (It
might thus be said that Julie/Saint-Preux/Claire better
represent a true "menage a trois" than do the traditional
trinity of Julie/Saint-Preux/Wolmar.). 2)

It seems that it

is only in a menage a trois that the soul— and even its
affections— cannot be distinguished.

Saint-Preux said that

he could not distinguish Julie and Claire, and from that
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moment he was cured; Julie says that if Claire and SaintPreux marry,

she will not be able to distinguish them.

Asceticism does not seem to be Rousseau's road to Platonic
or spiritual love; it seems rather a sort of sublimation
made possible by a merged friendship in which passions are
diffused, rarefied, and elevated.
But, if Claire is not agreeable to marriage with SaintPreux, Julie proposes that "we cast away from ourselves this
dangerous main." (634)

The education of their children is

not as important as the virtue of their mothers.
but

professes

a

continuing

passion

for

controllable only by Claire's marriage to him.

Julie all

Saint-Preux,
And we learn

from a letter by Claire's young daughter Henriette that
Julie exits from the room where she has been writing the
subject letter, showing every evidence that she has been
crying.
So, we end Part V with Saint-Preux claiming to and
showing some signs of having been cured of his passion, and
with Julie breaking down into admission that Saint-Preux is
still for her "a dangerous man."

The former has found, and

the latter seeks, liberation through a sort of "menage a
trois."

It seems

to be a relationship existing somewhere

between the private intensity of romantic love and the
public sameness of citizenship.

Whatever the nature of the

cure, this "new Heloise" is not yet resigned to her convent
life.
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Part VI
Claire answers Julie's proposal of her, Claire's,
marriage to Saint-Preux by saying that, whereas friendship
is lavish,

love is miserly.

In other words,

she loves

Saint-Preux because he is Julie's friend.
I think that too close relations are always
perilous at the age where he and I were; but,
both of us with hearts full of the same object,
we would accustom ourselves so to placing it
between us that, unless we annihilated you, we
would no longer be able to make contact with each
other. (VI,II,640)
Claire does not share the ideal of the "menage a trois"
which requires a sort of merging of love and friendship.
For Claire, the champion of pure friendship,
Love wants to make all its progress by itself; it
does not like friendship to halve the road with
it.(641)
For Claire, old friends do not become new lovers.

But she

does confess, or rather recapitulates, to Julie how she felt
an attraction for Saint-Preux and how she admitted in the
Elysium the attachments that she felt being born within the
both of them.

But marriage to him?

Never!

For one, Claire is too independent and too far removed
from the yoke of marriage.

Besides,

she does not fear

having a bachelor Saint-Preux around Clarens as does Julie.
Also,

Claire cannot stand the idea of giving her first

husband a successor.

Add to these reasons the fact that it

is abhorrent to Claire to marry the former lover of her
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precious Julie and the catalogue of Claire's oppositions to
that marriage is complete.
What of the other half of this proposed marriage?
Saint-Preux

is

in

Italy

conducting himself with
lovesick boy.

and,

according

surety and not

at

to
all

Bomston,
like

a

But it is advice that Saint-Preux gives to

Bomston, who is embroiled with two women at the same time,
that relates as much to Saint-Preux as to his friend.

He

tells Bomston, "You were able to break one chain only with
another." (652)

Even though both of Bomston's women were

thought unworthy of him, and both of Saint-Preux's thought
worthy,

the

natural

process— call

it that

of

assisted

"elective affinities"— was the same in both cases for cures
of lovesickness.

Saint-Preux had learned from his haphazard

experience with Julie and Claire just how to cure Bomston.
Ironically, it was Saint-Preux who employed nature in the
service of reason (whereas, I contend, Wolmar's attempt at
the same thing failed).
Saint-Preux announces his definitive cure to Bomston
when he says to him that "The reign of love is past, that of
friendship begins." (653)
Bomston.

And he swears solemn loyalty to

Bomston says that such a zealous profession of

friendship made him forget both the Marquise and Laura.
Friendship replaced love,
replaced each other.

as affinities within love had

Bomston announces to Wolmar that

Saint-Preux is "truly cured" and ready to be returned to
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Clarens.

(Bomston seems to imply erroneously, I think, that

Wolmar is more than indirectly responsible for this cure.
In fact, in Wolmar's reply to Bomston, he has the pride (of
philosophy) to say to Bomston that he, Wolmar, did not need
Bomston's proof of Saint-Preux's cure,
Wolmar, had his own proof and 2)

because 1)

he,

"I believe I know him as

well as one man is able to know another." (656)

We should

never forget that, however astute Wolmar is in knowledge
through

intellection,

he

cannot

know

sensibilities— which is, of course,

by

means

of

his

the primary mode of

knowing for Rousseau and his progeny the romantics.)
In her first letter to Saint-Preux since Part III,
Julie begins with her considerations on how one is cured of
love:

"Great passions are smothered, rarely purified. . .

. The cause which makes one cease to love might be a vice,
[but?]

the

friendship
(VI,VI,664)
cure.

cause
no

that

less

changes

lively

a

could

tender
not

be

love

into

a

equivocal."

Julie is, within herself, negotiating her own

For Julie, even in the wake of extinguished love, the

senses survive and everywhere is the occasion of relapse.
She warns Saint-Preux in litany-like fashion of the dangers
that must be confronted (e.g.,

"Do you believe that the

monuments to be feared exist only at Meillerie?"), but she
sounds more and more like one hopelessly crying out to
herself, thinking that her task is to convince others.
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Confuting

(unawares?)

Wolmar's theory of the cure,

Julie expresses a fundament of later Romanticism:
Ahl you know only too well that a tender soul
interests the entire universe in its passion and
that, even after the cure, all the objects of
nature recall to us still that which we felt
before in seeing them. (667)
These dangers,

even— especially— romantic ones,

must be

neutralized if Julie and Saint-Preux are ever to be happy.
And it is,
world.19

of course,

a question of happiness in this

So she inches toward the issue of marriage to

Claire, which seems Julie's key to happiness, even if not
Saint-Preux's and Claire's.

She claims that,

Claire to him, she is giving herself.

in giving

She sees herself as

owing Saint-Preux an old debt, and Claire is offered as
payment.

In so doing, Julie "figures to reunite us without

danger."

(671)

The sweetest of sentiments will become

legitimate, and there will be no danger between them.
will

love

each

other

"perfectly"

and

truly

They

taste

of

friendship, love, and innocence (the latter of which seems
to be regained by this "menage a trois").

Julie's goal is

none other than "a happiness reserved, beginning with this
world, only for the friends of virtue." (671)
the same question:

It is always

The reconciliation of love and virtue,

19In Part I, the question was How to find happiness
within passionate love? In Parts II and III, it was How to
find happiness within a passionate love that cannot be
fulfilled? In Parts IV, V, and VI, the question is How to
find happiness in the wake of passionate love?
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of happiness and virtue.

To fulfill the demands of her

heart, Julie needs Saint-Preux; to fulfill the demands of
virtue, she needs Wolmar.
the

"menage

a

trois"

In short, for Julie to be happy,
must

succeed,

speaking, it is a "menage a quatre."

though,

strictly

Julie, in her attempts

to negotiate this marriage, is in (or sees herself to be in)
a fight for her emotional and spiritual life.
Saint-Preux begins his response to this letter from
Julie in an exuberant fashion, but stops himself as if to
say But do not worry and continues by saying "I feel well;
I am no longer the same, or you are no longer the same."
(674)

He tells her that his reason has returned to him, all

of which makes her even dearer to him.

He says that,

although he has stopped loving, the impressions from the
time of their romance are eternal and that he will ever be
"the friend of your person and the lover of your virtues,"
a peculiar merging of love and friendship in a most benign
fashion.

Opposing Wolmar's theory of displaced memories,

Saint-Preux writes that "The flower of my years will not
fade in my memory."

(675)

All of this seems

expression of a sort of ascetic courtly love.

like an

He says that,

although he no longer belongs to her, he has remained "under
her protection," as if she were his liege lady.

Whereas

this courtly disposition, with him a bachelor,

seems to

satisfy him (for he seems cured), whether or not it would
give Julie the peace of mind she needs remains dubious.
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Admitting that he has grown more sensitive to Claire's
charms,

Saint-Preux nonetheless compares, unfavorably of

course, what he feels for Claire to what he had felt for
Julie.

All that he can say for Claire is that she, along

with Julie, make up the entire female population for SaintPreux, for his long-suffering has made him forget the rest
of women.
effect:

He quotes Petrarch (alluding to Dante?) to the
"My career is finished in the middle of my years."

He is, of course, in the midst of his explanation of his
cure, of which he says that
misfortune/unhappiness took the place in my case
of force for the conquering of nature and the
triumph over temptations.
One has few desires
when suffering, and you have taught me to
extinguish them by resisting them.
A great
unhappy passion is a great means of wisdom. My
heart became,
so to speak, the expression
[organe] of all my needs; I do not have any when
it is tranquil. Leave it in peace, the one and
the other, and henceforth it is so for always.
(677)
There is no clearer expression of world weariness than
the above words of Saint-Preux, just as Julie will have a
similar pronouncement in Letter XI.

But, here, with Saint-

Preux' s response to the idea of marriage to Claire, Julie's
last

grasp

at

earthly

Everyone— Saint-Preux,

happiness
Claire,

themselves and in their lives.

seems

to

Wolmar— seems
Saint-Preux,

be

fading.

settled

in

seeming to

argue for his capability of sustaining a chaste courtly
love, says to Julie:

"the fires in which I burned have

purified me; there is no longer anything of the ordinary man
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in

me."

(678)

It

seems

that

Julie

alone

is

still

"unpurified" and subject to temptation.20
Like Claire, Saint-Preux catalogues his reasons for not
marrying.

From being a tender and grateful friend to

Claire, he would become "a vulgar husband"; Julie's presence
would dominate their marriage and, besides, he cannot bring
himself to break faith with Julie, even though circumstances
seem to allow it.

Admitting that his feeling of love for

Claire has helped him bear his love for Julie with less
pain, he ask that he not be shaken from the nothingness into
which he has fallen; "from fear that with the sentiment of
my existence I not rediscover that of my ills, and that a
violent state not reopen all my wounds."

(681)

Rather,

living "peacefully" among Julie and Claire is his idea of
contentment.
The irony of Saint-Preux's letter is that he chides
Julie for being overly cautious and fearful of what could
happen at Clarens, if he and Claire do not marry.

Whereas

he claims that he has no more battles to fight with himself
(682), he totally overlooks the possibility that Julie might
be in need of support.

And then he goes on to give her a

lesson in theology— one,

we might add, which is hardly

useful to a person in the grip of passionate love;

"[God]

gives us the reason to know what is good, the conscience to

^ h e situation of our couple is not unlike that of the
original Heloise and Abelard.
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love it, and the freedom to choose it."

(683)

Arguing

against the efficacy of prayer, he addresses another lesson
at Julie, a lesson that, like the last one, argues for man's
self-sufficiency, even if ultimately provided for by God:
"It is not

[God]

who changes us,

it is we who change

ourselves by raising ourselves up to Him."21 (684)

The

extension of the argument against the direct efficacy of
prayer might be taken as an argument against miracles and
against asceticism.
Whether or not Saint-Preux has intended it, his words
have told Julie that she can expect no help from him or
anyone else in overcoming her burdensome passion for him.
He seems to be describing the nature of the phenomenon,
there

included,

his

actual

inability

to

marry

Claire.

Julie's letter of reply will reflect her tacit reception of
that somber message.
Before his cure, Saint-Preux had been called a child by
Bomston; now, after his cure, he is so called by Julie:
"Your letter is like your life, sublime and cringing, full
of strength and puerilities.

My dear Philosopher, will you

never cease to be a child?" (687)

She insists that she was

not trying to lay down any laws for him, but was merely
trying to foresee any inconveniences they might encounter in
their life together at Clarens.

21This notion
Abelard.

of prayer

sounds

like that

of Peter
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She

goes

further

and

states

that

it

is

in

this

"delicatesse" that survives a true love, rather than in the
subtle distinctions of Wolmar, that they must look for the
reason of "this elevation of soul and of this interior
strength that we experience with each other." (688)

Julie

does not want to lose Saint-Preux because of what now looks
like a desperate and foolish attempt to marry Claire and
himself.

She even tries to bring him closer to her by

expressing openly that her husband does not understand "true
love."

She tells him that the last six months have been

"the sweetest of my life."
Then Julie enters into a paradoxical, but ultimately
despairing, picture of life:

She has everything around her-

-family and friends; her being is extended by all she has,
without being divided.

Everything seems perfect, but

my imagination no longer has anything to do, I
have nothing to desire; to feel and to enjoy are
the same thing for me; I live simultaneously in
all that I love, I am full of happiness and life:
0 death, come when you wish!
I no longer fear
you, I have lived, I wait for you, I have no more
new feelings to know, you have nothing more to
take from me. (689)
Julie also fears that the pleasure of living in the presence
of Saint-Preux will be spoiled and demeaned by a necessary
lack of openness.

She seems to underestimate the degree to

which the cure has worked on him and speaks to him of his
coming time of surety and even indifference (to her). (690)
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But she again invites him to Clarens, but this time as a
brother, in spite of what she perceives as the dangers.
Having discussed Saint-Preux and his state of mind,
Julie opens a discussion of herself.

This Letter VIII

represents a sort of "confessions" of Julie.
summoned death,

Having already

she here describes her life,

since her

marriage, as one— paradoxically— of erotic "happiness" only.
During the reign of the passions, they aid in
bearing the torments that they give; they keep
hope next to desire. As long as one desires, one
can do without being happy; one expects to become
so;
if happiness does not come, hope is
prolonged, and the spell of illusion lasts as
long as the passion which causes it. Thus, this
state is self-sufficient, and the anxiety that it
causes is a sort of enjoyment which supplements
reality. (693)
Alluding to her last world-weary speech, she concludes this
one:

"Misfortune to whoever has nothing more to desire!"

In a sense, happiness is always outsmarting itself, for "one
is happy only before being happy."

Completing this text,

which is the source for many nineteenth-century romantics22,
Julie seems to offer one of the keys for an understanding of
this novel which, we contend, is at least partially within
the tradition of the passion myth.
The country of chimeras is the only one in the
world worthy to be inhabited, and such is the
nothingness of human things that, except for the
Being existing by Himself, there is nothing
beautiful except that which is not. (693)

^OC II

693, n. 1.
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Julie defines the human being as the desiring creature.
(694)

To be unable to desire— to live without illusion— *is

the only unbearable privation of humankind.

"My friend, I

am too happy; happiness bores me."
This may well be the ultimate irony of the story:
Julie has all that life could possibly give her— among what
she would

take— and

ultimate fashion.

still

she

is not happy

after her

Could the marriage of Claire and Saint-

Preux have restored to her

life a renewal of illusive

passion that could have made life worthwhile? Whatever, she
says that she desires, but for nothing of this world.

For

lack of a love both noble and passionate enough, Julie looks
to Heaven.

Saint-Preux has, for all passionate purposes,

abandoned her.23
Perhaps the most meaningful conclusion for our purposes
to be drawn from the relative estrangement of Julie and
Saint-Preux is that passionate love and friendship cannot
exist between the same persons at the same time.

The

"menage a trois" proposed by Julie would have attempted to
preserve a sort of courtly love along with friendship.

It

“The disagreement between Saint-Preux and Julie over
the nature and power of prayer might be his way of
expressing to her that she must cure herself of lingering
lovesickness.
It seems, as we noted earlier, that the
nature of the passion is such that no one can directly
assist in its cure. It is Julie who quotes Wolmar to the
effect that prayer is the opium of the soul. Saint-Preux,
on the other hand, seems to view prayer as a sort of selffulfilling wish.
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is as if the elements changed their natures and effected the
election of affinities accordingly:

A friend does not

compound with a lover.24
Nonetheless,

Julie

closes

her

last

letter with

a

renewal of the invitation to come to Clarens, but, this
time,

with

the

intention

of

entering

into

a

sort

of

conspiracy of Christian example in order to convert Wolmar
from his disbelief.
If the project displeases you or frightens you,
listen to your conscience; it dictates your duty.
I have nothing more to say to you. (701)
One might say that, just as Julie has discovered that just
as

conversion

or

teaching

by

example

is

superior

to

philosophic discourse, Rousseau uses the heroes and heroines
of his novel to convert to a manner of expressing and
circumscribing relations of love.

Julie's project is a

Christian

one

one;

Rousseau's

is

of

moralistic

sentimentalism.
Julie's death is announced to Saint-Preux by Claire:
"It is done."

That note is followed by a long letter from

Wolmar, describing the last days and the death of Julie.

MThe
situation
is
somewhat
like
the
Elective
Affinities, a later novel by Goethe, in which, as writes
Irving Singer, The Nature of Love. Vol. II (Chicago:
University Press of Chicago), pp. 440-41: "Nature appears
as a deterministic mechanism that unites men and women as
if they were chemical elements bonded to one another
regardless of marital commitments that si.ek to keep them
apart...[NJatural destinies are not concerned about the
welfare of individuals."
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Though Wolmar, the would-be "living eye," gives a sober
account of the events, Julie's dying and death reflect an
assuaged Christian mythology or liturgy:

There is a Holy

Week; there is a Last Supper; and there is even the illusion
of a Resurrection.

Julie's dying days are surely meant by

Rousseau to teach or show the reader how to live, more so
than how to die.

She, we dare say, is the founding goddess

of a religion of love— on both the humanistic and divine
levels.

As Wolmar, the atheist, writes:

like any other:

"She did not live

no one that I know has died like her."

(VI,XI,704)
In brief, both her life and her death were exemplary.
Rousseau,

although in the world of the imagination,

is

competing with his beloved Plutarch, in the creation of a
heroine who will answer the needs of the times.

(Whether

Julie, with her form of benign and loving Christianity,
answers the needs of all times is questionable— that is, in
light of Rousseau's rejection in On the Social Contract of
Christianity as an appropriate civil religion.
Rousseau

felt

that

he

had

sufficiently

Perhaps

redirected

the

attention of Julie's religion to this world and therefore
made Christianity acceptable as a civil religion.)
Julie asked that they all have dinner in her room, and,
afterwards, the Minister arrives uninvited and unannounced.
Julie ends by giving religious instructions to the Minister,
but in a totally ingenuous manner.

One of the things she
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tells him is that she believes "The preparation for death is
a good life." (715)
undeniable
4

in

a

The Socratic ring of this statement is
traditional

Christian

environment

■

represented

by

the

Minister

who

believes

in

deathbed

salvation.
Julie speaks words of love and encouragement to each of
her friends and family,
thoughts of her.

putting them at peace in their

As she-says to them:

My happiness climbed by degrees to the highest
point; it could only fall. . . . Is a permanent
state made for man? No, when one has acquired
everything, it is necessary to lose. (726)
But she will not allow them to think that they are losing
her:
I am not leaving you, so to speak; I remain with
you; by leaving you all united, my spirit, my
heart dwells with you.
You will see me
incessantly among yourselves. . . . I was happy,
I am happy, I am going to be so: my happiness is
fixed, I snatch it from fortune; its only borders
are eternity. (727)
The posture of Julie is that of a spiritual leader who
is dying.

She speaks to them on the state of the soul

separated from the body and concludes that a pure spirit
could never communicate with a soul trapped in a body.25
The message is:

Do not expect me to communicate with you

after my death.

But a soul can return to earth in order to

know what others think and feel; this is done by immediate

“But God can make Himself felt by speaking to the
heart. (728)
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communication, somewhat like God's.

(However, it seems that

God's communications go both ways; those of separated souls
only one way.)
Then there is the discovery that one day's worth of
wine provisions had lasted five days.

The incident is not

made into a miracle, but no certain explanation is sought or
found.
of

It is hard to tell if such instances during the week

Julie's

death

demystifications.
operate

according

individual.

are

meant

to

be

mystifications

or

It would seem that their effects would
to

the

frame

of

reference

of

the

Nonetheless, the incident of Julie's supposed

resuscitation is doubtlessly a form of demystification,
brought

on

by

an

active

imagination

coupled

with

the

people's love of the marvelous. (736)
For hours the servants, all of whom were truly devoted
to Julie, believed that she had come back to life, so to
speak.

Finally, Claire places a veil of pearls over Julie's

face and dares anyone to lift it and look on the now
decomposing body.

In her own world,

Julie was a true

heroine of almost goddess-like proportions— to the extent
that her "people" would want to believe or think her capable
of resurrecting.
Julie's last words to her (former) lover Saint-Preux
are delivered to him, in the form of a letter of course, by
Wolmar.

She writes that Heaven prevented their reunion and

that the reunion was not good.

She says that she has lived
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under an illusion for a longtime, and that it dissolves only
when she no longer has need of it.
and I believed to be." (VI,XII,740)

"You believed me cured,
This illusion of being

cured was salutary, for it might well have kept Julie from
falling into the abyss,

as she says.

But the greatest

sentiment (or love) of her life wakes at the moment when
there is nothing to fear; it bears her up at the moment of
death.
Julie does not apologize for her feelings:
involuntary and cost nothing to her innocence.
can say:

they are

In fact, she

"Virtue is mine without a stain, and love is mine

without remorse."

(741)

At death— and only at death— is

Julie able to say that she has reconciled love and virtue.
But it was not without the help of illusion.26 It is death
that makes and saves this reconciliation from possible
dissolution.
Have I not lived enough for happiness and for
virtue? What of use remained for me to get from
life? By taking life from me Heaven takes from
me nothing that is regrettable, and seals my
honor. (741)
She feels that it is a good time for her to die and she
leaves joyfully.

She exhorts Saint-Preux to live, even in

his pain and loss, within the community that Julie defined.
"You lose of Julie only that which you lost long ago." (741)
She will only die when the last of them dies.

And she

26The value given here to illusion seems to disparage
Wolmar's rationalistic principle of complete openness.
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describes to him his duties and dispositions vis-a-vis
Claire, Wolmar, and her children.
The very last words of Julie are much like a swan song-the free expression of love in the face of death,
allowed only by death.

and

For one last moment, she allows

herself the luxury of talking to Saint-Preux as her lover.
She ends her life as she "began" it:
friend."

calling him "sweet

She fears that she is talking too much, when her

heart no longer has a disguise, but she concludes that she
has nothing to fear, because it is no longer herself who
speaks, for she is "already in the arms of death."27
Her last sentences begin with a sort of neo-Platonic
Christian expression of love and death, and end with a most
noble all-to-human gift of love.
When you see this letter, worms will be eating
the face of your lover, and her heart where you
will be no more. But would my soul exist without
you; without you what happiness would I taste?
No, I do not leave you, I am going to wait for
you. Virtue, which separated us on earth, will
unite us in our eternal stay.
I die in that
sweet expectation. Only too happy to buy at the
price of my life the right to love you forever
without remorse, and to say it to you one more
time. (743)
Julie's posthumous letter focuses much that has filled
the

novel:

its

experimentation

neo-Platonism,
with

triangular

its
and

courtly

love,

its

quartenary

love

relationships, its opposition of love and friendship.

It is

^In effect, then, her words become a sort of illusion.
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in death that Julie has found the key to the reconciliation
of love and virtue; only the dead and dying soul is totally
free to express love to whomever and to do it without loss
of honor.

Or should it be rephrased?— only he or she who is

dead to the world is free of the world and, thus, able to
love

and

remain

virtuous

at

the

same

time,

in

any

circumstances.
Julie's impending death allows her to express her love
(which, in fact, had been hidden from her by illusion, if
she was truthful in saying so).

I contend that it is only

a slight imaginative leap from Julie's last letter to the
realization that the chaste courtly love tradition, outlined
by Denis de Rougement,

offers Rousseau's answer to the

dilemma of love and virtue in a imperfect world of contrary
"elective affinities."
The novel actually ends with Claire inviting SaintPreux and his friend Bomston to settle at Clarens as Julie
had wished.

She speaks of Julie as of a saint (or goddess).

Come then, dear and respectable friends, come
reunite with all that remains of her.
Let's
reassemble all who were dear to her.
May her
spirit animate us; may her heart join all of
ours; let's live always in her sight. (744)
Julie was surely not a goddess for Rousseau, but, I think,
he put into her possession, so to speak, the key of how
eighteenth-century European men and women might learn to
manage their out-of-control love affairs.

One can say that

it involves primarily asceticism, but, perhaps, a better
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description would be sublimation; for courtly love does not
suppress the expression of love but rather gives it a
defined, directed, and circumscribed manner of celebration.
What Julie never attained, others may because of the Julie.
The "menage a trois" Julie/Saint-Preux/Wolmar did not
last (despite one glorious day in Elysium), because the love
couple (Julie and Saint-Preux) had no third party into which
to merge and sublimate their passion for the love object.28
That possibility was offered,
Claire

who

was

loved

by

at least Julie hoped,

both

Julie

and

by

Saint-Preux.

Unfortunately for Julie, Claire and Saint-Preux were not
sufficiently attracted

to each other

to overcome their

overwhelming attraction

for

Thechemistry was just

not

right;

unhappiness.

and

that

is the

Julie.
ironic

tragedy

of

Julie's

Such an arrangement would have been the basis

of a courtly love, which haunts the work from beginning to
end.
Our most general thesis is that Rousseau is concerned
primarily with individual and collective happiness— that he
is primarily a eudaemonistic moralist.

The subtle proposal,

as I see it, of something like a courtly love rubric of
addressing
affinities,

and

living

represents

public moralist.

with
the

the randomness
action

of

amorous

ofan individual and

It is a political act— by a political

28Theoretically, there seems no reason why a "menage a
trois" could not work.
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philosopher who sees his true concerns as those of the
individual soul.

CHAPTER 7
THE CONCLUSION
Rousseau's overarching objective was a contribution to
the happiness of humankind; the overarching obstacle to
happiness was seen as alienation or division of the soul
between nature and society, passion and virtue, happiness
and duty.

The Julie deals directly with this complex and

envisions a synthesis— at least for a limited subset of
human relationships.
happiness,

There is more than one morpheme of

according to Rousseau,

and there is no real

hierarchy among them.
As we saw in Chapter I, there is solitary happiness and
civic happiness,

not to mention the good Emile

solitary nor civic).

(neither

The Julie presents the guest of

happiness of the romantic couple, which ends— in Julie's
vision, at least— in a partial association or love triangle.
This is a form of existence between solitude and society.
Such an association is similar to the political in that
friendship is its existential foundation and, in that, it is
spiritually self-sufficient; but it is unlike the political
in that it is not materially self-sufficient.

It is not a

return to nature; it is a transcendence of it.
The intent of the Julie, then, is to explore whether or
not there can exist something like communal happiness— that
is, other than solitary happiness— within the confines and
horizon of love:

that is, beyond love of self.
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Clarens and

252

its

idyllic

community

is,

I think,

a metaphor

of the

spiritual self-sufficiency envisioned by Julie in the love
triangle, as opposed to Clarens being some sort of blueprint
for political well-being.
Love

and

happiness

are

inseparable

experiences throughout the Julie.

notions

and

From Part I, love is in

fact viewed as the means to happiness, and, though the type
of love as a means to happiness will change as the story
develops, the inseparable nature of the two never falls from
Julie's firmament.
friendship

and

And, from the beginning of the novel,

courtly

love

also

play

a

role:

the

friendship of Claire and Julie; and the very nick name given
Saint-Preux (Holy Knight)— not to mention the mock courtly
love games engaged in by Claire, Julie, and Saint-Preux.
A fascination with an elevated Platonic love is never
more evident than in Part I— when the lovers are actually in
physical contact.

Is it that even in the early stages of a

young romance Julie senses that "ordinary" love will never
satisfy her?

It will turn out that she needs a religious

love or at least a love nuanced with religious symbol (or
courtly love).

She will go to her death in the embrace of

both these types of love— expressing, I shall conclude, a
sacramentalizing of courtly love (not unlike what
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de

Rougement

describes1) .

Nonetheless,

de

Rougement's

contention that the Julie is a mere expression of the
passion myth is, it seems to me, inaccurate on two counts:
1)

Rousseau is dealing with much more than passionate love;

not only is he interested in friendship but also solitude
and philosophy and civic virtue and happiness in various
forms; 2)

de Rougement concludes his brief analysis of the

Julie by saying that "Rousseau ends with marriage— that is
to say, with the triumph of the world as sanctified by
Christianity;"

de

oversimplification:

Rougement

must

know

this

to

be

an

Does Julie not, so to speak, dissolve

her marriage at the moment of her death,

all the while

living a sort of Christian death-in-life?

It seems clear

that Rousseau did not believe the social institution of
marriage to be an effective resolution of the passion myth,
at least not for everyone (see Bomston and Saint-Preux's
discussion of marriage as it relates to the few and the
many).
It

seems

that

Rousseau— even

if

only

through

the

Italian poets like Petrarch— was definitely writing within
the tradition of Cortezia (courtly love) and the passion
myth.

In Parts II and III of the novel, themes of romantic

love per se begin to appear in sharp silhouette.
according to Saint-Preux, as if a "charm"

It is,

(read: potion)

^ e Rougement, Love. "Passion and Mysticism," pp. 14979.
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gave birth to their love, just as in the Tristan and Iseult
myth.

And it is in Part II that Saint-Preux abandons

philosophy for "chaste love and sublime friendship"— or,
otherwise expressed, for a sort of courtly love of Julie.
Forsaking philosophy is tantamount to abandoning the ideal
of solitude and god-like self-sufficiency.

The latter is

now comprised by the one soul of the two lovers, which makes
their current separation all the more— infinitely more—
trying.

The

lovers

are,

following

de

Rougement,

now

experiencing a longing of the infinite, or a longing unto
death.
But, in this ordeal, Claire reminds the lovers— and she
an outsider to love— that it appears to her that

love

requires such obstacles for its very survival; that left
alone with itself love would die.

Here Claire expresses the

essential dynamic of the passion myth.

And even Julie shows

an understanding of the needs of passionate love:

"in order

for us to love each other forever we must renounce each
other.

Let's forget all the rest and be the lover of my

soul." (364)

The only problem with this resolution is that

the passion myth is only resolved in death or, as we shall
see, in a death-in-rlife existence.

And it is our ultimate

contention that Rousseau was attempting to found, within the
context of the passion myth, a new or at least a newly
rediscovered
myth.

resolution to the infinite longing of the

That resolution would return to the courtly love of
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the Middle Ages, but to a courtly love that was, like de
Rougement's

(as

opposed

to

Singer's),

a

chaste

love.

Medieval courtly love begins to twine itself about the
allusive symbol of the Abbess Heloise in spiritual communion
with her former lover Abelard.
Let us remember that it is Claire, the non-lover, who
gives the most pertinent expression to the dynamic of love—
that is, the necessity of obstacles to its survival.

Could

this not be Rousseau's way of saying that you cannot love
and

know

love

at the

same time?

This

represents

an

extension of Saint-Preux's proposition that one cannot both
act and know at the same time.

But Saint-Preux also seemed

to say that one had to act in the world in order to know the
world.
posit

The only way out of this conundrum is, perhaps, to
two

sentiment.

kinds

of

knowledge:

by

intellect

and

by

It is as if, by knowing in one fashion, we

surrender our ability to know in the other.

In other words,

loving, like acting, is a form of knowledge:
non-self-reflective.

necessarily

Thus, both forms of knowledge— reason

and sentiment— are partially blind.

As with Rousseau in

general, we can never embrace the entire pie; it might be
phrased this way:
same time.

We cannot know and know we know at the

The heart of the paradox of Rousseau is akin to

the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle:

Man is not God, but,

of necessity, he acts as if he were; he pretends to both act
and know, when he cannot in deed do both.

Rousseau is the
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first romantic in that he finds,

in the experience of

writing, a synthesis of acting and knowing.

That Rousseau

championed sentimental knowledge should not blind us to the
fact he

is often viewed as a rationalist— and that he

appreciated

the

limits

and

horizons

of

each

form

of

knowledge.
Julie is "in love" and does not understand the nature
of that love nor its sacrifices;

so,

in Part III,

she

totally alienates herself from herself by attempting to be
everything to everyone and by becoming nothing!

She gives

herself totally to each force within her life:

to Saint-

Preux

(love);

to

her

father

(virtue);

to

Claire

(friendship). Then she enters into the ultimate compromise
for her:

marriage.

She alienates herself.

And it is after

her marriage that she asks Saint-Preux (again) to be the
lover of her soul.
courtly love!

What is this but a classic situation of

(but a chaste one).

If there

happiness within the confines of this novel,
found

in

a

form

of

courtly

love,

for

is to be
it must be

otherwise

the

resolution would mean adultery— something that would be too
damaging to the moral sensibilities of a Julie.
The novel in fact moves toward just such a resolution:
the

challenge

of

the

"cure"

of

lova

first

tests

by

friendship and then attempts to open up into cortezia.
Claire and Julie represent the ideal of friendship.

And it

is in the "matinee a l'englaise" that the gestalt of courtly
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love

is

first

configurations

configured.
change; Wolmar,

But,
we

as

we

know,

summarily

say

the
(when

compared with Claire as a member of the menage), is an
unworthy member of the triangle— for in him the other two
cannot lose and rarefy their love.

Though Saint-Preux

offers himself as the ideal courtly lover— friend of your
person and lover of your virtues— Julie knows that the
traditional configuration of the "menage a trois" holds the
answer, even if Wolmar is not a part of it.

It is in Part

V that the reader first intimates that the key, or at least
a key to happiness will be some sort of communion of souls—
more specifically, some sort of love triangle.

Some sort of

courtly love.
Julie has

her own "cure" for herself: itwould have

been a sort of

mystical love triangle, an even higher form

of love than she suffers.

Like Saint-Preux, Julie has found

her own cure, and it is so different from Wolmar's theories
of replacement of past memories with new memories.
Let

us

return

explicitly

to

our

primary

subject:

happiness.2 Rousseau's test for happiness is being able to
say:

"I will this moment to last forever."

This guideline

is enunciated both in the Julie and in the Reveries. Using

^h e "stress on morality...should not be allowed to
conceal the essential truth that in each phase of their
relationship the fundamental psychological purpose is the
same:
the attainment of happiness."
(Grimsley, JeanJacques. p. 136)
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it as a barometer of the various approaches to happiness in
the Julie yields consistent and insightful results.

The

happiness of the couple must be a form of courtly love; the
happiness of the individual must be solitude.

And whether

there is a happiness that extends beyond the "menage a
trois," whether there is a more extensive or political
happiness is not a question that Rousseau seems to answer in
the Julie.

The most that can be said is that, if there is

a political happiness portrayed in the Julie, it is that of
the peasants at the grape harvest.

It is the happiness of

children at a festival.

The "general will", as opposed to

a

belles

small

community

of

ames,

has

not

yet

been

introduced as a means of overcoming alienation.
But what of erotic love?
couple?

What of the love of the

One might guess that, theoretically, the couple

would will the moment of coitus to last forever, but it is
not a moment of stasis,
death.

rather a constant longing unto

At all other moments, the couple, one might say, is

willing or moving toward orgasm.
motion, not rest.

Their life is one of

There is no moment that they might will

to last forever, for there exists no moment of even relative
rest in their lives (in so far as they exist as a couple).
We saw in Part I where Julie intermittently made appeals to
a sort of Platonic love or union of souls, as if she, with
keener sensibilities than Saint-Preux, knew that happiness
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was more or something different from what they were acting
out.
But what of the happiness of the family— Julie's second
mode of life?

For a while it seems that family life in

rustic retreat holds the key to happiness, but Julie's world
weary speech in Part VI shatters the readers hold on that
illusion.

Again it is a question of motion and rest.

As

Julie explains, happiness of necessity climbs to a peak,
then declines.

She is, of course, speaking of her present

state of happiness:

the family which is naturally an

evolving or moving organism.

Children grow up and go away,

and that is what you will for them, but it is a hard reality
that robs you of your happiness.

In other words, there is

no moment in the life of the family that you will to last
forever.

After growing children, there are grandchildren,

and so on.

Thus,

erotic love and family life are both

states of motion— so inherently so that in them there is no
moment that will be willed into eternity.
Rousseau's criteria for happiness is another way of
demanding the eternal present, another way of asking man to
imitate God, another way of transcending motion.

It is the

romantic attempt to live the illusion of Zeno's paradox of
the arrow that never reaches its mark, that is in motion and
yet is not.
What forms of life— other than religious forms— pass
Rousseau's happiness test?

Within the confines of our

novel, we might say that both solitude and courtly love do.
It is in Part IV that Saint-Preux spends two hours alone in
Julie's garden Elysium.

He says that he preferred that two

hours to any time of his life.

In Part I he spoke of his

one hour after love-making with Julie as the preferred time
of his life; and in Part V he and Julie and Wolmar spent two
hours together in Elysium in a sort of communion of souls.
Though sublime, the two hours with Julie and Wolmar are not
said to rival his two hours of solitude in the same garden.
When he first entered Elysium, Saint-Preux expressed the
feeling

that

the

garden

wilderness or nature.
ideal

prime

wholeness?
This

is

nature

affected

him

like

primeval

Is art perfecting nature into an
not

the

closest

man

can

come

to

Does the solitary not recreate his own soul?

some

evidence that

Saint-Preux

is

at heart

a

solitary and that, after the end of the novel, he will not
join the others at Clarens.

This is, of course, conjecture,

but that the preferred moment of a man's life is two hours
of solitude, when he has loved such as Julie,
something

of

his

nature,

validation, for Rousseau, of

and

it

seems

to

does say
express

existence in solitude.

a

That

Saint-Preux prefers solitude to the communion of the "menage
a trois" seems to prefigure his refusal to wed Claire and
enter into a chaste triangle at the end of the story.

One

might say that, whereas Saint-Preux's deepest nature is of
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the solitary and Claire's is of the friend,

Julie's is

love.
And how does courtly love pass the test of happiness?
De Rougement claims that the lovers who are within the
passion myth actually wish for death, the only resolution to
their infinite longing.

Of course, the passion myth, and

the courtly love which contains it, are allegorical of a
religious longing, of a passion to unite with the Godhead,
of a wish to return to the Universe.

I agree with de

Rougement that Rousseau was well aware of the tradition of
the passion myth.
Abelard, who,

Of course, he was aware of Heloise and

according to de Rougement, were the first

historical instance of its being lived out.

But I do not

believe, as de Rougement seems to, that Rousseau was simply
another

chronicler

of

the

myth.

De

Rougement

finds

resolution to the passion of the myth, at least on a totally
personal

level,

in Christian marriage.

I contend that

Rousseau offered his own manner of resolution.
Again, it is a question of motion and rest.

Briefly,

Rousseau's answer to the passion was courtly love— chaste
courtly love:
to

the

a mode of life in which you love/desire/move

fullest,

duty/virtue/rest.

without

fear

of

falling

from

It is that synthesis of love and virtue

that Julie discovered that imminent death gave her.

Just as

the life of the solitary is changeless, the life of courtly
love is changeless, but also imaginative and free.

Because
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the imagination is restrained within a person by a death-inlife and by the chemistry of the "menage", it does not risk
setting the love in motion.
place

of

"nearness

to

Yes, death-in-life takes the
death"— thus

eliminating

the

accidental nature of the occurrence of happiness, as we find
in the Confessions and the Reveries, not to mention the
Julie.
It must be clear by now that Rousseau's medieval title
reflects more than a passing fad of the times,
experts think.
paradigm

of

medieval.

as some

Rather, it is an indication that Rousseau's
happiness

is

somehow

Christian,

somehow

He borrows from Christianity the metaphor of the

Christ who walks and loves in this world, but who is dead to
this world.

He who would save his life must first lose it.

Rousseau's lover is the Heloise of the convent, writing to
her lover Abelard, knowing full well he is no longer an
ordinary man, but loving him as before.

Abelard does not

seem to understand her abiding love; he silences her.

And,

after their second exchange of letters, there is no longer
a hint in her words of her love for him. (There are not a
few parallels between Saint-Preux and Abelard:
sexual power;

both somehow reject Heloise;

both lose

both have a

similar view of prayer; not to mention the more pedestrian
comparisons.)
Courtly love passes Rousseau's test of happiness
because, despite its being love (and thus motion), it wishes
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for or wills nothing that it is not already.
the element of stasis,

of rest?

But what adds

It is the triangular

relation that allows for the diffusion and rarefaction of
the loves.

In the case of Saint-Preux and Julie,

the

relationship of each to Claire would have been the element
of the transmutation of their love into something of both
motion and rest.

Such a communion of love might be compared

to monastic brotherhood or sisterhood, or to alchemy.
Of course, courtly love had existed centuries before
and,

if we are to believe de Rougement,

even within a

framework of chastity, but Rousseau secularized a Christian
modus vivendi for love by creating the "menage a trois" in
place of the convent.
Heloise:

So the New Heloise is very much an

She attempts to create her imaginary convent walls

with the mutual love of Claire and Saint-Preux, but finds
that

her

friends

are

ultimately

of

different

natures.

Claire is the friend; Saint-Preux is the solitary.
Courtly

love,

and

serving

one's

Lady,

together something that Kant has since broken:

puts

back

Rousseau

joins desire to duty in the pursuit of happiness.

With

Rousseau, duty and its fulfillment are still linked to the
sweetness of pleasure.

As Saint-Preux says, knowing that

one has done good is the sweetest of pleasures.

And, when

the duty is performed in the service of one's Lady, the
happiness is infinitely sweeter.

The incident of Saint-

Preux' s assisting the peasant couple Claude Anet and Fanchon
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seems a foreshadowing of the vassal serving his liege Lady.
Of course, at the time of the event (Part I), Saint-Preux is
still absorbed in erotic compulsions, but, even so, he takes
great pleasure— even happiness— in his knowledge of having
performed a good act, in spite of its interrupting plans for
a love tryst.
It is to some extent true that Rousseau was a moralist,
for he was surely always working on moral problems.

For

him, the best morality was the one that helped to make
people whole "again"— that turned them inward and away from
the fragmentation of the passions and the whims of the
imagination.
virtue

But the attempt to find the coincidence of

and happiness,

in the Julie or

elsewhere,

will

eventually raise the question of and the role of truth in
the

ordering

account,

of

society.

Virtue,

even

on

Rousseau's

is necessary to happiness, but the relation of

truth to virtue seems problematic in Rousseau.

It is the

unnaturalness in virtue that might prompt us to ask if
virtue can thus make us happy, for Rousseau strives for a
natural wholeness of the individual.

Or perhaps:

"The life

of virtue, for all its moral worth, neglects [the] living
element of absolute desire and imagination, and so fails to
satisfy all man's needs."3

Perhaps it is as simple as

saying that art must improve on nature— especially since

3Grimsley, Jean-Jacquesr p. 149.
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nature

is

not

malleable.

changeless,

but

rather

perfectible

and

It might be that, because of the malleability of

man, the project of constructing happiness for humankind can
legitimately take different forms.
In the Julie. Saint-Preux the tutor allows Beauty and
Goodness to preempt Truth;

or,

rather,

composition of Beauty and Goodness.

Truth becomes a

And, when speaking

individually and not as tutor, Saint-Preux states that, if
he penetrated the mysteries of the Universe, he believes his
situation

would

be

"blinding ecstacy."

less

"delicious"

than

the

existing

For all of his rationalism in his more

scientific works, Rousseau, at least in the Julie, humbles
philosophy and her devotees.

Saint-Preux blames philosophy

for his cowardice and other ills and renounces it for love
and friendship; Wolmar, on my unorthodox reading, is made to
appear almost retarded in his understanding of humankind.
Just

as

Saint-Preux

the

philosopher

broke,

Wolmar

the

philosopher is near conversion to Christianity as the novel
ends.

Can

we

say

that

such

critiques

of

philosophy

represent a philosophic teaching, or do we entertain the
possibility, as Roger D. Masters seems to believe, that such
portrayals
audience?

are

mere

fodder

for

the

"vulgar"

reading

Such questions always appear in considerations of

Rousseau, for he was, above almost all things, concerned
with his usefulness.

Once we accept the fact that Rousseau saw nothing wrong
with using art to arrive at naturalness, we can accept the
Julie as consistent with his other writings on happiness.
In the Confessions and the Reveries. we have seen the role
played by the nearness-to-death experience in the attainment
of happiness; and we have seen in the Reveries that Rousseau
embraces the happiness of the solitary.

Both notions are

validated by the Julie, but the novel deals with the love of
the couple (and the triangle) and, accordingly, adds to the
scaffolding

of happiness,

so to

speak.

Once

love

is

presented with an infinite obstacle, the love itself becomes
infinite for all practical purposes (or dies). Whereas the
solitary of the Reveries sees the infinite in a star-studded
sky over Lake Geneva, the lovers of the Julie could have
seen the infinite in the communion of the "menage a trois."
In a sense, Rousseau attempts to show how to create an
infinite world— not otherworldly, but infinite in its own
way and for its own purpose.

And the purpose of the action

of the novel, whether or not attained, is the happiness of
the lovers or, to expand the metaphor, the salvation of the
lovers.
Julie, it seems, is saved— but at the moment of death
and because of death.

Saint-Preux remains a question, for

he showed no little callousness to Julie's plight in her
struggle with her abiding love for him.
Saint-Preux

represent

a

sort

of

But both Julie and

cursed

elect

among
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humankind— those who fall into a grand and controlling love.
And such represents what I would call the loss of public
innocence, for some people never attain a private state of
existence, because they are born into and remain in the
public

world

of

sensibilities.

political

or

conventional

virtue

and

Falling into the private world of passionate

love is tantamount to a loss of innocence of public virtue
and habits.

As ironic as this might sound, it is surely

more common than a conscious loss of natural innocence.

The

entire role of Wolmar and Bomston is to bring Saint-Preux
back to his political self, where in fact it is nature or
natural processes that "cure" him.

And it is death, the

most natural process of all, that cures Julie.

Rousseau has

us consider just what portion of lovers ever come back to
the political, if any.

Of course, this is the reverse side

of the attempt to return to a quasi-natural wholeness.
of

whatever

kind

of

innocence

requires

some

Loss

form

of

convalescence or cure, for wholeness— an essential condition
for happiness— is not gained by accident, though access to
it might be.
There is a movement in the sentimental action of the
Julie, as our whole discussion and division of the novel
indicates; and Irving Singer has noted a Kierkegaardian-like
evolution to our story.
As if anticipating Kierkegaard, Rousseau presents
the lovers' progress throughout the novel as

stages of development that correspond to
aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious.

the

Saint-Preux begins as the representative of an
aesthetic attitude toward love— not promiscuous,
as Kierkegaard was later to define the aesthetic,
but responsive to its immediate goodness. Being
a person in love, he manifests sexual passion as
a source of vitality and human well-being. He
and Julie
move to a condition higher than the
aesthetic when they fall under the influence of
Wolmar, who represents the ethical stage. Julie
finally attains the highest level of human
development in her pantheistic love of nature.
This supplants the aesthetic and the ethical as
ultimate values without denying the ideality in
each.4
The above must be compared with another of Singer's broad
statements about the Julie;

"For Rousseau the principal

issue was to find the kind of relationship between men and
women that will

satisfy both love and virtue. The novel is

thus an attempt

to synthesize the two ideals,as opposed to

leaving

them

in

dialectical

conflict."5

For

me,

an

important point of the last statement is that it involves a
relationship or a mutual love, not an individual state of
synthetic resolution.
Also, there are two problems with the Kierkegaardian
analogy;

1)

It is more Saint-Preux than Julie who worships

Nature; in fact, I am not sure where to find supporting
texts for such a statement about Julie; and 2)

Whatever

happened to the relationship between men and women that will

4Irving Singer, The Nature of Love. Vol. II. pp. 308
09.
5Singer, p. 307.
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satisfy both love and virtue?

Does Julie leave Saint-Preux

behind in her synthetic rise to the religious?

If so, what

happens to love, as opposed to the two individuals?
I think that Singer asks the pertinent questions, but
I find slightly differing resolutions.

Yes, the lovers go

through three stages; call them Kierkegaardian for purposes
of orientation:

1)

The stage of engaged erotic love; the

aesthetic level; 2)

The stage of what we have called the

passion

erotic

myth— when

love,

because

of

external

obstacles, cannot be fulfilled; the moral stage which also
involves external control, whether physical or persuasive;
and 3)

The ideal or paradigmatic stage approached by Julie

and Saint-Preux— call it Courtly Love— but never achieved by
the couple; this stage is "religious" in that it involves
internal

(self-imposed and fully-embraced)

obstacles to

erotic love; in fact, the eros is given another object.
As stated above, my stages break down this way:
I; Parts II and III; and Parts IV, V, VI.

Part

Singer's stages

seem to divide the novel in two, but it remains unclear at
just what point Julie begins her elevation to the religious.
If you had three stages, it would seem that you needed three
divisions in which to act them out.

Also, Singer conducts

his analysis as if the personage of Julie foreshadows the
Rousseau of the Reveries.

I do not agree with such a

reading, if that is in fact the subtext of Singer's line of
analysis.

This is a novel of political import, even if it
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is not a political novel; the Reveries only incidently speak
to the political.

Perhaps, the Julie is about the highest

that we can attain in society, and the Reveries is about the
highest we can attain in solitude.

Looking at Rousseau's

personal life, the understatement would be that the Julie
was

a

failure;

and

that

the

Reveries. in process

at

Rousseau's death, were at least a partial success.
Where is the major political import of this work?

One

is tempted to say that the world weariness of Julie and
Saint-Preux seems to express the frustration and sadness of
the

political

philosopher

Rousseau— unable

to

find

a

solution or resolution of happiness that would be both
political and human.

But Rousseau is not only political

philosopher— he is poet and creator— and he attempts to be
good, beautiful, and true in his efforts to be salutary.
But make no mistake about it:

This is not a question of an

exoteric and an esoteric teaching.
world

Rather, because the

is perfectible or at least malleable,

created— and that includes humankind.

it can be

Rousseau offered in

his version of courtly love a new mode or order of living— a
new way of being happy.
Aristotle defined happiness as an activity of the soul
in conformity with virtue; as a form of self-restraint or
moderation.

The dominant modern view is that happiness is

the satisfaction of desires.

The salutary political nature

of the ancient view and the naturalism of the modern view
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are blended in Rousseau.

And what allows him to ride the

fence, so to speak, is his romantic belief in the power to
shape the world.

In courtly love,

both approaches to

happiness are being lived simultaneously:

a motion that is

rest; and a rest that is motion.
Rousseau, I think, was both rationalist and romantic—
and that duality constituted his self-proclaimed uniqueness.
He lived as a romantic and recapitulated that romanticism in
a form of rationalism.

His ability and willingness to allow

both these opposing natures to grow and prosper with himself
constitutes his greatness as well as his unique limitations.
Recognizing the claims of Antiquity,
abandon the promise of Modernity.

he

could not

That promise was and is

comprised of a true freedom and equality of soul.

And what

does that mean?

Within the context of my enquiry, it means

that

more

there

happiness.

is

than

one

way

(via)

to

even

There are at least three general ways:

1)

true
the

private or solitary way, which involves love of self; 2)
the public or civic way, which involves love of country; and
3) the tertiary way of romantic love.

The Julie explores

the last of these vitae.
Also, there is a tension in Plato/Aristotle of viewing
the

good

life

(happiness)

as

attainable

through

the

political and of viewing the good life as contemplative or
as a partial or complete retreat from the political.

All

one has to do is read On the social Contract and the
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Reveries in order to discover the same tension or polarity
in Rousseau.

Perhaps the major difference between these

ancients and Rousseau is that for Plato/Aristotle virtue was
natural

and

eternal

verities

were

contemplated;

Rousseau, virtue was artifice and varied,

for

and the grand

spectacle of Nature was the object of both mind and eye.

As

we have pointed out already, Rousseau's greatest affinity
with the ancients was, as with Machiavelli, through ancient
heroes, especially those of Plutarch.

And, as Rousseau

suggests in his Second Preface, the characters of the Julie
are heroes

of the human heart.

I would

suggest that

Rousseau elevates Plato so in the Julie, because he regards
him as a poet.
Just how we think happiness is attained will somewhat
determine what we expect of the political.

If we believe

that happiness is a state of mind (Stoicism), we are less
likely to demand much in the way of social programs; if we
believe happiness to be the maximization of pleasure over
pain

(Utilitarianism), we are more

likely to

institute

social programs aimed at the physical well-being of the
citizens.

But what do we do or demand when we believe

happiness to be found in solitude?

If we the citizens also

believe that man is radically solitary by nature, we would
probably try to create an over-powering and over-whelming
political community,

for the purpose of protecting the

integrity and preservation of the collective, the only way
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of

life that could ever preserve the

species.

If we

believed only a small fraction of people to be solitary, we
might even help support them in order to control them.
Cast in the most fundamental terms, the conflict that
Rousseau sees is between the truth of life and the life of
society.

Happiness might be found on each extreme and even

in the middle.

This middle way is that of the Julie— the

way of the partial association:

a private political union.

Let's say, the truth of life brings us to the raw impulses
of the solitary dreamer, and the life of society takes us to
a denaturing of life itself.

Only in the love of Julie's

vision— joined with virtue and friendship— is man allowed to
exist as fully natural and as fully virtuous.
there

synthesis,

retreat.

as

opposed

to

constant

Only here is
opposition

or

Of course, whether this love is suitable to more

than a slight proportion of humankind is another question.
But what do we do as citizens,
happiness

might

be

found

in

a

if we believe that

sort

of

courtly

love?

Socially and politically, it seems only salutary; it would
offer,

even in its superficial practice,

framework within which possibly
affairs might be calmed.

illicit

a channel and
and disrupting

But Rousseau knew that such

institutions were the work of the poet, not the political
philosopher, in spite of the fact that such institutions and
mores were of profound political import.
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In the Julie. Rousseau seems more Plutarch than Plato.
He is a creator of heroes, hopefully, to be imitated, but
heroes of love, not war or politics.

Rousseau writes in the

Second Preface that, within that little world of the novel,
he

is

teaching people

to

love humanity.

His

heroine

resembles a religious leader and founder, especially in her
death and its aftermath, but, as has been said often, hers
is a religion of love and humanity, though bolstered by a
naturalistic Christianity.
The

popularity

of

this

book

must

have

been

embarrassing to Rousseau the political philosopher.

almost
Whereas

the young Werther later provoked a rash of suicides, Julie
only and purely edified.

Such a creation is political in

spite of itself— in spite of its effect on what it intends
to transcend.
An understanding of Julie: or The New Heloise gives the
political philosopher a window of insight into Rousseau's
political aspirations for humankind.

Order was no longer

enough; it had to be order with some semblance of love,
happiness, and unity of soul.
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